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Abstract 
 
 
Information-intensive innovation: the changing role of the private firm in the research 
ecosystem through the study of biosensed data 
 
by 
 
Elaine M Sedenberg 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Information Management and Systems 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Associate Professor Deirdre Mulligan, Co-Chair 
 
Professor John Chuang, Co-Chair 
 
 
 
In a world instrumented with smart sensors and digital platforms, some of our most 
intimate and information-rich data are being collected and curated by private 
companies. The opportunities and risks derived from potential knowledge carried 
within these data streams are undeniable, and the clustering of data within the private 
sector is challenging traditional data infrastructures and sites of research. The role of 
private industry in research and development (R&D) has traditionally been limited—
especially for earlier stage research—given the high risk, long time horizons, and 
uncertain returns on investment. However, the information economy has changed the 
way Silicon Valley and other technology firms operate their business models, which has 
vast implications for how they respectively innovate. Information drives competitive 
advantage, and builds upon the emergence of technical infrastructure for collecting, 
storing, and analyzing data at scale.  
Basic research and fundamental inquiry are becoming important innovation 
priorities for private firms as they tailor algorithms and customize services, and these 
changes have vast implications for individual privacy and research ethics. This 
information-intensive innovation does not simply introduce a new source of inquiry, but 
a shift in the possibilities and boundaries that enable market edge.  
This shift challenges prior models of innovation and reconsiders the role of the 
private firm within the research ecosystem—specifically in regards to Vannevar Bush’s 
Linear Model of Innovation and Donald Stokes’ Quadrant Model of Scientific Research. 
This change builds upon prior Silicon Valley innovation models outlined by AnnaLee 
Saxenian and Henry Chesbrough, but features additional key changes within industry 
R&D that are fundamentally reshaping the role of the firm within the broader 
  
2 
ecosystem. No longer can industry be cast as a place only equipped to grapple 
exclusively with narrowly applied or developmental research and fully separated or 
agnostic from users, customers, and citizens. Within this information and data 
abundant moment, the research and innovation ecosystem is at an inflection point that 
could alter decades of embedded beliefs and assumptions on who should conduct 
research and ask fundamental questions, not to mention who should govern and grant 
access to research data.  
This dissertation studies how the rise of data science infrastructure is changing the 
role of the private firm in the R&D ecosystem. This research works to understand how 
and under what conditions private sector firms are synthesizing user data (e.g., those 
picked up by sensors) internally and/or shared externally for research purposes. This 
dissertation specifically looks at applications of biosensed data for the purposes of 
social, behavioral, health, or public health research applications. Qualitative and mixed 
methods are used to research, document, and examine practices within the lens of 
existing research and innovation theoretical models. Historical frameworks are used to 
ground and place contemporary practices within broader context.  
This research presents three illustrative cases on firms that exemplify different 
aspects of strategies to adapt to the competitive pressures of information-intensive 
innovation. The firms include the Lioness smart vibrator, Kinsa smart thermometer, 
and Basis smart watch. This research establishes findings about how firms are working 
within the data and R&D landscape, and how new pressures are influencing emerging 
practices and strategies. Findings outline the changing definitional boundaries of 
research within the private firm, and evolving practices relating to knowledge sharing 
and research activities within the firms. This analysis also points to two key emerging 
challenges firms are coping with, including how to grapple with research ethics and the 
rise of secrecy practices that may impede collaboration and research strategies implicit 
with information-intensive innovation.  
Research is occurring at many levels within firms, breaking free of any traditional 
laboratory structure. Collaborations and data sharing with academics for mutually 
beneficial research partnerships are taking new, largely unstructured forms to meet 
rising demand and interest. There is fresh demand for new kinds of collaboration 
models derived from data sharing needs, and exploration into ways of leveraging 
research practices and incorporating academic research curiosity across firms.  
This dissertation concludes by summarizing the importance of reconsidering the role 
of the firm within the broader R&D ecosystem and broader policy considerations. 
Programs to help structure and incentivize private/academic research collaborations 
should be considered, and private firms should consider their internal protocols and 
strategies in light of this changing landscape.  
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In a world instrumented with smart sensors and digital platforms,1 some of 
our most intimate and information-rich data are being collected and curated by 
private companies. Wearable sensors monitor our vital signs and physiological 
idiosyncrasies at second intervals. Smart in-home devices track our behaviors 
and daily rhythms in the hopes of making our lives more efficient and 
frictionless. Smart phones are ubiquitous parts of daily living, mediating our 
communications, meticulously charting our GPS location throughout the day, all 
while wrangling our other smart devices onto one centralized control panel. 
Individuals may choose to augment their lives with these devices to outfit our 
curiosities (and vulnerabilities) with data intended to help us inform our 
existence with algorithmically-assisted decision making. Even individuals who 
choose to opt-out or cannot otherwise afford these often expensive data 
augmentations are subject to the record-keeping surveillance from remote 
sensing technologies in public, or within contexts like school, work, or 
healthcare.2 The reach of these sensors and information flows are often 
inexorable to the average person, but the opportunities and risks derived from 
potential knowledge carried within these data streams are undeniable.  
The clustering of data within the private sector is challenging traditional data 
infrastructures and sites of research. The information economy has changed the 
way Silicon Valley and other technology firms operate their business models, 
which has vast implications for how they respectively innovate. Information 
drives competitive advantage, and builds upon the emergence of technical 
infrastructure for collecting, storing, and analyzing data at scale. Basic research 
and fundamental inquiry are becoming important innovation priorities for 
private firms as they tailor algorithms and customize services, and these changes 
have vast implications to individual privacy and research ethics. This 
information-intensive innovation does not simply introduce a new source of 
inquiry, but a shift in the possibilities and boundaries that enable market edge.  
1 A smart device is generally taken to mean a device that is capable of communication and/or 
computation. 
See for example, Silverio-Fernández, Manuel. "What Is a Smart Device? - a Conceptualisation within 
the Paradigm of the Internet of Things." Visualization in Engineering 6, no. 3 (2018). https://doi.org/
7-018-0063-8. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40327-018-0063-8.
2 See for example: Sedenberg, Elaine, Richmond Wong, and John Chuang. "A Window into the Soul: 
Biosensing in Public." In Surveillance, Privacy and Public Space: Routledge, 2018. https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1702.04235.pdf
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This shift challenges prior models of innovation and reconsiders the role of 
the private firm within the research ecosystem—specifically in regards to 
Vannevar Bush’s Linear Model of Innovation and Donald Stokes’ Quadrant 
Model of Scientific Research. This change builds upon prior Silicon Valley 
innovation models outlined by AnnaLee Saxenian and Henry Chesbrough, but 
features additional key changes within industry R&D that are fundamentally 
reshaping the role of the firm within the broader ecosystem. These changes are 
altering the placement of private industry within research activities, and 
implicating areas of research that extend far beyond the purview of traditional 
Silicon Valley software and hardware development. No longer can industry be 
cast as a place only equipped to grapple exclusively with narrowly applied or 
developmental research and fully separated or agnostic from users, customers, 
and citizens. Within this information and data abundant moment, the research 
and innovation ecosystem is at an inflection point that could alter decades of 
embedded beliefs and assumptions on who should conduct research and ask 
fundamental questions, not to mention who should govern and grant access to 
research data. 
This dissertation studies how the rise of data science infrastructure is 
changing the role of the private firm in the R&D ecosystem. This research works 
to understand how and under what conditions private sector firms are 
synthesizing user data (e.g., those picked up by sensors) internally and/or shared 
externally for research purposes. To narrow the scope of this work, this 
dissertation specifically looks at applications of biosensed data for the purposes 
of social, behavioral, health, or public health research applications.3 Qualitative 
and mixed methods are used to research, document, and examine practices 
within the lens of existing research and innovation theoretical models. Historical 
frameworks are used to ground and place contemporary practices within broader 
context. 
Chapter 2 explores the changing role of the private firm within the R&D 
ecosystem, by outlining the foundational theoretical models, emerging challenges 
to these models, and introduces the concept of “information-intensive 
innovation.” This chapter also defines key terms and concepts. Chapter 3 explains 
the scoping and approach of this project, and presents a documentation of the 
methodology used. The following Chapter 4 presents historical context on the 
role of industrial or private sector R&D, so that contemporary practices and 
tensions may be understood and grounded within their historical foundations. 
This enables the analysis to establish how practices and strategies within firms 
have changed and evolved over time. Chapter 5 presents three illustrative cases 
on firms that exemplify different aspects of strategies to adapt to the competitive 
3 Biosensed data means the physiological, kinesthetic data that can be used to infer health, wellness, 
or emotional/mental states of an individual or group of people. See for example, Sedenberg, Wong, and 
Chuang. "A Window into the Soul: Biosensing in Public."
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pressures of information-intensive innovation. The firms include the Lioness 
smart vibrator, Kinsa smart thermometer, and Basis smart watch. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents findings about how firms are working within the 
data and R&D landscape, and how new pressures are influencing emerging 
practices and strategies. This chapter outlines the changing definitional 
boundaries of research within the private firm, and evolving practices relating to 
knowledge sharing and research activities within the firms. This analysis also 
points to two key emerging challenges firms are coping with, including how to 
grapple with research ethics and the rise of secrecy practices that may impede 
collaboration and research strategies implicit with information-intensive 
innovation. The ways in which these activities are considered research and thus 
part of the larger research and knowledge sharing ecosystem are in flux, and 
pressuring the traditional models of research and innovation in new, profound 
ways. Research is occurring at many levels within firms, breaking free of any 
traditional laboratory structure. Collaborations and data sharing with academics 
for mutually beneficial research partnerships are taking new, largely 
unstructured forms to meet rising demand and interest. There is fresh demand 
for new kinds of collaboration models derived from data sharing needs, and 
exploration into ways of leveraging research practices and incorporating 
academic research curiosity across firms. 
Finally, this dissertation concludes in Chapter 7 by summarizing the 
importance of reconsidering the role of the firm within the broader R&D 
ecosystem and broader policy considerations. Programs to help structure and 
incentivize private/academic research collaborations should be considered, and 
private firms should consider their internal protocols and strategies in light of 
this changing landscape.
Moving into the future
In 1993 at a small conference at Harvard Business School, a group of research 
managers and innovation scholars began debating the future of private sector 
R&D.4 One of the foundational papers stated that there is “a broad restructuring 
of the US national R&D system that involves change in the funding and functions 
of industry, universities, and government agencies.”5 Just as in the 1990s, experts 
saw a shift in how private firms were investing and conducting research, this 
contemporary moment of palatial data and private platforms represents a shift: a 
4 These papers were then published in “Engines of Innovation.” 
Rosenbloom, Richard S., and William J. Spencer. Engines of Innovation : U.S. Industrial Research at 
the End of an Era. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
5 Mowery, David C., and David J. Teece. "Strategic Alliances and Industrial Research." Chap. 3 In 
Engines of Innovation : U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, edited by Richard S. Rosenbloom 
and William J. Spencer, p.111. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
4
shift in the power dynamics of who holds (or shares) the goldmines of data and 
how these companies invest in their innovation pursuits. As scholars and 
practitioners struggled to make sense of the changes that were happening as the 
computer and electronics industries accelerated, so too must now be a moment to 
reckon with the new underlying motives, challenges, opportunities, and 
consequences of the digital data age. 
The product of this dissertation research is intended for three key audiences: 
1) Federal, state, and non-governmental policymakers to assist with the 
allocation and strategy of R&D programs and dollars to help design a more 
robust system of public/private partnerships appropriate for 21st century data 
realities; 2) Private sector R&D managers, researchers, and/or startup founders 
to help them design their internal processes and external partnerships in a way 
that drives responsible innovation outcomes. 3) A final audience—academics in 
research ethics, internet/information/organizational studies, open data, 
information law and policy, and science and technology policy—are of course 
heavily cited and leaned upon to create this body of work. This research is 
intended to make reciprocal contributions to this amorphous field, in pursuit of 
making actionable findings and recommendations for the first two stakeholder 
groups. 
5Chapter 2
Changing role of the private firm in 
the R&D ecosystem: Foundational 
Theoretical Models, Emerging 
Challenges, and Key Concepts
Introduction
This chapter establishes a conceptual and theoretical groundwork for this 
dissertation study, and presents the emerging practices and trends within 
technology firms that challenge this foundation. The documentation and analysis 
of these emerging practices and trends form the basis for this empirical study. 
Beginning by presenting the accepted models of R&D and innovation, this section 
highlights the origins and consequential limitations of these theories—
particularly in regard to the role of the private firm. 
This chapter builds primarily on Vannevar Bush’s Linear Innovation Model 
and Donald Stokes’ Quadrant Model of Scientific Research (also known as 
Pasteur’s Quadrant). Then, in narrowing the focus from the broader theories of 
research and innovation, this chapter considers in Section II how these theories 
were modified (and qualified) to fit the unique qualities and emerging insights 
from Silicon Valley technology firms in the 1980s through early 2000s. This 
section presents academic literature that documents and theorizes key changes 
that occurred within the private technology innovation ecosystem, and how it 
influenced—but did not completely overturn—the theoretical models of the larger 
R&D ecosystem. In particular, this section focuses on the regional innovation 
models presented in AnnaLee Saxenian’s work, alongside the paradigm shift and 
rebuttal of linear innovation within Henry Chesbrough’s model of Open 
Innovation. The shifts and departures from Bush and Stokes’ models identified 
by Saxenian and Chesbrough's work provide the foundation for understanding 
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new developments and the changing role of the private firm in the R&D 
ecosystem.
The next section (III) then establishes the key aspects and driving forces of 
change within Silicon Valley and contemporary tech firms’ approach to research 
and development via a focus and emphasis on information-intensive innovation 
for competitive advantage. This section establishes the important forces and 
changes within the last decade (2010-present) which drive the development of 
this emerging model of innovation—elements which form the basis and findings 
for this empirical research. These changes within the context of existing research 
and innovation models highlight a subtle evolution that has shifted the 
relationship of the firm to the R&D ecosystem from late stage consumer to data 
generator, data controller, data consumer, and knowledge contributor. 
These changes rely and build upon innovation structures and practices 
identified by Saxenian and Chesbrough decades prior, that together created a 
Silicon Valley model of innovation. The changing innovation models in Silicon 
Valley documented by Saxenian and Chesbrough (collectively referred to here as 
the Silicon Valley models)6 altered the process of research and innovation within 
the private sector that were specific to the region and industry, but did not 
fundamentally challenge the role of the private sector within the overall research 
ecosystem. In contrast, this empirical research found changes within industry 
R&D that are fundamentally reshaping the broader ecosystem—altering the 
placement and role of private industry—and implicating areas of research that 
extend far beyond the purview of traditional Silicon Valley software and 
hardware development. 
Industry has been empowered to collect and generate troves of data that are 
uniquely valuable to fundamental research questions (as opposed to exclusively 
later stage applied inquiry) in that they generate a new window into the social, 
behavioral, and health aspects of our human existence and society. Yet these data 
repositories cannot be matched in scale and scope within a university lab. The 
private firm is changing in its centrality and importance as an access and data 
gatekeeper for the next wave of scientific questions, allowing corporations to 
shape which research questions will be asked and how they will be answered. 
These shifts are challenging governments’ traditional role as a primary source 
and repository of administrative data important to social science research 
(among other disciplines) by offering private sector alternatives for researchers 
(as well as governments) at faster speeds, increasing granularity, offering new 
opportunities for insights and points of collection, and at previously unmet sizes 
and scope. In addition to access to data, industry now controls massive 
infrastructures for behavioral experimentation which allow researchers provided 
6 The collective Silicon Valley model is being introduced here to reflect the broader contributions of 
scholars (in particular, Saxenian) who documented early shifts in innovation patterns, that largely 
contributed later (~2006) to the construction of the Open Innovation Paradigm. 
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access to test theories at lightning speed, often in parallel, and on extremely large 
populations. 
This new opportunity for what this research refers to as an “information-
intensive innovation” has fueled an industry driven on algorithmic developments 
that toys with our fundamental nature as social human beings. The profits of 
many of these firms turns on the use of algorithms and design to respond to and 
shape human behavior, thus the demand the ability to leverage fundamental 
research in entirely new ways through internal practices, outside partnerships, 
and data sharing. These changes have occurred both within traditional academic 
contexts as well as by forming new internal modalities that account for changing 
concepts of research within the private firm. In addition to challenging prior 
theories of research and innovation, these shifts present new challenges to 
individual privacy, research ethics, and are generating new questions about the 
management of these issues through corporate governance and risk management 
practices. This shift toward information-intensive innovation and the affordances 
this allows have fundamentally changed the role of the private firm within the 
research ecosystem in a way that demands new policy considerations and 
strategy adjustments.
This chapter concludes by discussing the accepted definitions of key concepts
—specifically focusing on research, innovation, and the relationship between 
knowledge and public goods. This section then considers how these concepts 
relate to each other, and how the terms will be used throughout this dissertation 
work to provide a foundation in which to explore these shifts within empirical 
evidence. 
Section I: Theoretical Models of R&D and 
Innovation
Theories and accepted models of R&D and innovation are important for policy 
decisions at organizational, national, and international scales. These theories 
move beyond mere conceptualizations and mental models of how ideas and 
inquiry coalesce into tangible technological progress. In the past these theories 
have served as the basis for forming agencies—and an entire extramural research 
funding system—from scratch. They have also justified federal investment and 
continuous budgets by arguing the importance and value of early stage research. 
These research and innovation models have influenced policies that fund, 
incentivize, and protect research activities around the world. University programs 
and private firm investments have been designed with tacit acceptance of the 
premises widely argued within these theories. These models and theories seek to 
optimize the market both for economic output and social gain through the 
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generation of knowledge and social benefits derived from developments in 
technology and science.
This section introduces some of the most widely known theories, and in 
particular focuses on Vannevar Bush’s linear model of innovation from 1945. This 
model not only brought the concept of “basic research” into the canon, but 
influenced post-war US science policy leading to an entire funding and belief 
system that endures today. Though there are many critiques and tweaks to the 
model, key assumptions (as illustrated at the end of this chapter in definitional 
concepts of research) are so deeply intertwined in beliefs about the process of 
research and innovation that they elude scrutiny. Updates to the model such as 
Donald Stokes’ “Pasteur’s Quadrant” provide important caveats that have also 
influenced policymaking, but each of these models relegate the role of the private 
firm to a later and applied stage—carving out room only for narrow caveats such 
as the Bell Labs model where basic research is isolated and known to be the 
exception but not the rule. This dissertation study and discussion focuses in 
particular on these theories in relation to to the private firm.
Bush’s Linear Model and Stokes’ Pasteur’s Quadrant are intended to sweep 
broadly across all areas of science advancement and technological advancement—
from medical research to electrical hardware. Later models focus on Silicon 
Valley’s technology development strategies and specialized innovation models 
within and in between firms—becoming a key subset and rebuff of these broader 
theories of innovation. 
Linear Innovation Model
Prior to WWII, there were tensions between “pure research” and applied 
industrial research, but philosophical and pragmatic differences were not 
encapsulated in theory to explain the larger innovation ecosystem. This is 
possibly in part because there were no centralized institutions or accepted models 
for pursuing research systematically across organizations and throughout the 
larger national system. A full discussion of this time and debates around “pure” 
research and industrial applications of research are explored in Chapter 4, which 
describes how historically research conducted within the boundaries of the 
private firm were seen as less virtuous than those conducted within the early 
university.
At the end of the war and at the request of President Roosevelt, science 
advisor and director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) Vannevar Bush7 prepared a memo: “Science the Endless Frontier.” 
7 Vannevar Bush was an electrical engineer and the first acting science advisor to President Roosevelt. 
Bush ostensibly set up WWII research infrastructure (including the national laboratory infrastructure), 
and paved the way for the government funding of basic research and post-war federal science agencies. 
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Within this memo, Bush constructs the first widely held theory of R&D in the 
“linear model of innovation” where he creates the term “basic research” from the 
concept of what had previously been called “fundamental” or “pure” research. He 
posits that innovation within research occurs sequentially in a linear fashion, 
progressing from basic to applied and what would later be appended as 
“development.”8 As with any theory—but in this case, particularly with the linear 
model of innovation—the politics and context of the post-war time played a vital 
role in the development and strategy embedded within. These forces and context 
are documented in detail in Chapter 4. 
The linear model posits that research occurs in distinct and sequential stages: 
basic and applied, with development and final processes/products as the eventual 
final steps. Basic research, Bush proclaims, is “performed without thought of 
practical ends. It results in general knowledge and an understanding of nature 
and its laws.”9  According to Bush, it is in the realm of “applied research” to 
completely answer the questions and problem at hand, whereas the basic 
research scientist may not care at all about the applications of their work. 
Bush goes further by stating that “basic research is the pacemaker of 
technological progress” and that all industrial progress will slow and grow 
increasingly weak without investment in basic research—investment that can 
only be obtained through government programs since it is wholly without 
practical application. Instead of calling for the government to provide basic 
research activity through the infrastructure of government national labs set up 
during WWII, Bush calls for universities and research centers to be the sites of 
research given the intellectual freedom afforded by these institutions and the 
ability to create a pipeline of scientists who can feed government and industry 
talent demands and idea pipelines. 
“Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the 
fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New products 
and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new principles and 
new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest 
realms of science.”10
The logic follows: without basic research, applied and developmental will 
whither away. This is the central core argument of the linear innovation model. 
8 It is important to note the memo itself contains the phrasing “research and development” though 
Bush spent the memo distinguishing the sequential and differential natures of basic and applied research. 
This linear model later was understood to imply that development, and even production and operations 
would follow in a linear fashion after the first two key phases.
9 Bush, Vannevar. Science the Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1945.
10 Bush, Vannevar. Science the Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1945.
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The model further argues that universities are the only place where basic 
research can thrive, and that without government investment basic research will 
fail to flourish.
The role of industry within the linear innovation model is clearly articulated. 
By its very nature, industry is constrained by its own desire to apply research to 
applied problems, which relegates it as a later consumer of basic research 
findings and generator of only applied goals. 
“Industry is generally inhibited by preconceived goals, by its own clearly defined 
standards, and by the constant pressure of commercial necessity. Satisfactory 
progress in basic science seldom occurs under conditions prevailing in the 
normal industrial laboratory. There are some notable exceptions, it is true, but 
even in such cases it is rarely possible to match the universities in respect to the 
freedom which is so important to scientific discovery.”11
At its essence, the linear model was a blueprint for governments and 
policymakers on how to support an R&D ecosystem. Bush’s memo and the linear 
model for innovation was an important strategic vision to capture the R&D 
government investment and innovative spirit committed during the war for 
peacetime efforts that aimed to benefited society. However, this classification and 
sequential model, which cast industry—an otherwise important employer and 
participant in wartime efforts (as described within Chapter 4)—as a late stage 
consumer and participant which has had lasting effects that constrain our 
collective thinking about industry’s potential and appropriate place in the 
research ecosystem. 
Critiques of the linear model
In the book “Cycles of Invention and Discovery,” Narayanamurti and 
Odumosu question the linear innovation model implicit with this three stage 
categorization. In part of questioning this canonical model, the authors bring 
attention to the “false dichotomy” often pontificated on by scholars, 
businesspeople, economists, and policymakers to distinguish the highly lauded 
basic or pure research from other stages.12 Narayanamurti and Odumosu argue 
that not only is the pursuit of R&D messy and likely to mix stages and fall out of 
order (e.g., applied to final product, or developmental leading to basic research 
line of inquiry)13 but it is a tussle that has no clear resolution given the 
11 Bush, Vannevar. Science the Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1945.
12 Venkatesh Narayanamurti and Toluwalogo Odumosu. Cycles of Invention and Discovery: 
Rethinking the Endless Frontier. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 2.
13 For example, Narayanamurti & Odumosu cite the example of James Watt’s invention of the steam 
engine before the study of the laws of thermodynamics, of which the functioning of the steam engine is 
entirely dependent. The creation of this technology led in part to the fundamental science research that 
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complicated, messy, and sometimes fraught process of innovation. They argue 
the exact classification of activities have no bearing on the potential impact of 
eventual discoveries or innovations. 
Within “Science, the Endless Frontier,”14 Bush was deliberate about 
distinguishing “basic” and “applied” research, which as Narayanamurti and 
Odumosu put it: “enshrining the idea of a fundamental divide in research 
between “basic” and “applied”—and setting the parameters of the debate around 
federal funding of science and technology through the rest of the 20th century and 
into the present.”15 The authors state that after the report was published, there 
was an increase in the terms’ use in the Congressional Record indicating its 
adoption within policymaking circles.16 
It is important to note that in the decades following “Science the Endless 
Frontier” many academics and policymakers have tweaked the model, but largely 
followed the linear model. For instance, within the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) report on scientific and technological 
activities, there were successive tweaks throughout the 60s and early 70s in what 
is known as the OECD’s Franscati Manual (named for the Italian town, Franscati, 
where the modification was developed in conference) where scholars began to 
reconsider basic research that was oriented toward a particular goal. This 
“oriented research” still fell within the broad linear structure, but simply 
accounted for basic research that was applied toward scientific, economic, or 
social interests.17 The divide between basic and applied research, and the 
respective roles of the university verses the private firm in conducting these 
modes of inquiry remained largely unquestioned or reconsidered.
Pasteur’s Quadrant 
In the late 1990s, Donald Stokes reconsidered the linear model (and 
successive modifications like the Franscati Manual) by questioning the strict 
casting of scientific motivation and purpose, using prior scientific advancements 
followed. Venkatesh Narayanamurti and Toluwalogo Odumosu. Cycles of Invention and Discovery: 
Rethinking the Endless Frontier. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 27.
14 Bush, Vannevar. Science the Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1945.
15 Venkatesh Narayanamurti and Toluwalogo Odumosu. Cycles of Invention and Discovery: 
Rethinking the Endless Frontier. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 3.
Also note that this was the report that popularized the terms basic and applied according to the 
authors.
16 Venkatesh Narayanamurti and Toluwalogo Odumosu. Cycles of Invention and Discovery: 
Rethinking the Endless Frontier. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 33.
17 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 64-66.
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and his firsthand knowledge managing university research programs to create a 
new approach to a theoretical framework. Stokes summarized, what was in his 
view, the two key aphorisms from Bush’s work:18
1) Basic Research is performed without thought of practical ends
2) Basic Research is the pacemaker of technological progress
Stokes critiques that the first aphorism asserts a belief that the creativity 
necessary within basic research “is lost if it is constrained by premature thought 
of practical use.”19 The second aphorism contains the belief that only with basic 
research will innovations in products and processes be possible, and that those 
who invest in the virtues of basic research will be able to capture the value in 
successive stages. From Stokes’ perspective the linear model—though laudable in 
its dynamism and staying power—casts aside alternative processes that had 
achieved past technological advances by creating the illusion of an orderly and 
prescriptive process. 
Drawing in particular from the 19th century French scientist Louis Pasteur’s 
career, Stokes presents evidence that fundamental and basic science research can 
be achieved through the use of applied questioning. Pasteur’s early advancements 
in understanding crystallography, fermentation, and pasteurization were all tied 
to applied questions, yet absolutely fundamental to many science disciplines. His 
work was often tied to industry needs and ends,20 and yet this tension did not 
contaminate his scientific intellectual pursuits or contributions.21
Stokes’ Quadrant Model of Scientific Research (more commonly referred to by 
the title of his book as Pasteur’s Quadrant, which also denotes the key difference 
between Stokes’ framework and the linear model) establishes a 2:2 grid, where 
the X axis includes research inspired by consideration of use, and the Y axis 
research inspired by a quest for fundamental understanding.22 
Within Stokes’ Pasteur’s Quadrant, the theoretical framework explicitly allows 
for industrial inspiration and application of fundamental research aims. Though 
there are cases Stokes presents of collaboration in pursuit of these aims, the 
framework still mostly casts industry as a consumer and largely absent 
participant—a stakeholder that provides the application questions for fodder and 
motivation for some research aims only.23 Stokes’ model allows for the location of 
fundamental researchers within industry, citing that the goals of the 
18 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 3.
19 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 3.
20 As noted in the historical chapter, this tie to industry is not unique during this time. (See Chapter 4)
21 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 8.
22 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 73.
23 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 15.
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organizational setting (and usually the segregation of particular labs and teams) 
matter more than the employer of the scientist.24 However, the model does not 
account for the role of industry beyond occasional employer, research question 
inspiration, or eventual practical application of knowledge. It was, in any case, an 
important theoretical critique of the linear model’s sequential and strict 
purposeless pursuits of basic research. 
Stokes considered this theoretical model in the late 1990s an important 
reconsideration of how research was funded, and opportunity to reexamine 
beliefs about how technological progress could be harnessed for economic and 
social gains. By widening the thinking to a more dynamic model that explicitly 
allowed for exceptions, and policy programs that operated wholly outside of the 
linear mode, Stokes saw an opportunity to more adeptly capture the potential of 
contemporary advancement. It is within this same spirit that this dissertation 
continues to reexamine the theoretical frameworks in light of contemporary 
practices, and reconsider the relegation of industry into narrowly applied and 
consumptive roles.  
Section II: Silicon Valley Specific Models of 
Innovations
The Linear Model of Innovation and Quadrant Model of Innovation were 
intended to apply across research disciplines and industries, creating theoretical 
models of research and innovation that could guide organizational and national 
strategy. However, beginning in the 1980s with Silicon Valley, unique innovation 
models began emerging within and in-between firms specific to both the region 
and larger tech industry. The development of computer hardware and 
semiconductors, though rooted in fundamental physics and chemistry, began 
their own innovation patterns that fueled not only a region, but an entire industry 
and global competition. These changes throughout the 1980s, 90s, and early 
2000s were remarkable in that they reshaped how technology firms pursued 
research25—forming new collaborative models and relationship to others outside 
of the firm. These changes were captured in the work of AnnaLee Saxenian, most 
specifically within Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128. These changes challenged the broader innovation and 
organizational theories to form a series of key insights, and new conceptions of 
24 Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur's Quadrant : Basic Science and Technological Innovation. )Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 81.
25 Specifically focusing here on high-tech firms, not biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and agriculture 
style firms, for instance.
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innovation processes like the paradigm shift later noted by Henry Chesbrough 
called “Open Innovation.” By understanding the caveats specific to early Silicon 
Valley technology firms in their pursuit of rapid innovation and technological 
development, the contemporary and dynamic changes of current Silicon Valley 
technology firms can be better understood in their growing influence over 
existing models. Together, Saxenian and Chesbrough’s contributions will be 
loosely referred to as the Silicon Valley model, which has great influence over the 
emerging, revised model presented within this dissertation.
Silicon Valley as a region of specialized entrepreneurship became a key 
vanguard in developments that later echoed internationally through many 
different technology firms. Instead of the highly integrated firms that dominated 
mid-20th century firms, Silicon Valley entrepreneurial spirit called for 
decentralized and highly specialized services (e.g., legal expertise, contractors, 
suppliers, etc.) that existed outside of the firm and within the region.26 The 
networks of these boutique services and rapid small firm innovation broke down 
the previous barriers of large vertical and integrated firms, and developed a 
strong network of collective infrastructure and services catered to the highly 
specialized needs of the technological innovation.27 
Within this space, R&D models also became more decentralized and 
cooperative. Many firms dissolved their formal R&D departments (with notable 
exceptions like Xerox PARC), and relied instead on outside expertise from 
(particularly local) universities.28 Some firms like IBM espoused management 
styles that declared “everyone was an innovator” and therefore no one set of 
employees needed a special research designation.29 Further, the open and 
decentralized networks afforded rapid information and knowledge sharing 
between firms, which further challenged more structured research organizations 
and linear captures of applied research knowledge.
Additionally, international competition pressures to push semiconductor 
innovation—alongside the prohibitively high cost of machinery and materials—
pushed for cooperative research organizations that further brought research out 
of the university and corporate laboratories and into shared models of 
collaboration.30 A full and detailed analysis and discussion of particular research 
structures within technology firms, and between them in cooperative models is 
26 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. (Page 133)
27 See for example: Saxenian, AnnaLee. "The Origins and Dynamics of Production Networks in Silicon 
Valley." Research Policy 20 (1991): 423-37.
28 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. (Page 41; 138-139)
29 Armstrong, John. "Reinventing Research at IBM.” Chap. 5 In Engines of Innovation : U.S. 
Industrial Research at the End of an Era, edited by Richard S. Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer, 
p151-54. (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 152.
30 See, for example: Mowrey “Collaborative R&D: How Effective Is it?” 1998 
ES to grab other cites from history section
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found within Chapter 4. 
These changes began to strain the existing linear model, and required more 
system complexity than offered by Pasteur’s Quadrant in order to make effective 
national policy and organizational strategy. Chesbrough in 2003 introduced the 
concept of “open innovation” to begin encompassing the important key elements 
and shifts documented by scholars like Saxenian, Mowrey, Teece, Sturgeon, and 
Chandler (and others) within Silicon Valley and technology firms. Without these 
scholars, Chesbrough’s concept could not have been established. 
Chesbrough defines open innovation as “the use of purposive inflows and 
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets 
for external use of innovation, respectively. Open innovation is a paradigm that 
assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, 
and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance their 
technology.”31
Chesbrough’s open innovation paradigm shift builds upon the more dynamic 
model posed by Stokes in 1997, but adds specificity that arises from the study of 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurial firms. It asserts that R&D is an open system, rather 
than the increasingly closed and funneled nature embedded within the linear 
innovation model. Within the old model, basic research knowledge is translated 
into applied knowledge and developmental applications, the system becomes 
increasingly closed off and stove-piped into a single firm.32  Open source tools 
and methodologies prevalent in Silicon Valley and the technology industry 
strategy have increasingly opened the system and ushered in new intellectual 
property regimes.33 Open innovation is, in the words of Chesbrough, the 
“antithesis of the traditional vertical integration model where internal research 
and development activities lead to internally developed products that are then 
distributed by the firm.”34 Instead of the closed laboratories like Bell, open 
innovation espouses models that include spin off venture companies. This was a 
system that functioned to serve the drive to build out the computing and 
communications hardware and software for the industry and market.
The Open Innovation model sets an important precedence for the 
development of updated models, which account for innovation that occurs 
outside of the locus of the firm, with porous knowledge flows and innovation 
capture.35 The model also breaks from what Chesbrough calls the “man of genius” 
31 Henry William Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial 
Innovation." In Open Innovation : Researching a New Paradigm, eds. by Henry William Chesbrough, 
Wim Vanhaverbeke and Joel West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.
32 Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” 1-3.
33 There is a more nuanced discussion by Chesbrough and others in Open Innovation about how open 
source tools increase value creation but not value capture within firms. 
34 Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” 1.
35 Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” 8.
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model within the closed innovation paradigm,36 where firms invested in 
“brilliant” individuals and segmented research groups that had little business 
focus or designated path to market—thus relying on the theory behind the linear 
model of innovation that basic research would in time fuel economic gains for the 
investors. The open model of innovation additionally promotes the rapid 
spillover of knowledge from the firm, rather than the property capture of insight 
and knowledge from R&D activities.
These key insights into firm and regional behaviors were important to 
understand the contemporary information technology industry, but at the time 
largely did not challenge the returning impact to the entire R&D ecosystem. The 
new emerging model of information-intensive innovation, though focused within 
the next iteration of these technology firms, builds upon these key changes within 
Silicon Valley that have continued to place pressure on the generalized models of 
innovation from Section I. These collective forces call for a reconsideration of the 
role of the private firm within the R&D ecosystem and new frameworks that 
account for these fluctuations and tensions. Within the edited volume Open 
Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation, the 
Forward states that the phenomena of innovation is “too complex, dynamic, and 
adaptive to fit into a single conception for any extended period of time.”37 This 
dissertation builds upon these Silicon Valley models to account for key 
phenomena reshaping and now fundamentally altering research and innovation 
paradigms, thus building a new conception appropriate for contemporary 
practices. 
Section III: Emerging model of information-
intensive innovation
This section focuses on three key changes: the clustering of data within the 
private sector, challenges to traditional data infrastructures and sites of research, 
and emergence of basic research as an important innovation priority for private 
firms. These changes have implications to individual privacy, research ethics, and 
are generating new questions about the management of these issues through 
corporate governance and risk management practices. 
Silicon Valley and the larger tech industry has undergone additional 
transformations, as companies moved from hardware and software to digital 
platforms and services. Social media companies, search engines, smart devices,38 
36 Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” 8.
37 Chesbrough, "Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation,” viii.
38 The business model for smart devices varies, some are device purchase only whereas others also 
require a monthly service fee.
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and service platforms operate primarily under freemium models—collecting data 
to optimize their algorithms and services. Even more traditional online retailers 
use digital platforms to collect vast amounts of information about users. The 
information economy sells data about users, places advertisements, and charges 
for premium access to the platform or services—doing so in a context that thrives 
on categorization, individual tailoring, and subtle nudges. The information 
economy has changed the way Silicon Valley (as well as other technology) firms 
operate their business models, which has vast implications for how they 
respectively innovate. Information drives competitive advantage, and builds 
upon the emergence of technical infrastructure for collecting, storing, and 
analyzing data at scale. This infrastructure was enabled by advancements 
stemming from earlier Silicon Valley innovation models, but has opened up a 
new information-intensive innovation opportunities (and risks) that have flowed 
into virtually every corner of society that generates data—data most often 
captured by privately operated devices and platforms. 
The information economy is placing additional pressure on traditional data 
stewards like government institutions—entities who collected and curated data 
via surveys, records, and reports and had a civic obligation to make these data 
accessible for the public interest. The traditional sites of research, data collection, 
information access, and researcher employment are in deep transition and 
contested by stakeholders. Suddenly not only are the traditional role of actors in 
the research ecosystem in question, but research questions essential to driving 
information-intensive innovation have bled from almost strictly applied to more 
basic in nature. Even though some large firms like IBM, Microsoft, and Google 
have kept some forms of traditional industry laboratories that emphasize process 
and outputs consistent with academia, the research boundaries are contested and 
porous within many information-intensive firms given the demands of this 
developing sector. 
The transition of these data-rich portfolios to private entities introduces vital 
questions about obligations, mechanisms, and incentives to share, and 
consequences of use. These changes coincide with developments and limitations 
within academia as well, meaning these private sector changes are not happening 
in independent parallel. Rather, both changes have deep implications for the 
future of academic research. These data holdings are not easily replicable by 
traditional institutions and researchers, either in scale or blocked through 
proprietary devices and platforms. Academic researchers—medical, social, 
behavioral—rarely have large budgets to buy data or the time to negotiate and 
broker access to private data holdings. 
Information-intensive innovation does not simply introduce a new source of 
inquiry, but a shift in the possibilities and boundaries that enable market edge. 
These private data holdings offer intimate personal and community portraits that 
present deeper opportunities to explore fundamental questions relating to our 
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social and behavioral natures, not to mention health and wellness states, rather 
than limit itself to customer transactional data. No longer can industry be cast as 
a place only equipped to grapple exclusively with narrowly applied or 
developmental research and fully separated or agnostic from users, customers, 
and citizens. Through sensors and platforms the private sector has embedded 
themselves into nooks and crannies of our society. Within this information and 
data abundant moment, the research and innovation ecosystem is at an inflection 
point that could alter decades of embedded beliefs and assumptions on who 
should conduct research and ask fundamental questions, not to mention who 
should govern and grant access to research data. 
The ways in which these activities are considered research and thus part of the 
larger research and knowledge sharing ecosystem are in flux, and pressuring the 
traditional models of research and innovation in new, profound ways. Research is 
occurring at many levels within firms, breaking free of any traditional laboratory 
structure. Collaborations and data sharing with academics for mutually beneficial 
research partnerships are taking new unstructured forms to meet rising demand 
and interest. There is fresh demand for new kinds of collaboration models 
derived from data sharing needs, and exploration into ways of leveraging 
research practices and incorporating academic research curiosity across firms. 
Startups, though resource poor, are resourceful in leveraging outside expertise 
and experimenting with ways to develop their products and public image. Large 
firms have many resources and high profile instances of sharing data or running 
studies, but often with public pushback and limited extensibility.
However, some developments specific to the new information economy are 
developing strategies that run directly oppose to the open innovation model of 
past firms. Secrecy practices to protect trade secrets and information practices—
alongside proliferation of pervasive contracts like non-disclosure agreements and 
employee surveillance technologies—are rising hindrances to open innovation 
practices. Tensions between generating public benefits and positive images often 
oppose and complicate efforts to monetize information platforms. Many large 
and dominant firms are acquiring new innovators rather than spinning off new 
startups—locking up ideas and motivations to openly collaborate in walled 
gardens rich with resources but poor in knowledge transparency. 
These shifts present new challenges to individual privacy, research ethics, and 
are generating new questions about the management of these issues through 
corporate governance and risk management practices. Even though many studies 
can be designed to be passively observational (rather than experimental that 
often involves user manipulation) and aimed at groups of people rather than 
individuals, research poses risks for private entities. The process for research 
ethics within industry is largely unregulated,39 and research/data sharing 
39 With the exception of pharmaceutical, medical, and medical device studies which are regulated by 
the FDA.
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partnerships open companies up to public relations and legal risks, not to 
mention resource and administrative burdens. Even though these data may be 
used and studied within the private sector, sharing or partnering externally—even 
if conducted carefully to generate social benefit—is sometimes too risky to 
pursue. To add further complications, many PhD trained researchers are being 
employed within the private sector to analyze these data but in research-
ambiguous positions.40 
This dissertation seeks to document and understand these phenomena and 
developments, and better understand the essential ways these changes are 
challenging existing models of research and innovation and placing the private 
firm in a new position within the research ecosystem. This shift toward 
information-intensive innovation and the affordances this allows have 
fundamentally changed the role of the private firm within the research ecosystem 
in a way that demands new policy considerations and strategy adjustments. By 
understanding the ways in which research and innovation models and the role of 
the firm within them should be reconsidered, policy programs, funding, and firm 
strategy may be reevaluated for effectiveness and efficiency. 
Section IV: Key Concepts
“Research, like poetry, cannot be defined in a manner that is universally 
acceptable”41 
One of the challenges of studying a classification concept as broad and 
pervasive as “research” is that there is no singular or definitive definition of what 
constitutes a proper research activity—particularly in the context of the private 
sector. The boundaries of this activity are fuzzy—stemming from the mixture of 
disciplines, practices, methodologies, and contexts implicit with this direction of 
inquiry. As previously stated in Section I, Bush’s linear model introduced “basic” 
research (a departure from fundamental or pure terminology) into the lexicon, 
and established the entire linear conceptualization of which research definitions 
are structured. Stokes added dimension to this definitional debate derived from 
theory by questioning the limitations Bush offered in purpose of the activity. 
Additional Silicon Valley innovation models often do not offer crisp debates 
about what qualified as a research activity, tending to focus more in inputs and 
outputs to the technology development system. 
The debate over where particular activities, especially in the private sector, 
40 See for instance: Check Hayden, Erika. "Tech Titans Lure Life-Sciences Elite." Nature 526 (2015).
41 Furnas, CC. ed. 1948 Research in Industry: It’s Organization and management. New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Company.
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fit on this spectrum—or qualify as R&D42 at all—have been contested throughout 
the 20th century through today. These definitional concepts seek to specifically 
include those that relate to the boundaries offered within the context of private 
industry and the development of software and algorithms, given the focus of this 
dissertation study. Understanding the definitionally broad scope, as well as the 
ambiguity of these widely accepted definitions is a key concept for the rest of this 
dissertation. As will be explored in later chapters, one often repeated belief was 
that private sector activities did not classify as “research,” both because of the 
place where it was occurring (industry) and the applied nature of the activity. 
Though these boundaries and ambiguities are examined later, it is important to 
establish what is defined as research, R&D, innovation, and public goods since 
they are key definitional premises of this body of research.
Research and R&D
R&D, or research in general, is typically broken down into three general 
stages—the linear assumption embedded in this definitional structure is 
explicated above:
1) Basic research
2) Applied research
3) Developmental research
The purpose embedded within an activity relating to research is often used 
to define the activity, but as explored below the place or location of research is 
also used as a definitional guide. This is often based upon the assumption that 
particular places, such as industry, imply particular purpose and motivated ends.
The names of each of these stages may be slightly different depending on the 
source of the categorization, but usually most of the debate centers around basic/
applied research, and development is lumped as more amorphous final catchall 
for later stage research. For instance, the OECD called the third stage 
“experimental development” but still generally captures the final stage where new 
knowledge is tweaked and applied to new or existing products/processes.43 
The OECD defines R&D as “creative and systematic work undertaken in 
order to increase the stock of knowledge—including knowledge of humankind, 
culture and society—and to devise new applications of available knowledge.” The 
OECD includes a list of five core criteria necessary for an activity to qualify as 
R&D, including that it must be: novel, creative, uncertain, systematic, 
transferable and/or reproducible.
42 “Development” though often forgotten or cast as separate from research activities is an important 
part of late stage research, as per definitions below. 
43 OECD. Frascati Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and 
Experimental Development (2015). http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/Frascati-Manual.htm.
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Definitions of R&D also translate differently depending on who is 
conducting the work. These nuances are reflected in documentation provided by 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) that provides (or curates others’) 
definitions of research and development activities, which offers unique 
definitions for: A) International activities; B) Business/Private Sector; C) Federal 
or state governments; D) Academic or non-profit organizations.44 
The definition of business enterprise R&D, as stated in the federal Business 
R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) is as follows: 
“Research and development (R&D) comprise creative and systematic work 
undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge and to devise new 
applications of available knowledge. This includes a) activities aimed at acquiring 
new knowledge or understanding without specific immediate commercial 
applications or uses (basic research); b) activities aimed at solving a specific 
problem or meeting a specific commercial objective (applied research); and c) 
systematic work, drawing on research and practical experience and resulting in 
additional knowledge, which is directed to producing new products or processes 
or to improving existing products or processes (development).”
This definition goes on to state that R&D does not include market research 
or “seasonal or periodic design changes to existing products” which could be 
interpreted to exclude UX research to improve functionality, but leaves open to 
interpretation studies that seek to understand the behavior of users that could 
lead to new features or new products45/services. 
This definition does specify R&D activity in software to include within the 
classification of R&D: 
“-Software development or improvement activities that expand scientific or
technological knowledge
-Construction of new theories and algorithms in the field of computer science”
However, this statement is followed by exclusions that state software 
development that does not depend on a scientific or technological advance, such 
as the addition of new functionality to existing application programs, does not 
qualify as research under this definition. Even in this precise context of algorithm 
and platform development there are shades of gray depending on one’s 
interpretation of what qualifies as a “scientific or technological advance46.”
44 National Science Foundation. Definitions of Research and Development: An Annotated 
Compilation of Official Sources. (2018). https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/randdef/rd-definitions.pdf.
45 Especially as some large user platforms define many different features as “products.”
46 In the case of biosensing, the connection between instrumentation, biosignals, and user experiences 
probes science questions.
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There are other notable federal definitions of business R&D, such as the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB; focusing more on definitions as 
they related to financial accounting) and the US Code of Federal Regulations 
(focusing on the terms as they relate to R&D for tax filing purposes). The BRDIS 
is the most specific, particularly with regard to algorithms. 
Additionally, a common source for the definition of research is found in 
what is known as the Common Rule regulatory text (45 CFR 46), which mandates 
guidelines on the protection of human subjects in research. This definition ties 
research to the end goal of the activity, which is described as “designed to develop 
or contribute to generalizable knowledge” which is subsequently not defined47.
 
Evolution of industry specific definitions of R&D
Economist Richard R Nelson defined industrial R&D in relation to the place, 
laboratories, where it is carried out but linked a wide spectrum of activities 
relating to product innovation and development to R&D: “Research laboratories 
may be created and maintained by firms for many purposes, including 
development and application of quality control and other testing techniques, 
elimination of manufacturing troubles, and improvement of manufacturing 
methods, improvement of existing products and development of new uses for 
them, development of new products and processes, and scientific research to 
acquire knowledge enabling more effective work to be done to achieve the above 
purposes.”48 
Similarly and many years prior in 1985, Leonard Reich wrote that industrial 
research occurs in “industrial laboratories set apart from production facilities, 
staffed by people trained in science and advanced engineering who work toward 
deeper understandings of corporate-related science and technology, and who are 
organized and administered to keep them somewhat insulated from the 
immediate demands yet responsive to long-term company needs.”49
As explored in the previous section, these definitions hinge primarily on 
47 "Subpart a—Basic Hhs Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects." In 5 U.S.C. 301; 42 
U.S.C. 289(a); 42 U.S.C. 300v-1(b), 2017. https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?
gp=&SID=83cd09e1c0f5c6937cd9d7513160fc3f&pitd=20180719&n=pt45.1.46&r=PART&ty=HTML#se45
.1.46_1102.
"Revised Common Rule Regulatory Text." In 45 CFR 46, 2018. https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
regulations-and-policy/regulations/revised-common-rule-regulatory-text/index.html.
"Revised Common Rule Regulatory Text." In 45 CFR 46, 2018. https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
regulations-and-policy/regulations/revised-common-rule-regulatory-text/index.html.
48 Nelson, Richard R. "The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature." The Journal of 
Business, no. 32 (1959): 119.
49 Leonard S. Reich. The Making of American Industrial Research : Science and Business at Ge and 
Bell, 1876-1926. Studies in Economic History and Policy. (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3.
23
assumptions that activities driven by purposes generally fall along a sequential 
progression implicit in the linear model of innovation. 
Innovation
Other key terms like “innovation” come up a lot in this research and also 
have broad meanings, though likely with less political or organizational 
consequences. For the purposes of this work, “innovation” is taken to mean a new 
product, method, or idea. Narayanamurti and Odumosu sum up the relation 
between discovery and invention in relation to research and development quite 
succinctly: “Discovery is the creation of new knowledge and facts about the world, 
and Invention is the accumulation and creation of knowledge that results in a 
new tool, device, or process that accomplishes a particular or specific purpose. 
We understand innovation to encompass discovery, invention, research, and 
development, extending these into the products, processes, and ideas that result 
in significant improvements in the world.”50 
Put simply: research and development can be seen as an input, whereas 
innovation is the output.51 
The concept and model of “open innovation” as introduced by Hendry 
Chesbrough will be defined in the context of its theory below. 
Knowledge and the Public Good
In addition to understanding the definitions of research and innovation, it is 
important to understand these concepts in connection to data, knowledge 
generation, and contributions to the public good.
For the purposes of this dissertation, data are considered to be base 
observations, signals, sensor readings, statistics, or various other measurements 
that could either be quantitative or qualitative in nature. Data are assumed to 
have varying degrees of accuracy and precision. This concept is extensively 
discussed in the edited volume “‘Raw Data’ is an Oxymoron,” and also considers 
the inability to have truly naked or raw data due to larger socio-technical 
influence and bias.52 Information, another fuzzy concept even among proper 
“information scholars,” is considered loosely within this dissertation to be 
meaning or useful facts derived collectively from data and as a resolution from 
50 Venkatesh Narayanamurti and Toluwalogo Odumosu. Cycles of Invention and Discovery: 
Rethinking the Endless Frontier. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 11.
51 Credit for this succinct conceptualization belongs to Anno Saxenian.
52 Gitelman, Lisa. "Raw Data" Is an Oxymoron. Infrastructures Series. Cambridge, Massachusetts ; 
London, England: The MIT Press, 2013.
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uncertainty. A more in depth discussion of the concepts of information may be 
found in the writings of philosophers, communication, information, and STS 
scholars.53 Knowledge for the purposes of this work is taken to mean lessons, 
general truths, new information applied to problems, and validation (or 
repudiation) for existing theories.54 Knowledge generation was an important 
output and purpose for the definitions of research and development supplied 
above. 
Within economics, public goods are defined as something that is non-
excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning that an individual cannot be excluded 
from consumption or use, and that the use or consumption by one individual 
cannot decrease its availability to others. Canonical examples of a public good 
include public health, national security, knowledge, etc.55 Similarly, a common 
good is rivalrous (meaning consumption by one person decreases availability) but 
it is non-excludable, like natural resources. A club good or scarce good is the 
opposite of a common good where it is excludable but non-rivalrous, and are 
often considered to be things that require payment or membership to use. Private 
goods as the opposite to public goods are both excludable and rivalrous, and 
often refer to property. Social goods, though often lumped with the concept of a 
public good or common good, is most often used to loosely describe an action or 
product that widely benefits a large group of people or society, and does not 
necessarily imply its relation to being excludable or rivalrous. In many cases 
where social good is described as the common good, it refers to the philosophical 
“greater good” rather than the economic concept. Social goods often relate to 
corporate social responsibility which conveys a responsibility of a private 
company to use their business model to promote a greater wellbeing of 
employees, citizens, or societies. 
53 See, for example: 
Israel, David, and John Perry. "What Is Information?". In Information, Language and Cognition, 
edited by Philip P. Hanson: University of British Columbia Press, 1990.
Dretske, Fred I. Knowledge & the Flow of Information. 1st MIT Press ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1981.
Shannon, C.E. "A Mathematical Theory of Communication." Bell Systems Technical Journal July & 
October (Reprinted in ACM SIGMOBILE) 5, no. 1 (1948 (2001)): 3-55.
These citations are from the course syllabus Info 218 taught by Paul Duguid and Geoff Nunberg in 
2015.
54 The concepts here could be the subject of entire dissertations and should be considered definitive, 
but guiding frameworks for their use within this research.
55 There are of course ways to control and limit the flows of public good implementation, thus making 
them club goods or private goods. The challenges around controlling knowledge flows are discussed 
within this dissertation.
Stiglitz, J. "Knowledge as a Global Public Good." In Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in 
the 21st Century, edited by I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M.A. Stern. New York: The United Nations 
Development Programme, 1999.
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Research, and specifically the knowledge derived from research activities, is 
often thought of as a public good. When research creates new knowledge, this 
knowledge in theory cannot be contained in a way that excludes others from the 
benefits or rivalrous in a way that use by one person decreases availability by 
another. There are however legal and policy mechanisms that can turn the 
knowledge generated by research activities into a club good, where one can be 
excluded by form of payment for the tangible device that came out of this new 
knowledge (e.g., a medical device) and knowledge can be prevented from open 
consumption through access barriers or by being treated as an entirely private 
good if the information underlying the knowledge is kept private. The intellectual 
property system in the US created what has been referred to as the “grand 
bargain” where in exchange for offering patent protection for new knowledge 
(e.g., invention, device, application), inventors must publicly disclose their 
invention through the publishing of patent applications.56 Even when an 
individual or firm does not have a right to the invention and thus cannot make 
money off of knowledge contained within a patent, the idea and technology is 
able to be scrutinized and studied in public or academic discourse. Trade secrets 
and other mechanisms control the knowledge flows in ways that damage the 
public good externalities of research and consequential knowledge generation, 
and this is explored in depth in this dissertation study. 
This section established accepted definitions of research and development, 
innovation, and how research can be seen as the input to the system and 
innovation as a form of output. Additionally, this section presents some 
important concepts embedded in the use of the word data, as well as how data 
fuels research. Knowledge generation—which was utilized within the definitions 
of R&D—is an important goal and output of research activities, and contributes to 
the generation of public goods. Public good utility, as well as data donation and 
“data for good” programs will be referenced later in this dissertation, so having a 
basic understanding of how research, knowledge flows, and public goods are 
broadly defined and relate to each other will grow increasingly important 
throughout the rest of this dissertation’s chapters. 
56 Williams, Heidi L. "How Do Patents Affect Research Investments." HHS Public Access  (2017). 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5664960/pdf/nihms844246.pdf.
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Chapter 3
Research Approach, Methodology, 
and Researcher Positionality
“The social scientist is supposed to be able to help the public to understand any 
social problem (especially ideological ones) and the policy analyst to come up 
with clear recommendations on any issue, including the future of mankind or, at 
least, of American civilization.”57 
“Interviewing gives us access to the observations of others. Through interviewing 
we can learn about places we have not been and could not go and about settings 
in which we have not lived.”58 
Introduction
The aim of this research is to use social science methods to gather data 
about practices that may inform policymaking and discussions around the future 
of R&D and private sector data sharing in the United States.59 Data gathered 
throughout the course of this work are meant to examine activities and 
motivations (particularly those unavailable or otherwise invisible to the public), 
document these cases as a foundation for future work, contextualize current 
practices. In doing so this work aims to propose adjustments to existing research 
and innovation theory, specifically relating to how firms utilize user data 
internally and share externally for research purposes in the social, behavioral, 
health, and public health fields. By understanding the emerging themes including 
57 Orlans, Harold. "Developments in Government Policies toward Science and Technology." Chap. 9 
In Public Science Policy and Administration, (edited by Albert H. Rosenthal. Albuquerque, NM: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1973), 252.
58 Weiss, Robert Stuart. Learning from Strangers:The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview 
Studies (New York
Toronto: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 1.
59 Given the international reach of multinational corporations and the interconnected nature of the 
21st century, the implications of these findings likely have a wider reach but the policy implications and 
firm focus are on the United States.
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motivations, barriers, and forces (internal and external), this work seeks to 
provide insight into how these actors and stakeholders may impact the national 
research and data sharing ecosystem, and how policies at the corporate, state, 
and national level may influence and shape future outcomes.
This chapter first describes the primary research questions and details a 
purpose statement of this particular dissertation study. Next, this chapter situates 
this dissertation work within the qualitative methodological tradition, and 
provides a detailed rationale that led to the selection of this particular approach 
and the philosophical approach that underpins this strategy. Following this 
research approach, this chapter provides a detailed view of the study scoping, 
data collection and sources, and analysis process. This chapter then discusses 
ethical frameworks around handling interviews and interviewees, including how 
side conversations and background information are included (or not) in this 
dissertation work. Referencing back to the methodological tradition, this chapter 
also contains a positionality statement that reflects on the researcher (me) as an 
instrument and how my implicit participation and view in this research space 
shaped and influenced the data collected and presented within this dissertation. 
Finally this chapter describes the trustworthiness of the findings, credibility, and 
dependability. The methodology described here provides a description of all 
aspects relating to the study design, data collection, analysis, and a discussion of 
the limitations and tradeoffs of this research. 
Research Questions and Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to develop a grounded theory of 
how the rise of data science infrastructure is changing the role of the private firm 
in the R&D ecosystem, thus challenging existing research and innovation models. 
In order to construct a grounded theory, this work seeks to understand how (and 
under what conditions and forces) private firms make decisions and construct 
processes to use or designate user-generated data for research purposes relating 
to social, behavioral, health, and public health. These activities may be for 
internal use, or may be shared externally with outside parties for these research 
purposes. Based on these findings and understanding of stakeholder actions, 
broader implications to the national research and data sharing ecosystem may be 
better understood and recommendations to help shape this system will be 
proposed. In order to develop this grounded theory, there are two central 
research questions:
1) How and under what conditions are private sector firms synthesizing user data 
internally and/or sharing data externally for research activities relating to social, 
behavioral, health, and public health?
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2) How may the collective actions of these firms impact the national research and 
data sharing ecosystem, and what policy recommendations may be considered to 
shape these outcomes?
These two primary research questions are supplemented by the following sub-
questions,60 that although they could be considered implicit to the above 
questions, signal a particular attention to specific details:
A) What research activities (relating to social, behavioral, health, and public 
health) are being conducted within private firms on user-generated data, and 
how do practitioners decide what is considered a research activity? How does that 
distinction impact (if at all) the treatment of ethics, knowledge sharing, and 
allocation of resources?
B) What conditions (including access arrangements, incentives, barriers) enable 
or preclude private sector data sharing, information exchanges, or partnerships 
for research activities relating to social, behavioral, health, and public health? 
This includes academic researchers university and medical researchers, as well as 
government actors like public health researchers.
C) What policy interventions (if any) based on these findings shape research 
activities and their outcomes? This includes considerations relating to knowledge 
sharing/documentation, research ethics, long-term investments, public good 
programs, and partnerships. 
What emerged in the course of pursuing these research questions was that this 
work and theory of practice was ultimately addressing a larger, more 
fundamental yet comprehensive question: How is the rise of data science 
infrastructure changing the role of the private firm in the R&D ecosystem? 
Identifying this core question, and understanding its significance in 
contemporary policy and friction against past innovation models would not have 
been possible without first pursing the original questions of inquiry. This is 
exactly why grounded theory approaches are designed the way described below.
Research Approach: Philosophical groundings, 
methodological traditions, and analysis approach
60 The presentation of central research question and sub-questions follows the guidelines in Creswell.
Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design : Choosing among Five Approaches (3rd 
ed. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2013), 141
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Selecting a philosophical tradition
This dissertation work falls under mixed method research, with an 
interpretive framework based on pragmatism with some key elements of social 
constructivism as uncovered during the research process and incorporated as 
allowed by the pragmatist approach.61 The “philosophical assumptions”62 or 
“knowledge claims”63 imbue researchers with particular assumptions about how 
knowledge will be learned or uncovered during data collection.64 These research 
paradigms, worldviews, or philosophical groundings influence the chosen 
research design and methods used because they implicitly (or sometimes 
explicitly) make claims about the nature of reality with regard to knowledge 
shared from different perspectives (ontology), how researchers discern 
knowledge from participants (epistemology), and the values embedded in 
discerning this knowledge (axiology), and the process for collecting and 
understanding this knowledge (methodology).65
Pragmatism (as opposed to postpositivism, social constructivism, 
transformative frameworks, critical theory, etc.) focuses research on the 
outcomes and consequences of inquiry rather than antecedent conditions 
(postpositivism)66 or necessarily the experiences of individuals or groups (social 
61 See, for example:
Creswell, John W., and Vicki L. Plano Clark. Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. 
2nd ed. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2011.
Plano Clark, Vicki L., and John W. Creswell. The Mixed Methods Reader. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 2008.
 
Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design : Choosing among Five Approaches. 2nd 
ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. 
62 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design:Choosing among Five Approaches, 
16.
63 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End (2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2012), 28.
64 Note that Creswell and Bloomberg differ in some of their categorization of philosophical 
assumptions and differ in how to classify critical theory, for instance. Since this is not an approach used in 
this work, the discussion here should be sufficient for this dissertation work. 
65 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
20.
66 Postpositivism, often called the “scientific method,” approaches research questions with he belief 
that a set of laws and theories govern all actions/matter in the world, and thus these theories/laws can be 
tested and verified using hypotheses and often experiments. The term postpositivism is used instead of 
positivism because contemporary postpositivists do not constrain themselves to strict cause and effect, 
but instead recognize that all cause/effect is tied to a probability that it may or may not occur. (Creswell, 
John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 24.) This 
approach can be seen as reductionistic, particularly when applied to some social or organizational 
phenomena by some researchers, while others see it as a rigorous way to collect multiple levels of data 
collection and analysis. 
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constructivism).67 Social constructivism (also known as interpretivism) 
challenges the assumption embedded in postpositivism that all phenomena can 
be broken down into testable parts, and treats reality as a construct of social, 
cultural, and historical influences. This approach is value-bound rather than 
value-free,68 and assumes that individuals are influenced by their own personal 
experiences—making multiple meanings or truths possible. In social 
constructivism, the process under which the researcher interacts with is taken 
into account through their “position” to the subjects. Researchers seek to make 
sense of, or interpret, the meaning others hold about the world in this approach, 
and generate a theory or pattern of meaning to these processes and 
perspectives.69 
Critical theory70—which is often used within the interdisciplinary and cross 
disciplinary fields contributing to internet studies broadly—may also be referred 
to as advocacy, transformative frameworks, or participatory frameworks, and 
encompasses approaches that address marginalized or disenfranchised groups 
including feminist studies or queer theory. Pragmatism, on the other hand, is not 
committed to any one philosophical approach but approaches knowledge 
acquisition as a product of its context and conditions. Pragmatism is from the 
work of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey,71 and concerns itself primarily with the 
practical application and workable solutions to address a research problem.72
Pragmatism gives researchers the freedom to choose methods, techniques, 
and procedures for research that best fit the purposes and needs of the project, 
and allows the inquiry to naturally be open to social, historical, and political 
contexts. Within a pragmatic philosophic grounding, researchers allow for truth 
to be what it is at that point in time for subjects, and allow for the world to exist 
67 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
22-35.
68 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 28.
69 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
25.
70 Critical theorists approach their work with the belief that research is intertwined with politics and 
advocating action to address inequalities or injustices, and often involve approaches like participatory 
acton research. Creswell (Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among 
Five Approaches, 27) separates the philosophical approaches of transformative frameworks, postmodern 
perspectives, feminist theories, critical theory/critical race theory, queer theory, and disability theories 
but for this discussion these have been lumped together following Bloomberg. Bloomberg, Linda Dale, 
and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map from Beginning to End, 28.
71 These scholars were repeatedly cited in the methodological literature, and a brief overview of their 
contributions may be found here. 
"Pragmatism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
pragmatism/.
See, for instance, citations in Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative 
Dissertation : A Road Map from Beginning to End, 29.
72 Patton, Michael Quinn. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, 
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990.
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outside of an absolute unity of a single truth.73 Researchers using pragmatism as 
a worldview do not see the world in absolute unity, and thus look toward many 
approaches and data sources to produce results. A mixed methods approach that 
employs many ways to creatively study and understand a research problem from 
any available angle is best suited for research grounded in pragmatism (e.g., 
mixed qualitative approaches, or qualitative and quantitative studies). 
From the onset, this dissertation was rooted in a pragmatist worldview and 
philosophical approach. Pragmatism gave this dissertation research a problem-
centered, real world practice oriented approach, which from the beginning 
allowed for the research to accept the limitations of this line of inquiry and stay 
focused on policy-relevant findings. In talking to employees, I anticipated their 
answers (or ability to answer) would be heavily influenced by their corporate 
environments and culture, position within the company, length of time within the 
company, and any other numerous factors. These factors often of limited 
transparency to me as the researcher, and would be impossible to control for 
systematically across companies—pragmatism allows this research to 
acknowledge the presence of these complications and influences, account for 
them where possible, and allow for the uncertainty they may present while 
generating findings. Artifacts online represent narratives constructed by the 
firms which explicitly contain biased and curated content, and additional experts 
polled throughout the study may have their stances on issues shaped by current 
events especially since this dissertation examines contemporary phenomena. 
However, these concessions were necessary in order to gain access and address 
the research questions at the heart of this dissertation study. These constraining 
factors need to be acknowledged and taken into account by both me as the 
researcher, the audience of this study, and, where possible, incorporated into the 
findings.
Throughout the course of this dissertation, it became apparent my 
positionality as a white female researcher at UC Berkeley living in the San 
Francisco Bay Area (referred to in this dissertation as “the Bay Area”) was 
influencing my access and likely some of my responses from individuals. By living 
in the Bay Area and thus embedding myself in this particular cultural and 
historical moment, I not only was becoming a part of this story but my particular 
experiences, professional status, affiliations, and my appearance were all 
influencing my interactions with research subjects and companies. Because of 
this and my grounded theory approach (explained in the next subsection) that 
allowed me to pose research questions and inductively generate meaning from 
my data collected in the field, this dissertation lends itself to a pragmatic 
worldview. I also borrow heavily from the social constructivism/interpretivism 
given my sensitivity to how my own experiences living within the Bay Area 
73 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
28.
32
culture and experiences conducting this research were shaping my access and 
findings. Reflections on my positionality as a researcher may be found later 
within this chapter. 
Building off of this understanding of philosophical approach and the 
embedded assumptions made within this choice, several qualitative methods 
were selected to create a mixed methods74 approach to this dissertation 
research.75 Qualitative research is immersed in real world settings, and considers 
context when setting a research design and generating findings from data. The 
findings derived from qualitative research are emergent and evolving, and often 
move between induction and deduction. As expected from a qualitative research 
study, this dissertation includes the voices of participants/subjects, a reflection of 
the reflexivity of the researcher, a detailed and complex description of the 
problem and an interpretation of the context by the researcher, and a final 
contribution to the literature or a call for change.76 Where possible, this 
dissertation used economic data or survey data from separate studies to 
complement the qualitative work. 
Approach to inquiry and implications for analysis
Based on the philosophical groundings of the research, approach to the 
inquiry or qualitative research tradition or genre needs to be selected—this77 
dissertation based its approach off of grounded theory.78 Grounded theory 
enables a researcher to move beyond mere descriptive techniques by making it 
possible to generate a theory of process or action based on the views and 
practices of participants (interviewees).79 This theory is developed by—or 
74 Mixed methods research has emerged as a central part of interdisciplinary projects, and in the past 
few decades has received increasing discussion in diverse academic communities, and has given rise to a 
group of conceptual and research design models.  Mixed methods research allows the researcher to gather 
more comprehensive evidence for the problem at hand than quantitative or qualitative research alone. 
Creswell, John W. Research Design : Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (3rd 
ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2009), 203. Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and 
Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 15.
75 Strategies of inquiry are most often associated with quantitative research, whereas qualitative work 
has associated traditions or genres that specify the focus and form of the work which is how this 
dissertation was approached. Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative 
Dissertation : A Road Map from Beginning to End, 30.
76 Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
44.
77 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 30.
Creswell, John W. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 69.
78 Grounded theory approaches include narrative research, phenomenological research, ethnographic 
research, case studies, hermeneutics, or action research.  In this dissertation, case studies are specifically 
used as an analytical tool, in addition to semistructured interviews.
79 Strauss, A., and J. Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998.
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grounded in—data collected through mostly qualitative methods that describe the 
actions, social processes, and interactions of subjects or firms in a way that brings 
forward key themes.80 This approach creates a theory that might explain the 
practices of participants (and in this dissertation’s case, firms as well as their 
employees), and/or set up a framework for additional research on the topic 
area.81 Grounded theory has two primary characteristics: 1) constant comparative 
method that involves the ongoing analysis of data generating emerging 
categories; 2) theoretical sampling that focuses on different groups to maximize 
the possible similarities and differences of subjects.82 As best stated in the 
literature: “For the purposes of this paper, grounded theory is defined as a theory 
generated from data systematically obtained and analyzed through the constant 
comparative method.”83
Based on data collected, grounded theory allows the researcher to create a 
theoretical framework that articulates the causes, conditions, and consequences 
of processes being studied.84 This identification of causes, conditions, and 
consequences is done in part through the qualitative coding of interviews, notes, 
and other artifacts. In this dissertation research, qualitative coding of interviews 
and artifacts taken together with research notes and experiences were used to 
construct a framework of practices and external forces (or at times, internal 
forces within the firms) that shaped this research and information sharing 
system. The analysis identified unique cases of incentive structures that were 
used to explore broader themes and lessons, key drivers of actions, decisions 
influencers, new paradigms, and resulting models of private sector R&D practices 
and data sharing relating to social, behavioral, health, and public health realms. 
These findings were able to challenge existing theories and models of private 
sector research and innovation, and present key elements that have constructed a 
new emerging model of practices. 
Analysis Strategy
As per this approach to inquiry, coding was done iteratively. The theory is 
meant to evolve during data analysis and through the “continuous interplay 
80 Strauss and Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory. 
81 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
82 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
83 Conrad, Clifton F. "A Grounded Theory of Academic Charge." Sociology of Education 51, no. 2 
(1978): 101-12
84 Alternatively, grounded theory may enable a researcher to amend existing theory on the subject if 
one already exists.
Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
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between analysis and data collection.”85 This process is meant to allow the 
researcher to continually ask new questions as they arise, and make adjustments 
accordingly to the data collection and theory development—especially since 
knowledge gleaned from subjects is assumed to be linked closely with place and 
time.86 First after every interview, thorough memoing of key themes and 
reflections on commonalities or differences with existing interviews.87 Once a 
large portion of interviews—the primary source of data—were collected, a read 
through was done to generate open codes for themes identified as large types of 
information categories. Following this open coding process, axial coding was 
used to identify the codes that represent core phenomena.88 Causal conditions, 
strategies (responses to core phenomena), contextual and intervening conditions 
(elements of the context that influence strategies), and consequences are all key 
theoretical elements generated by the axial coding step.89 The final stage of 
coding—selective coding—was completed after forming a hypotheses about how 
coded categories interrelate and thus formed the final articulated theory.  
Limitations of Grounded Theory Approach
When using grounded theory, a researcher does not enter the field with 
testable hypotheses. Ideally, grounded theory researchers enter the field with 
little to no idea what they will find, and remain open to all possibilities. It is in 
practice difficult for researchers using grounded theory “to suspend theoretical 
ideas so that the analytic substantive theory can emerge.”90 Given the 
motivations underlying the topic of this research, the formation of my research 
questions, and the very limited time I had with interviewees (~20-90 minutes), I 
used my existing experience/knowledge and pre-interviews to inform “hunches” 
which thereby informed my interview guide and participant selection. 
It is also difficult to fully assess when coded categories are fully saturated 
and when the theory has been sufficiently developed to reflect the full 
comprehensive picture of reality.91 It is also a risk that theory will not be fully 
developed by the end of the study, but in the case of this dissertation and 
85 Strauss and Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory, 273.
86 Strauss and Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory, 276.
87 This memoing also captured additional details or thoughts from the interview. 
88 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
89 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
90 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
91 Bloomberg, Linda Dale, and Marie Volpe. Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation : A Road Map 
from Beginning to End, 33.
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research in general, this dissertation project is part of a longer research agenda 
that should (and is intended) to continue over time. This work will provide theory 
to continue to revise in the future, and to assume any social and organizational 
phenomena can be reduced to a simple theory that will stand over time is simply 
ridiculous and out of touch with reality.  This dissertation is merely a starting 
point for a lifetime of inquiry. 
Evidenced-based Policymaking
Calls for informed policymaking—legislation and programs created or 
altered on the basis of research and data rather than political maneuvering or 
public perception—are hardly new. Yet, these calls have seen a renaissance in 
recent years as calls to place more academic research in the pipeline set to 
directly inform the policymaking process, in forms such as anticipatory 
governance and more contemporary or reflective stances like in evidenced-based 
policymaking.92 Donald T. Campbell, a renown social psychologist and scholar in 
new methodologies, wrote about what he termed the “experimenting society” in 
1969 that called for social policy programs to experiment with possible solutions. 
He stated that for these experimental programs93 to be able to reflect on their 
success, limitations, or failures, a more robust set of evaluation criteria should be 
available to make these determinations.94 Ray Pawson, in his book-length 
discourse on what “evidenced-based policymaking” is and is not, is careful to 
outline that political positioning of research, data portals (or other tools that 
simply bring together raw materials), polling of public opinion, or partnerships 
with government organizations do not qualify.95 Pew Charitable Trust describes 
evidenced-based policymaking as policy that “uses the best available research and 
information on program results to guide decisions at all stages of the policy 
process in each branch of government. It identifies what works, highlights gaps 
where evidence of program effectiveness is lacking, enables policymakers to use 
92 Guston, David H. "Understanding ‘Anticipatory Governance’." Social Studies of Science 44, no. 2 
(2014): 218-42.
93 Previously, I worked on a team that conducted a lifetime evaluation of the EPSCoR Program 
(Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research) [Yes the word program after EPSCoR is 
repetitive, but the program is now almost exclusively known for the acronym and not the title]. EPSCoR 
was founded in the late 1970s, and at the time I think there was some uncertainty about the origins of the 
word “experimental” in the title. It is possible this title choice originated from Campbells’ work at the 
time, especially since the program was trying a new method of distributing scientific research funds across 
states. Zuckerman, Brian L. , Rachel A.  Parker, Thomas W.  Jones, Brian Q.  Rieksts, Ian D.  Simon, 
Gilbert J.  Watson III, Elaine M.  Sedenberg, et al. Evaluation of the National Science Foundation’s 
Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (Epscor): Final Report. IDA Science and 
Technology Policy Institute (Washington DC: 2014). https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/
Publications/STPIPubs/2015/P-5221.ashx.
94 Campbell, D.T. "Reforms as Experiments." American Psychologist 24, no. 4 (1969): 409.
95 Pawson, Ray. Evidence-Based Policy: A Realist Perspective (Sage Publishing, 2006), 4-6.
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evidence in budget and policy decisions….”96 
This dissertation work, strictly speaking, falls more in line with a broader 
goal to inform policymaking by providing empirical evidence from the field on 
how private firms are conducting R&D, the barriers or opportunities to 
partnerships, motivations and arrangements underlying private sector data 
applications for public good activities, knowledge sharing from private sector 
data, and the impact these activities may have on the broader research 
ecosystem. Even though this work is not executed to inform a particular policy or 
set of policies, the products of this research are intended to broadly reflect on 
available policy mechanisms (e.g., public/private partnership funding programs 
via agencies like SBA or DoD), the need of new programs to address misaligned 
incentives or market failures, and/or provide a framework for similar lines of 
inquiry. This work is therefore intended to be a foundational building block for 
future work in evidence-based policymaking, though the goal to inform 
policymaking is quite clear. This goal is reinforced by the decision to use 
grounded theory, which was cited as a useful method to study diverse and 
complicated phenomena including policy.97
Research policy, Science policy, S&T policy, tech policy: Just all of the policy
This research falls within the realm of “science and technology policy” or 
“S&T policy” relevant research. Technology policy, or tech policy is more often 
associated with high-tech or internet policy, whereas science policy is more 
historic and has roots in the law and policy worlds primarily following WWII 
(but, traces of this can be seen in relation to research in the historical context 
found in Chapter 4). Science policy can either be oriented as “science for policy” 
where data or scientific research is used to inform policymaking, or “policy for 
science” in that policy can dictate research agendas, special programs, and 
regulations on innovation processes and technology itself. The latter can also be 
viewed as “research policy,” and as Kleinman states: “The notion of science policy 
is fairly broad. It may include the establishment of research priorities for 
government-supported research, as well as the regulation of the potentially 
negative effects of technological development…. I focus on the former, which I 
term research policy, because I believe that how and what research priorities are 
set has a dramatic impact on the contours of a society and indeed, says a good 
96 Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Guide for Effective Government. The PEW Charitable Trust
MacArthur Foundation (2014). http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/11/-
evidencebasedpolicymakingaguideforeffectivegovernment.pdf. 2. 
"Evidence-Based Policymaking Collaborative." Brookings, nd, accessed August, 2018, https://
www.brookings.edu/evidence-based-policymaking-collaborative/.
97 Strauss and Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing 
Grounded Theory, 275.
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deal about the society’s broader views and priorities.”98 In some ways, this 
dissertation itself is science policy in that it is hoped to inform policymaking, but 
it studies in some ways how policy for science has influenced industrial R&D. 
Scope, sample selection, sources, and data collection 
Scope, research setting, and context
The scope of this dissertation included companies (firms) who collect or 
curate biosensed data from users as part of their business model through the 
functioning of their product or service.99 Biosensed data includes physiological, 
kinesthetic, biological samples, and emotion/behavior data about individuals. 
Biosensed data was chosen because it is particularly rich in inferential and 
scientific potential, and enables research regarding health, wellness, social lives, 
and behaviors of users—in addition to larger studies implicating groups of people 
or public health interests. These activities may be conducted through internal 
activities, partnerships, or exchanges (either through data or devices, usually in 
this case prototypes) with outside entities. 
This dissertation primarily focused on sensor-based companies and smart 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. However, as seen with inferences made through 
search data with regard to the health status of users,100 a variety of data may be 
relevant given unknown links between digitally mediated interactions and other 
personal states. Almost all of these data may be considered to be passively 
collected from the user using sensors or activity logs, but some data flows may be 
augmented with additional context or information from the user. Companies 
included were or intended to be consumer facing, but in a few cases companies 
were business to business (B2B) applications. In these limited cases, the business 
was based off of data collected directly from recruited study subjects from the 
general population, or from users of the business using the application. 
Biosensing is one of many possible lenses to examine this phenomena, and 
though it lends some specificity to the analysis and discussion many of the 
broader themes can be extracted for non-biosensing companies.
This dissertation focused primarily on North American companies (US and 
Canada), but several companies are either large multinational firms or have a 
strong presence in another country due to the home of the founders. All 
companies interviewed have at least some presence within the US, and either had 
98 Kleinman, Daniel Lee. Politics on the Endless Frontier : Postwar Research Policy in the United 
States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 5.
99 Sedenberg, Wong, and Chuang. "A Window into the Soul: Biosensing in Public."
100 Gigerenzer, Gerd. "Can Search Engine Data Predict Pancreatic Cancer?". The BMJ 358:j3159 
(2017). https://www.bmj.com/content/358/bmj.j3159.
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an “office” (or more likely in the case of startups, a WeWork address)101 in Silicon 
Valley/Bay Area, or another technology prominent region of the US like Boston, 
New York, or Austin. Some regional diversity was sought within the US in order 
to help diversify geographic influences, but each company either had clients in 
the US or intended to after launch. 
There are two geographic firms used throughout this dissertation that may 
be confusing due to shifting boundaries over time. Originally, Silicon Valley was 
the part of the San Francisco Bay Area (Bay Area) that had the rich technology 
activity. Silicon Valley properly means the peninsula south of San Francisco to 
what is known as “South Bay” around San Jose.102 Today, the technology activity 
is pervasive to almost all of the Bay Area, and in particular traditional Silicon 
Valley as well as San Francisco and East Bay (in Berkeley and Oakland). 
Historically when discussing activities, Silicon Valley will be used as the most 
accurate description but, when applying or comparing to today, it will more likely 
be described as the Bay Area or Silicon Valley (understanding the now porous 
boundaries) to maintain logical consistency. 
Often in studies of industry, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
or the newer North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes are 
used to help provide standard definitions and boundaries around an industry of 
interest. In the context of this study however, they do not provide much guidance. 
For instance, most companies that collect and process user data are under the 
business type “Information,” and have a primary NAICS Code as “518210 - Data 
Processing, Hosting, and Related Services.” Yet some sensing technologies, like 
Fitbit Inc. are classified under business type “Retail Trade” and have a primary 
NAICS Code as “443142 - Electronics Stores.” Additionally, many startups’ self-
identified NAICS code are not published, and hard to ascertain from the outside
—or most importantly, invisible when using the code to find and identify 
potential interview targets. There is additional complexity with apps and 
platforms associated with the sharing economy, which means platforms like 
Airbnb may be listed under codes relating to travel accommodations,103 rooming/
boarding, real estate, or data processing. From a researcher’s perspective, even 
with occasionally fuzzy industry definitions, there are notable exchanges within a 
particular set of information companies. For instance, many of these companies 
collect, curate, and analyze user data in order to provide a service or information-
enriched product. These companies exchange employees with the same skillset, 
exchange methods and techniques, often attend the same set of conferences, and 
receive funding from similar tech sources and VCs. 
101 WeWork is the popular cowering space found in many large cities, especially in the United States
102 See for example: Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
103 Airbnb is obviously not a sensing company (at least at the moment) but is used here to illustrate 
some of the conflicting and complicated codes used for digital platform and services in this space.
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The unit of analysis for most of this dissertation study was the company 
(firm) to understand the organization and the people fueling it. Semi-structured 
interviews were the primary source of qualitative data which naturally relied on 
participation from current or former employees. The employees of course bring 
their own perspectives, biases, and limited experience to the table, but that is 
expected and part of the process. When possible, multiple people were 
interviewed and public artifacts (e.g., legal documents, public statements, 
websites, product descriptions) were used to make these data more robust.
When speaking to individuals put forth by their firms for an interview 
request it is difficult to try and instill gender and ethnic diversity into my 
interviewee pool. For the first several months I realized I had—with one 
exception—only spoken with white males. By the end of the study, I had achieved 
more diversity. Though I did not ask or thereby record the race of my 
participants,104 I did personally feel it was important to strive for some diversity 
on my interview subjects in order to get a fair and accurate reflection on 
corporate practices. 
Firm Selection and Purposive Sampling
To begin the scoping of this work I conducted several preliminary 
interviews to talk openly with professional contacts at startups and large firms 
about their experiences in R&D and their reflections on current practices. These 
interviews were used to shape the overall dissertation study, and inform the first 
interview guide. 
Purposive sampling105 was used to to select firms for recruitment.106 
Purposive sampling is based on selecting firms that are particularly information 
rich for the research questions. Using Bailey’s edition’s sampling procedures,107 
three different types of sampling procedures were used:108 1) Intensity (selecting 
cases that manifest the phenomena intensely but not extremely and are 
“information rich”; 2) Extreme or deviant cases (“selecting cases that have 
unusual manifestations of the phenomena of interest”); and finally 3) Criterion 
(Cases selected based on a particular criterion of interest). Procedures 1 and 2 
104 In an ideal world researchers would have all possible data from their subjects. Since this was not 
central to my research questions, and I had very limited time with each interviewee these were not 
questions I asked. However, these reflections were made in my own internal research notes, but of course 
limited by my own interpretation and not verified by interviewee’s identities. 
105 Bailey, Carol A. A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. Third Edition. ed. Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publications, 2018.
Patton. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods.
106 There are several different types of purposive sampling frameworks that have been amended based 
on Patton’s (1990) original work
107 Bailey. A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. 120.
108 As per Bailey, “different sampling procedures can be combined.” Bailey. A Guide to Qualitative 
Field Research. 119.
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were sequential at first, and eventually simultaneous. At first cases that were in 
the information sharing space either through press or internal but otherwise 
public knowledge of experts were selected. Firms that fell into this category were 
those that had some information sharing or internal research, but it may not be a 
well developed program or a one off example. Eventually cases were identified 
through public announcements or searching of lists (see recruitment methods 
below) that were highly sought because they exemplified an unusual case of 
contributing to research or research-related activities through data sharing or 
internal practice, a policy of no sharing at all, or an unusual encounter with 
regulation or acquisition that made the firm’s experience exceptional. This 
method allowed recruitment to go broad and then more narrow, while still 
allowing for continued recruitment of information-rich firms that participated in 
research/information sharing without being an extreme or otherwise exemplary 
case. Procedure 3 was used in the final stretch of analysis to round out findings in 
the initial analysis and check for robustness and was done using a framework 
described below looking for companies who included “research activities” in their 
privacy policy, as identified through lists of most innovative companies. 
In addition to these cases, experts were interviewed on particular topics, 
and were selected based on the criterion that they had deep knowledge or unique 
experience with a detail or practice. These supplemental interviews added depth 
to particular topics relevant to my firms of interest, even if they could not openly 
speak about their current or past firms. These interviews were sought in order to 
bring detailed insight to light for analysis. 
The Numbers and saturation
For most companies, only one or two individuals were interviewed 
assuming their jobs were central to the activities of interest or their experience 
relevant to the discussion. In many startups, other individuals would be asked to 
participate in parts of the interview or looped in later during follow up. For a few 
early cases, every team member was contacted and the majority interviewed 
about their role and perspectives on the team. After about two people, 
information quickly became redundant or not helpful for this particular study—
particularly the farther their role was to R&D or partnership management. Many 
small firms are resource constrained so talking to each team member would likely 
have not benefited the research and would have unduly burdened the firm. For 
cases in large firms, it is often hard to get more than one contact to agree to 
participate. (See Appendix for a detailed documentation and description of these 
practices)
As noted above, deciding when saturation has been reached is a challenge 
when using grounded theory. For qualitative research, there is no magic or 
correct number signaling enough interviews have been done — particularly 
considering the diversity of possible experiences and examples in the world. This 
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dissertation project is meant to begin building the framework of a lifelong 
research agenda. Once the three procedures of sampling were complete and I felt 
there was enough data to form a theory, interviews were paused. 
This research design is not meant to be representative, but rather to collect 
data that allows for a rich description and understanding of common and 
exceptional cases of private sector data being used internally for research or 
shared externally for public benefit.
Recruitment
A variety of recruitment methods were used after a company had been 
identified as part of the sampling framework—usually after reading about their 
work in a press release, hearing a presentation, talking with employees at events, 
finding them while scanning websites of companies (e.g., TechCrunch or 
incubators). In some cases, a personal interaction led to the interview invite and I 
gave participants my contact information. In other cases, I emailed a publicly 
available general contact on the company website introducing myself and my 
research, asking for an interview. In several cases, a personal introduction 
through a colleague or professional acquaintance was made after the interviewee 
consented to be approached.
Many emails to companies or attempts to follow up with individuals who 
agreed to be contacted were met with no response, or a very tardy response (up to 
6 months). This issue is discussed and reflected on further in another section 
(Appendix B), and became an unexpected and important aspect of this research. 
Data collection methods & interview process
The primary source of data was obtained using semi-structured interview 
methodology. The consent and ethical process is described separately below. 
If possible, interviews were conducted in person at their place of work or a 
public location like a coffee shop. The interview was recorded on two separate 
recording devices for redundancy and transcribed later using a service.109 If the 
interview needed to take place digitally, Skype was used and ECamm was used to 
record the session.110 Interviews typically lasted 30-90 minutes, with the average 
or typical interview lasting just under 60 minutes. Follow up on the progress of 
companies and their projects/initiatives of interest would occur with permission 
of the interviewee, and for any attribution/quotes additional follow up was done 
after the analysis/write up to confirm both the accuracy of content as well as the 
109 This saved one 1.5 hour long interview when the primary microphone inextricably stopped 
recording 10 minutes in. 
110 This was before Skype released an embedded recording feature in September 2018.
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continued consent of the interviewee. 
 In the beginning, there was one interview guide developed based on 
preliminary interviews and content analysis. However over time, it became clear 
there were distinct types of interviews that required their own guide:
-Firm with identification (and maybe identification of interviewee) 
-Non-identified firm and non-identified interviewee (i.e., the “Why people won’t 
talk to me” interview)
-Expert interview for key details, unique experience, or perspective on activities 
of interest
Before each interview, as much information as possible was gathered about 
the firm’s activities via publicly available information so that the interview could 
be structured to make best use of the interviewee’s time. The method of semi-
structured interviewing was informed by Weiss (1994), Bailey and influenced by 
other key methodology texts including Holstein and Gubrium (1995) and Morgan 
(1997).111
During the interview, I took notes to reinforce key statements, concepts, or 
quotes said during the interview. These notes provided a basis for some initial 
open qualitative coding, and memoing about observations such as the workplace 
environment, body language of the interviewee, people around us, etc.
This dissertation was initially constructed to include a survey of more 
individuals about their views and to solicit information about their firms. 
However, previous work studying organizations demonstrated that: 1) It is hard 
to reach the right individuals within organizations since there is no unifying job 
title, consortia, professional organization, etc.; 2) Without the ability to establish 
trust with the respondent (as is the case in semi-structured interviews), it is 
difficult to get an honest and detailed response—let alone any response; 3) Many 
people who are in the “right” position within the firm do not think they are 
knowledgable about the topic of interest and self-disqualify. This was the case in 
cybersecurity, as well as demonstrated during interviews when interviewees 
would state they “didn’t know how much help they could be but they would try 
anyway” and their experiences were exactly what our study was looking for.112  
There were 23 completed full interviews, and an additional 9 background 
interviews. 
111 Weiss, Robert Stuart. Learning from Strangers : The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview 
Studies. New York; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994.
Bailey. A Guide to Qualitative Field Research. 119.
Holstein, James A., and Jaber F. Gubrium. The Active Interview. Qualitative Research Methods. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1995.
Morgan, David L. Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. Qualitative Research Methods Series. 2nd 
ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997.
112 For more information, see Sedenberg, Elaine, and James X. Dempsey. "Cybersecurity Information-
Sharing Governance Structures: An Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Trade-Offs." Chap. 1 In Rewired: 
Cybersecurity Governance, edited by Ryan Ellis and Vivek Mohan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
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Analysis
Part of the analysis strategy may be found above as it relates to the 
grounded theory approach. Qualitative coding was used to identify core 
phenomena and then the causal conditions, strategies, and contextual elements 
that contribute or stem from these key insights. These codes were done iteratively 
on interviews and content in order to allow key themes to emerge, and then 
revisited as findings were fully developed. The final stage of coding—selective 
coding—was completed after forming a hypotheses about how coded categories 
interrelate and thus forms the final articulated theory.113
Archival process
Since many of the links to company content (e.g., press releases, privacy 
policies, etc.) are hosted on private websites, they could disappear without a 
record in the future. Material used in this dissertation will not only be on file with 
the author, but will also be backed up to the Internet Archive so that anyone 
reading or conducting similar research could have open access to the same 
material. The process used after consulting with the Internet Archive’s WayBack 
Machine staff was to use “Archive-it.org” for URLs, or to establish a permanent 
URL using “perma.cc.” This practice should be more widely adopted as 
responsible citation management for material that lives outside of classic 
academic periodicals, including primary sources referenced in internet studies 
work.
Ethics
As someone who studies research ethics, I found it particularly important 
and vital to my professional reputation to hold myself to the highest standard 
possible. Here I detail two processes for how I approached my interactions with 
interview subjects. This is all conducted in addition to review and approval of 
procedures by the UC Berkeley IRB.
Formal interviews - Ethical Process
Each interviewee was presented with two traditional informed consent 
forms (one to sign and one to keep) along side what I called “Plain English 
Informed Consent” which I created to plainly state the most salient features 
embedded in the form for research participants (e.g., data collection, storage, and 
attribution). If the interview was in person, I provided them the paper versions 
113 Bernard, H. Russell, and Gery Wayne Ryan. Analyzing Qualitative Data : Systematic Approaches. 
Los Angeles Calif.: SAGE, 2010.
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and asked them to sign it after verbally going over key points and allowing them 
time to read it and ask questions. If the interview was over Skype or the phone, I 
sent these documents ahead of them, and then asked for verbal consent after we 
went over key details and questions. 
In rare occasions, what I thought was a background informational 
interview would turn into an opportunity formal one. There I asked the 
participants if they were comfortable with being a part of my research and recited 
the key facts of the informed consent form to them for verbal consent. If any 
attributions were made in these cases, I followed up via email to confirm they 
were comfortable with the quotes or general attribution to make sure the 
research process had been made clear to them. 
In many cases, I asked to use the company name but to generalize their 
position within the company (e.g., data scientist or product manager). In some 
cases, particularly with startups, individuals asked that their company and name/
title be used explicitly to avoid confusion with competitors and to promote the 
company. This often happened because interviewees were high enough in the 
company they felt comfortable giving permission for full attribution. In some 
cases, interviewees were uncomfortable with their company or name/position be 
used or recorded at all. These interviews have made up what will be discussed 
later as “why people won’t talk to me” phenomena. In these cases, I took very 
seriously the concerns of interviewees and followed their requests. One 
interviewee wanted to make sure that their name was nowhere in my records, 
and that the transcript of the conversation was done by hand instead of using a 
transcription service. In other cases, interviewees simply asked that they or their 
companies not be identified in my dissertation. Attribution took great care, and I 
worked with interviewees who occasionally wanted to read transcripts or quotes 
before determining if they wanted to be identified. I felt this was an important 
part of not only my role as an ethical research and prevent any harm on their 
part, but I also felt these extra steps helped me establish trust with my 
interviewees—a process that was undoubtedly important to the research and data 
collection within this dissertation.
Each interview began with a statement that I did not want to know any 
sensitive material about them or their past/present companies. I made it 
explicitly clear to all interviewees that not only could they refuse any questions or 
end the interview at any time, but they could contact me later and ask to be 
removed or deleted from the study. I explained though I could not forcibly 
“forget” anything they told me, I would do my best to remove them from any 
unpublished work or adjust their level of attribution. 
For any particularly negative findings, I decided that I would remove 
attribution ahead of time and only focus on key factors of the firm and generally 
describe possible antecedent conditions that would be relevant for discussion. I 
did not feel it necessary to use my dissertation as a shaming platform, when the 
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same lessons could be learned from anonymous sources. 
In some cases, I offered companies write ups for their blogs based on my 
research or insights from my general research tailored for their company in 
exchange for their time. To date, no company has taken me up on this offer, but I 
felt this was a gesture that did not compromise my subjectivity but yet offered an 
exchange for time. If companies felt uncomfortable, I allowed the ability to review 
selected quotes from the interview for accuracy but was careful to never allow for 
the review of my findings or entire discussion. In some cases, I also circled back 
to companies and employees to make sure I had the story correct, and offer a 
chance for them to offer any updates since the last time we spoke. I felt this move 
only strengthened the quality of my research and gave them a fair opportunity to 
ensure my facts and interpretation was correct, without compromising my 
integrity or intellectual freedom as a researcher. 
Informal background interviews - Ethical Process
As part of the process of validating my results, I often discussed my 
research and findings with colleagues and friends familiar with the area to solicit 
their opinions and perspectives. I feel this is similar to how many people discuss 
their work and obtain outside feedback. I would also often find someone through 
professional connections or complete happenstance who would provide details 
and commentary relevant to my dissertation work but were not themselves a 
formal subject—a part of living and breathing the Bay Area for five years as 
discussed in positionally reflection. For these informal interactions, I tried to 
always make it clear who I was (a researcher studying the topic at UC Berkeley) 
and felt it was a violation of my ethics to ever “pump” someone for information, 
even if it was not considered a formal and quotable interview. I felt this sort of 
prying would be unethical and betray the trust of those individuals willing to 
discuss their views of my dissertation topic, and I also felt offhand comments said 
while individuals were drinking at social events would be unethical to record—
even though I of course cannot forget things volunteered or said to me, I did find 
it appropriate to make any notes of these conversations/comments. For the other 
open conversations with sober individuals talking openly about my area of 
research, I made notes after the conversations in my dissertation journal, 
memoing to myself the comments/anecdotes/suggested readings or references/
and my reflections about them. These reflections or comments would be made 
without attribution to individuals or companies since it was outside of the 
framework of my informed consent. 
Research Reflection Memo — My positionally to (mostly) 
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Silicon Valley/Bay Area firms114
In beginning this dissertation research, I had naively assumed that in 
studying organizations and their associated practices, policies, and cultures that 
my positionality to these firms and their employees would not be remarkable. 
Based on my professional experiences conducting qualitative policy research in 
Washington, DC and working alongside collaborators here at Berkeley, I felt I 
had a good feel for what conducting my own qualitative dissertation work would 
be like. What I discounted was the effect of conducting field research on my own, 
with entirely new contacts forged myself. 
I think these differences can be attributed to three things, that sometimes 
worked in my favor with regards to access or developing trust-based 
relationships, or hampered my credibility, stature, or ability to conduct 
interviews. 1) My physical appearance and identity as a blonde female junior 
scholar; 2) My position at UC Berkeley in the Bay Area; 3) the Bay Area/Silicon 
Valley/Northern Californian general culture.
Overall, my experiences were mostly positive and I feel deeply indebted to 
the women and men who took the time out of their busy schedule to chat with 
me. The majority of interviewees were kind, helpful, and professional. But I have 
realized over the course how several particular interactions shaped my approach 
within my interviews, and likely influenced some of my perceptions of my 
fieldwork and culture of the tech scene. 
One of my first interviews when I was still establishing my scope and 
getting comfortable with my interview guide was with a male subject at a large 
firm who chatted with me at a conference reception. He said he worked in 
research for the firm, and he would be happy to chat with me. When I tried to 
schedule a time, he requested I come to his office in downtown San Francisco on 
a Saturday, which I was happy to do. Except when I showed up, the office was 
completely empty. We proceeded with the interview when it became very clear he 
did not actually work in any research part of the organization, and really had no 
clue what I was trying to chat about despite his original claims. I politely wrapped 
up the interview and thanked him for his time, and left without incident. 
However, he proceeded to begin texting me after I left (I give all my interviewees 
my cell phone number in case they need to contact me to reschedule, etc.) asking 
me out on a date. I professionally and politely declined, but this was met with 
further protestations telling me that as a PhD student I should get out and have 
some fun, and that he would really like to see me. I remained firm, and finally 
stopped responding. This was one of my first solo interactions and interviews 
conducted after my qualifying exam. But this initial interview ushered in a series 
114 The content and style of this section was inspired by Derry, Min, "Writing Strategies: What’s Your 
Positionality?," WEINGARTENLEARNINGRESOURCES ed., 2017, https://
weingartenlrc.wordpress.com/2017/01/09/research-writing-whats-your-positionality/.
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of circumstances were often I wasn’t sure how one-on-one interactions were 
motivated—especially when it came to background off the record interviews. 
It is impossible to know why certain people or firms were or were not 
willing to participate in my research or respond to my emails. In some cases, I 
think I was able to get access because of my position at UC Berkeley—a school 
and program with name recognition, proximity and access to exclusive events, 
and with a large alumni base seeded in the tech industry. In some cases, I suspect 
I got access because I was a young woman—in other cases I think I was denied 
access based on these same features and embedded (and often gender oriented) 
assumptions made about my qualitative and policy-oriented research. Maybe 
neither of these is true—I am only left with my suspicions based on my reflections 
compared to my colleagues’ shared experiences. Compared to my colleagues, I 
got less access inside firms on a professional level, but more access to “social” 
events like parties or invitations to hang out over drinks.
Ideally in qualitative interviews, the interview plays the role of a minimally 
informed yet curious participant. This allows interviewees to fully establish their 
points without introducing bias, yet this is hard to do when interviewing experts 
and highly educated employees who prefer to speak to a peer rather than explain 
the basics. I found over the course of my interviews that I led my questions more 
than I would have liked from a methodological standpoint. I began doing so 
because I realized it was essential I demonstrated my expertise and qualifications 
to be having these discussions in the first place—again, a possibly gendered bias. 
It is hard in semi-structured interview to prompt the interviewee to give a 
detailed explanation of what might otherwise be obvious to anyone with subject 
matter expertise, but requires explicit descriptions to either confirm or document 
the instance*. Part of this is the challenge of essentially having ten minutes to 
introduce myself, my work, go over ethics and consent, and then establish some 
baseline trust with my interviewee. This is an impossible task, yet I was a 
standard I strove to hit in all of my interviews—also establishing the deep subject 
matter expertise while asking basic questions about practices was a skill I have 
not yet finessed. I now attempt to explain this challenge plainly in the beginning, 
but even when I do it often comes off in the conversation as if I am not simply 
playing a naive but curious participant. 
The best example I had of this was in one interview where the interviewee 
had somehow accepted my request, but was late, changed the medium of our 
interview moments before (a challenge for recording set up), and attempted to 
explain from the first moment (incorrectly) why my dissertation was already a 
studied topic. When he stated he couldn’t share any details of his firm’s internal 
practices because of intellectual property issues, I switched the interview into the 
“why you can’t talk to me” category. Upon inquiring about these limitations, I 
received a patronizing lecture about cupcakes, and how if I were a cupcake 
salesmen I would not give away how many cupcakes I was baking that day or the 
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flavors that was offered. What I could not retort back, despite my deepest 
urgings, is that the analogy was in fact broken: the number of cupcakes and 
flavors of the day refer to business analytics, and the secret recipe for the 
cupcakes (trade secret algorithm), test kitchen preparations underway to create 
entirely new flavors (internal R&D), or partnerships with specialized chefs to 
bring in unique culinary talent in order to meld or develop a new type of cupcake 
based dessert (R&D partnerships) would be more appropriate. I have a difficult 
time imagining this interviewee going on about cupcakes to a male interviewer. 
Particularly given the onslaught of sexist issues within the technology 
industry, I feel as a researcher I doubled-down on establishing my extensive 
knowledge—the continual reemphasis on my own knowledge became painfully 
apparent during qualitative analysis of transcripts where I see myself performing 
this assertion repeatedly. This is not an intention I had in the beginning of my 
interviews, and something that within my desire to be as scientific and controlled 
as possible I wish could have better standardized. This in many ways was an 
impossible standard given my knowledge that the human researcher is an 
instrument of the study as discussed in prior sections of this chapter. The vast 
majority of my interviewees were fair and professional, but with so much on the 
line (as there is in a dissertation research project) the instinct to establish my 
credibility and not lose a research participant—one that probably took hours to 
find, recruit, and schedule with—due to assumptions made about me led to more 
performativity than my ideal standard of an inert and minimized interviewer as 
an instrument. 
While conducting the majority of this research, I lived in the Bay Area 
which meant I lived and breathed the tech industry even on my personal time. 
Meeting up with friends almost invariably involved some facet of the tech 
industry—either through meeting people, talking about current events, installing 
the latest app designed to make the aging city infrastructure less frustrating, or 
confronting the social inequalities made apparent by the stark juxtaposition of 
the homeless at the literal feet of pristine and contemporary tech headquarters in 
downtown San Francisco. Despite all aspirations to be as objective, fair, and 
neutral, I too have been a part of the culture or forced to reckon with its fallout in 
my personal life. While I still approached my work as objectively as possible, it 
would be remiss not to acknowledge my own participant (and sometimes forced 
participant-observer) role as a resident in Oakland from 2013 to 2018.
2018 Silicon Valley is a land full of leakers, journalist-led exposés, and a 
largely critical public. This is a theme discussed later in negotiating access to 
subjects and companies. I felt at times my research was treated as if I was an 
investigative journalist—and while investigative journalists are an important role 
of this tech landscape,115 the goals of research and investigative journalism are 
115 See, for example, Carreyrou, John. Bad Blood : Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018.
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vastly different. My role is to study and understand. My professional ethical 
obligation is to protect my research subjects from harm. A journalist’s goal is to 
find and tell a story for the public. This mixed perception and common treatment 
no doubt impacted my ability do my research. 
A reflection on the reticence and secrecy practices impacting this research 
is found in the Appendix.
As previously stated, I approach my research from a place of pragmatism: 
my goal is to document practices and provide an explanation in order to inform 
evidenced-based policymaking. I have colleagues who approach their work from 
an advocacy and critical theory perspectives, which makes their approach much 
different than mine. I am willing to work with companies and accept their claims 
as their public positions and work to find solutions given constraints of the 
private sector—different scholarly orientations have different approaches to 
working with companies’ positions and constraints and this diversity I believe is 
needed within the field. 
Trustworthiness: Credibility and Dependability 
Credibility/Validity: As per the research design, it was expected that answers 
from employees, founders, or individuals who are otherwise participants in the 
system may contain biased perspectives. This was built into the structure of this 
study and anticipated as part of the narrative. Where possible, multiple people 
were interviewed and statements were corroborated with others’ perspectives and 
public documents where necessary. The number of interviews was also increased 
in order to incorporate more cases and experiences into this theory.
As a researcher, it is acknowledged (particularly in my positionally 
statement) that I bring bias into this qualitative work which bears on my 
understanding, approach, and access to firms’ perspectives. However, every 
attempt to minimize this was made by keeping dissertation notes through 
memoing of interviews and thoughts related to the dissertation, using recordings 
(and transcripts) instead of relying on my memory of interview, and multiple 
corroborating sources including other interviews, public documents, national 
statistics, etc. were used to confirm or dispute findings. Additionally, dissertation 
findings were discussed with outside experts for their input and feedback, as well 
as some of the subjects themselves to confirm the accuracy of the cases as they 
are portrayed here. 
Dependability/Reliability: This chapter has described in detail every aspect 
thought to be important in retracing the data collection and analysis. All public 
records, where possible, are made available via the archival process and interview 
data is on record with the researcher. 
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Transferability: The research design did its best to work with what was 
accessible and set research questions that could reasonably be answered using 
the methods available. 
Conclusion
This chapter describes the research design and methodology used to 
answer the selected research questions. This section also sought to establish why 
choices were made both in the design and methodology, and present what other 
options were so that future work could build off of this work in novel ways or 
expand the work established here. 
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Chapter 4
Traditional Role of the Private Sector 
in Research: Historical Context of 
American Industrial R&D, Academic 
Partnerships, and Traces of Data 
Sharing Instances
“Firms that pioneered industrial R&D in the United States did so because they 
were threatened by competition, because they were engaged in a process of 
rationalizing their organizations (often in response to antitrust threats and 
actions), and because they saw benefits to internalizing R&D rather than 
relying on the market. Yet in internalizing these functions, the R&D pioneers 
and firms that emulated them were never completely free to do what they 
wanted vis-a-vis scientists and research-oriented engineers. Corporations were 
highly dependent on educational institutions and an elite cadre of university 
professors for their supply of researchers.”116 
“Today the research laboratory is widely recognized as an indispensable part of 
the country’s industrial equipment. From it comes the knowledge that leads not 
only to improved methods and materials but also to entirely new processes and 
products and occasionally new industries.”117  
“Chemically based electronics functions had slipped through the cracks in 
university research. Because it fit neither the chemical engineering nor 
electrical engineering departments of universities, for a decade basic research 
116 David A. Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States." Chap. 1 In 
Engines of Innovation : U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, edited by Richard S. Rosenbloom 
and William J. Spencer, 56. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
117 Howard R. Bartlett, "The Development of Industrial Research in the United States." Journal of the 
Patent Office Society 23 (1941), 475.
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in semiconductors was the province of the semiconductor industry.”118
“In an industry in which survival hinges on conducting research, Intel 
Corporation is distinct among semiconductor manufacturers in that it has no 
formal research organization and yet it invests steadily in R&D.”119
Introduction
Without historical contextualization, the present can be seen as entirely new 
phenomena ripe for novel policy recommendations and constructed solutions. 
Take your pick of aphorisms on the subject of history and they almost always 
underscore the importance of reflecting upon repetitive nature of our actions. 
George Santayana said “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it,” or in the case of innovation patterns, perhaps we are of equal risk of 
falling into the same quagmires as we are of failing to repeat the successful 
footsteps of the past that led to innovations that revolutionized modern society.
In Silicon Valley and the broader tech world, “history” can often be traced 
back through the recent lifetimes of key inventors and actors in the computer 
revolution—dating back merely six or seven decades—whereas broader 
innovation processes and information exchanges have a much longer 
evolutionary arch. Washington DC is notorious for short-lived institutional 
memory—often forgetting policy programs that happened a decade or 
administration before—resulting in sometimes nearsighted policy 
recommendations affected heavily by recency bias. Discussions surrounding 
private sector R&D are almost all dominated by lamentations about the golden 
days of Bell Labs and replete with calls to revive a lost era of industry-led and 
funded innovation120—speaking as if it is the best or only example of successful 
118 Gordon E. Moore, "Some Personal Perspectives on Research in the Semiconductor Industry,” 
Chap. 7 In Engines of Innovation : U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, eds by Richard S. 
Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer, (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 167.
119 Moore, "Some Personal Perspectives on Research in the Semiconductor Industry,” 165.
120 See, for example: 
Levine, Steve. "What Obama Could Learn from Bell Labs." The FP Group (Washington DC), March 15, 
2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/15/what-obama-could-learn-from-bell-labs/.
Slywotzky, Adrian. "Where Have You Gone, Bell Labs?" Bloomberg Businessweek (New York, NY), 
August 27, 2009. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-08-27/where-have-you-gone-bell-
labs.
Gertner, Jon. "Like Building Refrigerators:  Bell Labs and the End of Game-Changing Innovation." 
Time, March 27, 2012. http://business.time.com/2012/03/27/like-building-refrigerators-bell-labs-and-
the-end-of-game-changing-innovation/.
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private sector research. The research done at Bell Laboratories has reached 
almost mythical level in the way it is idolized and held up as a gold standard for 
private research—and certainly there is plenty to admire—but these praises often 
lack resolution of what structure, policy, and economic alignment led to that 
particular instance and culture of innovation. This circular referencing to Bell 
Labs casts aside a more robust and complete picture of private sector R&D 
practice, and unnecessarily pigeon holes the conversation and consideration of 
possible modern remedies and approaches into one segment of industry and 
time.
This chapter seeks to establish a baseline of historical background on private 
sector R&D—predominately in the United States but drawing from international 
examples or contrast when necessary—as well as documenting the evolving 
structure and culture around university research partnerships that foreground 
the collaborations and data exchanges taking place today. This is done to  clarify 
the traditional role of the private sector in research based on historical evidence 
and prior scholarship. In addition to a historical discussion of corporate research 
and research partnerships, this work weaves in the history of early marketing and 
policy research (done on behalf of industry), as well as early forms of consumer 
data brokering since data exchanges play a key role in many present day research 
activities. Market research and research on users also have many commonalities 
including the need to study behavior, impulses, and desires, and also often relied 
on expert consultants or academics to conduct the work. This chapter introduces 
examples from primary sources at the start of the computer industry that 
illustrate how changing economic pressures influenced private sector R&D 
strategy. These changes were further aided by the new semiconductor and 
personal computing industries that challenged research models of established 
industries by changing the cost of equipment, introducing new competition 
models, new social and regional contexts, and most importantly new 
collaboration regimes. Only when presented in its totality can the evolution of 
private sector research be fully understood in a way helpful to parse out modern 
practices and their implications on the wider research ecosystem.
This section asserts that there are four key timeframes in terms of distinct 
Center for American Progress. "Foster Partnerships between Universities and Industry to Address 
New Challenges." Washington DC, April 11, 2008. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/
news/2008/04/11/4244/foster-partnerships-between-universities-and-industry-to-address-new-
challenges/.
Carafano, James Jay. "Next President Shouldn't Be a Mad Scientist." Washington DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, June 28, 2016. https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/next-
president-shouldnt-be-mad-scientist.
Hochheiser, Sheldon. "Your Engineering Heritage:  Bell Labs and the Transistor." IEEE InSight 
(Piscataway, NJ), 2009. https://insight.ieeeusa.org/articles/your-engineering-heritage-bell-labs-and-the-
transistor/.
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trends in industrial R&D leading up to modern practices in the last 10 years: 1) 
Early industrial era (late 1800s and early 1900s); 2) Wartime and Interwar R&D 
activity (WWI and WWII); 3) Post-war innovation and growth; and 4) Personal 
computer and semiconductor industries.  The 3rd and 4th time periods focus more 
exclusively on high-tech and the budding computer industries—whereas earlier 
sections focus on any documented industry R&D—though relevant examples 
from other industries, such as biotech, are cited as relevant. This chapter will 
discuss each of these timeframes in terms of key players, notable practices, 
incentive structures, cultures around scientific innovation, and political 
economies before concluding with some brief remarks which will foreground the 
proceeding dissertation study. An analysis of the ways in which modern practices 
aligns and diverges will occur throughout this dissertation. This chapter serves to 
establish a historical baseline for each eventual analysis, though a brief 
discussion will conclude the section. The material from this chapter comes from a 
mix of literature from science and innovation historians, primary documents and 
historical literature. This work builds upon the 1996 work “The Evolution of 
Industrial Research in the United States” by David A. Hounshell121 which is a part 
of the edited volume “Engines of Innovation.”122 Hounshell’s work was an 
important and distinctive piece of scholarship off of which this work supplements 
with additional sources and a broader attention to academic partnerships, data 
exchanges, early market research, and later “high-tech” R&D efforts. This chapter 
frames these elements to contemporary phenomena by pulling out the key 
themes that are particularly salient now, over two decades later. (The appropriate 
citations with page numbers to Hounshell are placed throughout.)
Early industrial pre-war research era (late 1800s 
and early 1900s)
The early 19th century US economy was fueled by small and independent 
business owners including farmers, carpenters, trades people, and merchants. 
Howard Bartlett in 1941 stated “The nineteenth century was nearly over before 
the industrial research laboratory became an important factor in the economic 
life of the United States.”123 Hounshell traces the first roots of industrial research 
to somewhere in between 1875—when the Pennsylvania Railroad hired a PhD in 
121 David A. Hounshell’s work is some of the most well researched, thorough, and well-organized 
manuscripts I’ve seen in a long time. He sets a model this author strives to immolate.
122 Hounshell, David A. "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States." Chap. 1 In 
Engines of Innovation : U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, edited by Richard S. Rosenbloom 
and William J. Spencer, 56. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
123 Bartlett, "The Development of Industrial Research in the United States,” 475.
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chemistry, Charles B. Dudley,124 to integrate science into their railroad practice 
by setting up a chemical laboratory especially for them—to 1900 when General 
Electric established a laboratory with the intent that knowledge generated would 
fuel the company’s core technologies and insulate them from competition on the 
market.125 These events, which arguably marked a departure in how industry 
organized and pursued innovation, coincided with larger changes in academic 
research and the professionalization of science. 
In the early 1800s, new technological contributions to industry were isolated 
and individualized coming from independent inventors (e.g., George 
Westinghouse in railroads and Thomas A. Edison in the telegraph industry) who 
would sell their patents to big business industries like the railroads and telegraph 
companies as sort of one-off accidental discovery and casual business 
partnership.  
Small external research organizations began growing at the close of the 19th 
century with the intention of supplying R&D capabilities to companies too small 
to support their own internal R&D capabilities. As Mowery and Rosenberg point 
out, these firms not only existed to outsource R&D capabilities to small firms, but 
also were used to supplement larger firms’ routine research through contract 
work.126 These early research consulting firms provided a bridge between 
external researchers and internal company needs.
Outside of the invention of products and manufacturing machinery that made 
processes faster and cheaper to produce consumer goods, business innovations 
came in the late 19th century as early efficiency experts who made industrial 
processes run faster and more cheaply. Functioning as business consultants, part 
of this job was to collect information and return recommendations to business 
owners.127 Early “information research” at this time had roots in market surveys 
to customers, special advice on technology, and early management consulting but 
was primarily focused on improving factory-level efficiencies.128  Firms like Lord 
124 One of the most interesting contributions of bringing academic ingenuity into early industry was 
Dudley’s invention of an analytical chemistry test for the purity of lard oil. At that time, signal lamps on 
the railroad were lit by lard oil but the lamps were frequently growing dim or extinguishing completely 
when lard oil purchased from outside producers was used—which put railroad passengers in danger of 
crashes. Dudley figured how to test oil to see if it was a mixture of lard oil and grape seed oil (the mixture 
that was being sold as pure lard oil) and once this test was announced there were no more issues 
obtaining pure lard oil on the market. Howard, "The Development of Industrial Research in the United 
States,” 493-494.
125 Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States,” 13; 17.
126 David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg. "New Developments in U.S. Technology Policy: 
Implications for Competitiveness and International Trade Policy." Business and Public Policy  (1989), 
79-82.
Mowery, David C. "Industrial Research and Firm Size, Survival, and Growth in American 
Manufacturing, 1921–1946: An Assessment." The Journal of Economic History 43, no. 4 (1983).
Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States,” 17.
127 James W. Cortada, All the Facts : A History of Information in the United States since 1870, (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110.
128 Cortada, All the Facts : A History of Information in the United States since 1870, 110.
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& Thomas collected information from retailers and consumers, and then sold 
them to advertisers and their customers to inform pricing and product 
introductions. Lord & Thomas, along with their contemporaries, referred to their 
products as “commercial research.”129
Independent firms that melded academic and business initiatives arose to 
meet the data needs of industries in the early 1900s. Organizations like the 
Harvard University Bureau of Business Research and the National Retail Dry 
Goods Association used academic methods for business ends by collecting, 
curating, and selling reports about retail operations. Interestingly, Arthur C. 
Nielsen—known for his radio and television viewer ratings—started his firm “A. 
C. Nielsen Company” in 1923 as a retail research center producing performance 
surveys on industrial equipment and businesses. The firm drifted from industrial 
research to consumer research by testing advertising and marketing strategies, 
price changes, and product packaging—eventually establishing audience 
measuring systems that are still widely known and used.130 In 1962, Neilsen was 
described as having “a raging curiosity, a desire to find out the facts behind 
appearances, and an engineer’s conviction that the facts were measurable. In the 
belief that he could get at the facts, organize them, and sell them to those who 
could use them, he founded the A. C. Nielsen Company.“131 Nielsen made a 
science of measuring markets, and publishing the results as part of a business 
model.132
These examples provide the closest early historical example of industry 
research data and information exchanges flowing in and out of the boundaries of 
the private firm. Though these examples relate more closely to modern consulting 
and market research practices, it represents an important moment where 
information exchanges with outside research parties offered market advantages 
for private companies.
Research organizations now known as “think tanks” have military origins, but 
arose out of joint commercial and academic interests.133 Early 20th century think 
129 Cortada, All the Facts : A History of Information in the United States since 1870, 89.
130 Carter, Bill. "A.C. Nielsen Jr., Who Built Ratings Firm, Dies at 92." New York Times (New York 
City, NY), October 4, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/business/media/ac-nielsen-jr-who-
transformed-research-firm-dies-at-92.html.
James Playsted Wood. "Leaders in Marketing: Arthur C. Nielsen." Journal of Marketing 26, no. 3 
(1962): 77.
131 Wood, “Leaders in Marketing: Arthur C. Nielsen,” 77.
132 It should be noted that Nielsen data is made available to researchers via the Kilts Center for 
Marketing at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This is an important and early example 
of contemporary private sector data sharing for research from a company with such long roots in private 
research and data collection. 
133  “Think tanks” get their name from early concepts in military contexts were academics, military 
professionals, and others could freely toss out ideas and discussion within a contained “room”)
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tanks were often funded by specific industries in order to extend their public 
relations and lobbying interests, yet attempted to maintain a neutral 
appearance.134 Academics at these institutes conducted research and published 
findings relating to public policy issues that often supported the point of view of 
funding industries.135 Economic research firms like the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), Institute for Government Research (IGR), and 
Brookings Institute all received partial or complete funding from large companies 
who also populated their boards with executives from their respective 
industries.136 The origins of corporate-funded and guided research illustrate early 
use of social and economic research to inform political and policy aims, but also 
shed light on the use of seemingly-independent research institutes to advance 
corporate agendas. These early think tanks also show an early partnership 
between academics and corporations. 
The beginning outgrowth of small contract firms that provided outside R&D 
expertise, early industry graduate fellowships, market research, and policy 
analysis begins to paint a picture of how the modern day instantiations of these 
firms plays a role in the broader industry research ecosystem. At the turn of the 
century these outside firms developed to respond to the complex research needs 
of private industry in different sectors and seeded organizational tradition that 
continued into later decades.
Internalizing Formal R&D
The German industry innovation system provided a stark contrast to the ad-
hoc, happenstance organization within US industry, owing much of the difference 
to the general superiority of the German research-based graduate education 
system (the US research education system was only its foundational stages 
around 1900). Hounshell describes industrial sponsorship as a key element of the 
German university research system, and that German firms in the chemical and 
electrical industries “believed that the interests of their firms and those of 
professors were mutual.”137 This system was based heavily off of these industry-
academic research partnerships (as well as government-sponsored initiatives) 
through the formation of special research institutes that represented these 
mutual research interests. Firms including Siemens, Vader, BASF, and Hoechst 
held dominate research positions compared to the non-existent private 
Carafano, James. "The Origins of American Think Tanks." The Daily Signal, October 23, 2015. 
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135 According to Cortada, early think tanks used social science methods to address issues relevant to 
businesses in the hopes that these methods could inform better policymaking, thus making these firms 
early practitioners in “evidenced-based policymaking” but for arguably industry biased ends.)
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infrastructure in the US leading up to 1900, and overall was the most advanced 
system of academic collaboration and research activity until World War I. 
By contrast, it took nearly 20 years after the turn of the century for US firms 
themselves to successfully begin piloting internal research programs—let alone 
lead charge for academic/industry partnerships. Several laboratories began 
springing up around 1900 at firms including General Chemical, Dow, Standard 
Oil of Indiana, Goodyear, and American Cyanamid though there is debate among 
historical scholars exactly what counted as a research laboratory. Hounshell did 
not count what he calls “analytical and control laboratories” unlike other scholars 
like Mowery who did,138 but this time represents when US firms began 
developing their own internal protocols and management structures for 
innovating in-house and moving away from the ad-hoc relationships with 
independent inventors.139 Bartlett attributes the eventual rise of corporate 
laboratories as a result of improved US education, but it should be noted that 
much of the PhD-level talent in the US were educated in Europe up until just 
before WWI.140
It is common to see a blurring of mid-20th century R&D successes painted 
over the struggles of early firms around the turn of the century in statements like: 
“US firms were among the pioneers in the development of in-house industrial 
research laboratories in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”141 
Understanding that US firms were not always R&D pioneers, in part due to the 
influences and consequences of these organizational choices, lack of structured 
partnerships, and weaknesses in domestic research education is important when 
reconsidering the implications of research within this dissertation.
Hounshell states that “the founding of formal R&D programs by these 
manufacturers stemmed in part from competitive threats to their business or 
core technologies.”142 He cites the creation of the General Electric Research 
Laboratory (GERL) in 1900 which was created in order to keep up with outside 
competition that could have rendered the company’s business obsolete since 
Edison’s foundational patents were set to expire. The lab was led by a prominent 
MIT researcher Willis R. Whitney—who was conflicted about taking the role in 
industry and embodied the challenge of the new role of R&D director that 
required as much business savvy as it does technical expertise. Whitney 
reportedly kept the lab focused on efforts that were of business importance by 
selling the problems to research staff on the basis of their intrinsic scientific 
138 See for instance: David C. Mowery, "The Emergence and Growth of Industrial Research in America 
Manufacturing, 1899-1946." (PhD Dissertation Stanford University, 1981), 104.
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merit.143 Suddenly, industry could no longer depend on the market of 
independent inventors to fuel their own competitive advantage.
Similarly, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was pushed to pursue 
formalized R&D activities by major Bell patents expiring, and the increase in the 
number of independent telephone companies, and competitive technological 
threat from developments in radio (making the hefty financial investment in 
wires obsolete).144 These early foundations led to the formation of the now 
infamous “Bell Laboratories” in 1925.
Antitrust attitudes in the early 20th century—following the passage of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890—also began to play a large part in the sudden 
imperative for firms to diversify internally and gain market dominance through 
the “merit of invention.” For instance, DuPont had become the primary supplier 
of explosives to the US military, but after acquiring about 2/3 of the American 
explosive industry, policymakers and the US military expressed uneasiness. 
DuPont had upped their investment in the early 1900s by establishing the 
General Experimental Laboratory and the Eastern Laboratory that worked on 
chemical R&D and improving manufacturing.145 This high research investment 
paid off for DuPont because after they were found guilty violating the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1912, the US military intervened because they “recognized that 
DuPont had devoted considerable sums to innovation in smokeless powder” and 
left that portion of DuPont intact—a move that positioned them in a powerful 
business position just prior to the outbreak of WWI.146
Similarly, Kodak Eastman founded their laboratory in 1912 out of fear of 
antitrust action and competition.147 Reportedly, George Eastman had been on a 
trip to Europe in 1911 or 1912 and while sitting next to a head of Bayer who 
casually dropped the number (several hundred) of chemists with doctorates 
employed within their research laboratory and then asked how many were 
employed by Kodak. This was of course embarrassing to Eastman, since Kodak 
only employed a few chemists and had no formal research laboratory.148 
Coincidentally, Louis Brandeis (who was not yet a Supreme Court Justice) gave 
an address to the City Club in Rochester that said large firms “wouldn’t do any 
research because they were self-satisfied with their positions and didn’t need any 
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technical advice.”149 These two events led to Eastman establishing the Kodak 
Laboratory later that year. Hounshell points out that it’s impossible to tell if 
Eastman established the lab in order to keep up appearances with other large 
businesses at the time or for the investment and commitment to internal 
discovery. 
David Mowrey, in his dissertation at Stanford, argued that most of the R&D 
before WWII was focused on chemistry and chemical technology, but as 
evidenced above, this paints a very limited and inaccurate depiction of the 
diversity of activity that fed what would later become a network of industrial 
research labs and organizations.150 This time was important where large firms 
began recognizing research not only as an important actual asset, but a strategic 
public one as well to earn prestige for this internal investment. In the early part 
of the 20th century in the absence of much of the modern university R&D 
funding, these formalized laboratories were an important employer of PhD-level 
researchers (though many were coming from Europe) and led to regional 
demands that put pressure on educational institutions to develop more rigorous 
research education. Further, this internalization of R&D was an important 
defense against anti-trust regulatory action in the early part of the century. By 
investing in R&D and developing innovations in house rather than poaching 
smaller to midsize businesses, industry was seen more favorably and benevolent 
to the general public—not to mention the regulators. It is important to 
understand how the organizational structure and external political and policy 
pressures were important in shaping a private research ecosystem, which has 
implications today. During this early time, industry usually was a later consumer 
and commercializer of research, but the ways in which industry helped to breed 
ideas in the absence of robust academic research (not to mention the ways 
external data and independent researcher firms were consulted) have important 
implications for modern practices.
Wartime (WWI + WWII) and Inter-wartime R&D 
Activity
Breakout of War 
At the time of WWI, many academics—who still received little funding from 
the federal government—saw the first war as a way to promote research and 
advance a scientific agenda in the US in order to help in the war effort. The 
149 Quote from Sturchio, 1985 via  Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United 
States,” 25.
150 David C. Mowery, "The Emergence and Growth of Industrial Research in America Manufacturing, 
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National Academy of Science (NAS)—the first of the academies; the National 
Academy of Engineering and Institute of Medicine followed later—was chartered 
in 1863 by President Lincoln to engage scholars with the policymaking process 
and was one of the first science policy organizations to bridge the technical and 
policy gap.151 The NAS voted in 1916 to help match scientific experts with the 
federal government by forming the National Research Council (NRC) as the 
functioning research arm. This move was made by prominent scientists who 
thought the NAS was too slow to take action and wanted to make a stronger 
impression on the Wilson Administration that scientists could be essential 
contributors to the war effort. These scientists recruited GE’s research director 
Willis Whitney to help make their case to establish the advanced university and 
ecosystem of research institutes that were found in Germany and set the country 
up technologically for international conflict. Hounshell describes this venture as 
“pure opportunism”152 but these discussions were one of the earliest proposals for 
the government to permanently and continuously fund American science 
research.153 It is particularly of note that Whitney, a private sector researcher, 
was one of the two primary promoters of this proposal. It should be noted that 
this policy strategy inherently supported ideas that were later encapsulated in the 
linear model of innovation. Interestingly, the research directors at the 
pioneering R&D firms—Willis Whitney (GE), Charles Reese (DuPont), Kenneth 
Mees (Kodak), JJ Carty (AT&T) and Frank Jewett (AT&T)—became prominent 
advisors for the government and American military, as well as other industry 
leaders on how research could be used to generate technological advances.154
At the end of WWI, these R&D directors created the Directors of Industrial 
Research (DIR) as a forum to meet and discuss everything from “starting salaries 
for scientists with doctoral degrees, publication policies, and coordination of 
research a diversified firm.”155  Members also hosted 1-2 daylong tours of their 
respective research facilities, which gave other outsiders an opportunity to see 
how the facilities were set up but also to give members without R&D backing 
from management the ability to go back and give specifics on why their firms 
should invest.156 
 Interwar Period
The success of research during the interwar years was described by John 
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Kenly Smith Jr as based on “two ingredients: the use of science to understand 
and improve technology, and the possession of organizational capabilities to 
develop and commercialize new products.”157
Several of the laboratories that would go on to dominate the post-war years 
were founded after WWI but before the breakout of WWII—namely, Bell Labs 
(even though AT&T did have formalized research activities prior to Bell Labs) and 
RCA Laboratories. But in addition to these new dominate players, this time was 
rich with industry research leadership, early policy proposals for the federal 
support of fundamental research, and expanding presence of private sector R&D 
practice.
Many of the key industry research leaders who had led conversations during 
WWI continued their advocacy to gain continual federal support for research. By 
the 1920s, several prominent researchers (who founded CalTech) and the 
National Research Council created a plan that was taken up and led by Herbert 
Hoover (then Secretary of Commerce) to raise $20 million from industry to set 
up a research endowment to fund basic science research at universities.158 This 
effort failed to raise enough industry financial backing and was abandoned by 
1932, but was an important policy strategy as an alternative to government 
funding of research that would later feed into industry under the assumptions of 
the linear innovation model.
In thinking critically about corporate strategy, scholars have noted that many 
times companies did what Wise calls “leapfrogging” by acquiring core technology 
outside of the firm and then using the corporate internal research capabilities to 
surpass competition.159 This can be seen in cases of DuPont and cellophane, GE 
refrigerators, and Kodak color film. But by the 1930s, industry leaders at DuPont 
and AT&T began incorporating more academic-style research into their research 
units because science was seen as the rate limiting factor in innovation—since 
companies were free to capture innovations stemming from good ideas 
happening outside of the company.160 These strategies support the model of 
linear innovation posed by Bush within the next decade.
Bell Telephone Laboratories (Bell Labs) was founded in 1925 to support the 
research and development capacities for American Telephone and Telegraph 
(AT&T). This move formalized earlier R&D efforts that arose in an effort to shape 
the patent portfolio of AT&T in the 1910s. Bell Labs is among the most well-
known privately funded basic and applied research lab—responsible for an array 
of groundbreaking technologies including the transistor, laser, UNIX operating 
system and 6 Nobel prizes.161 At the peak of Bell Labs’ production, the 
157 John Kenly Smith, "The Scientific Tradition in American Industrial Research." Technology and 
Culture 31, no. 1 (1990): 126-127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3105763.
158 Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States,” 35.
159 John Kenly Smith, "The Scientific Tradition in American Industrial Research,” 127.
160 Smith, "The Scientific Tradition in American Industrial Research.,” 127
161 Neal and McCormick. Beyond Sputnik : U.S. Science Policy in the Twenty-First Century,135.
63
organization had over 15,000 employees that included approximately 1200 
PhDs.162
University partnerships and colocation
The large corporate labs of this time were often built with an easy 
proximity to university talent—not unlike labs like DuPont and pharmaceutical 
companies earlier in the century. Except this time instead of taking advantage of 
local university talent (e.g., state schools in the region because the industry was 
already established in the area), this new wave of corporate research groups 
explicitly sought out colocation with elite private universities, and especially 
those who were willing to embrace engineering as a new field.163
State schools, on the other hand, continued a trend to use their research 
talent to help local industries—particularly during the war effort. For example, 
the University of Akron supplied skilled personnel to the local rubber industry 
and consequently became a leader in rubber research and innovation during the 
war.164 The colocation for talent and access to collaborations, and the 
consequential divide that results from these geographic choices or accidents 
remains a theme in contemporary partnerships. 
World War II
By WWII, research and the potential for industry to contribute to public 
knowledge was well regarded. In 1941, Bartlett stated: “Today the research 
laboratory is widely recognized as an indispensable part of the country’s 
industrial equipment. From it comes the knowledge that leads not only to 
improved methods and materials but also to entirely new processes and products 
and occasionally new industries.”165
According to John Kenly Smith Jr, the burst of wartime innovation was a 
result of cooperative R&D between governments, industry, and universities and 
by bringing resources together—in particular government (mostly military) 
funding of basic R&D thus removing the risk involved with financially 
committing to these activities.166  However this shared role in funding and 
intellectual leadership would be reshaped at the close of the war. 
Some of the large corporate labs played very central and vital roles during 
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the war. Bell Laboratories shut down most of its planned operations to dedicate 
their research staff to joint DoD projects, and many of their famous researchers, 
such as Claude Shannon, held security clearances. Projects were run in a military 
like manner, and information was primarily controlled using national security 
classification systems. According to Gertner (author of The Idea Factory) the 
research department within Bell labs had halted research activities and devoted 
about 75% of the lab’s work to wartime electronics development.167 Gertner also 
notes that Jewett, the Bell Labs President, spent the majority of his time in 
Washington DC strategizing with public leaders on how to use US scientists for 
the war effort.168 Much of the work from this time was shrouded in secrecy.169 
The military/defense partnerships Bell and other major labs had leading into and 
during the second world war lasted well into the 20th century, and undoubtedly 
had a great influence on how these labs organized and thought about research. 
World War II in the United States was an important time to solidify the 
importance of researchers in not only contributing to national security, but in the 
potential for science and engineering to benefit social and economic challenges. It 
is out of scope to cover the numerous scientific leaps and developments that 
occurred during WWII, at least in part from involvement from the private sector, 
but this is detailed in many other works. The effect this time had on companies 
and cultures of research is described in detail in the rest of this chapter.
RCA 170 (Radio Corporation of America) was a major electronics company 
created at the end of WWI, but whose formal laboratory would come about in the 
WWII era. At the close of the first world war, the radio industry was highly 
fragmented. GE was seeking to recoup over $1 million in development costs 
incurred during the war, but when the Marconi Company (a UK firm) tried to buy 
24 alternators and exclusive rights from GE for $3 million President Wilson 
stepped in to block the sale and prevent these assets from going to a foreign 
country.171 As a result of this block and new policies regulating how much a 
foreign firm could own in an American radio station, GE was ordered to buy 
American Marconi for $9.5 million and from that established a new company: 
RCA, which took on leadership from both GE and American Marconi.172 Prior to 
the laboratory being built, RCA’s research and development divisions were split 
between the RCA Radiotron Division in Harrison, New Jersey and the RCA Victor 
Division in Camden, New Jersey. One history book referred these two facilities as 
both old and full of red tape.173 When the company began to contract for more 
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R&D as well as production for the US armed forces in 1940-1941, a management 
decision was made to free up factory production space by consolidating R&D into 
one location, with an added bonus that such consolidation would make securing 
facilities against espionage much easier.174 Making the process for new 
innovations more straightforward appeared to be a bonus. RCA Laboratories 
(later renamed the David Sarnoff Research Center) was founded in 1941 just prior 
to the US involvement in WWII in Princeton because of its proximity to the 
company’s Rockefeller Center headquarters and a major university175. When the 
war broke out, the laboratory conducted unplanned defense focused research 
until the end of the war and even produced apple sauce as part of the war effort 
out of the orchards adjacent to the lab—which was built on farmland176. The lab is 
known for its advances in film, television displays, and basic research in physics 
that also resulted in a Nobel Prize. RCA, with its wartime roots, is often cited 
alongside Bell Labs as a notable model of corporate research laboratories in the 
mid-20th century. 
The war and interwar periods were an important point for industrial research 
since internal research laboratories had grown and formalized substantially, and 
there was a growing consensus among industry leaders that changes had to be 
made to invest in the educational pipeline of researchers. Most industry research 
had become completely internal through robust private infrastructure, with 
partnerships beginning to move toward public-private wartime collaborations. 
Despite the growing tussles over the sites and contexts of “pure” research, there 
was undeniable utility to the R&D efforts coming from private industry by the 
close of the second world war. These partnerships and applications heavily 
influenced post-war policy decision making and conceptualization of the linear 
order of innovation, which has shaped the modern research ecosystem and public 
perception to present.
Post-War Innovation Policy and Growth
Arguably, the most defining moment for US R&D came in the post-war period 
with large ramifications not just for academic research but for industrial R&D—in 
how it was typecast, organized, networked, and built into mental models of 
private sector R&D. The publication of several post-war books lauding the role of 
174 Magoun, David Sarnoff Research Center : RCA Labs to Sarnoff Corporation, 9.
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the scientist—and most notably Vannevar Bush’s “Science, the Endless 
Frontier”—set in motion both policy infrastructure as well as the formalized 
conceptualization of the linear model of innovation that exist and define the R&D 
landscape today.177  (A detailed discussion can be found in Chapter 2) This was a 
critical moment in the shaping of corporate R&D identity, that has lasting 
ramifications on how firms evolved and perceived their in house innovation, not 
to mention how innovation cycles were conceptualized globally.
There are entire books written about the politics of post war science policy, 
often focusing in particular on the impact of “Science, the Endless Frontier.” 
These works include: Kleinman’s “Politics on the Endless Frontier,”178 
Narayanamurti and Odumosu’s “Cycles of Invention and Discovery: Rethinking 
the Endless Frontier,”179 among many other works. This section intends to pull 
out the salient background, politics that shaped the national perception and 
functioning of industrial R&D, and explore the limitations of these pervasive 
narratives on mental models of industry R&D. Admittedly, entire dissertations 
could be written on this subtopic alone. Understanding key influences and how 
they shaped the perception and execution of industrial research and the entire 
R&D landscape in the US are briefly discussed here. 
Key moments at the closing of the war
Science had in the eyes of many won the war, and brought with it many 
different technological innovations like antibiotics, digital computing, and new 
materials that made their way directly into the home and workplace, while the 
bomb captured the imaginations—or likely rather fear and awe—of the general 
public. Sadly, wars also prompt improvements to emergency medicine, home 
health, and often public health. Though versions of homemade tampons were 
used in many cultures prior to WWI, it was not until the Kimberly-Clark 
company produced “tampons” in such large quantities in 1914 that they became 
commercially available as Kotex,180 and then widely popularized during WWII as 
women took on more active jobs and additional companies like Tampax.181 The 
war also saw great leaps in the prevention and treatment of public health 
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concerns like malaria.182
The credit was taken home by an educated elite in white coats rather than the 
engineers and industrialists, in part because of the focus by popular press and 
books like Scientists Against Time published in 1946.183 Not to mention 
calculated actions by leaders. Hounshell aptly puts it: “Seldom have the lessons of 
war been more fundamentally misunderstood. Seldom have such 
misunderstandings been more important, for they governed the course of 
national policy and the direction of the US industrial R&D until the 1960s. What 
everyone, including those who should have known better overlooked was that 
none of these new technologies and products could have emerged without the 
enormous engineering and manufacturing know-how and capabilities of the 
nation’s corporations.”184 This narrative by Bush focused on basic science as the 
determining factor of key wartime developments, completely ignoring the the 
massive infusion of military and government spending on these activities to make 
these advancements possible—regardless of their classification.185
Toward the end of WWII, then President Franklin Roosevelt expressed an 
interest in continuing the expansive science and technology apparatus that had 
been established between the military, federal government, private industry, and 
academics—only devoting this energy toward improving the health and standard 
of living of society instead of weapons of war. In a letter186 to his personal 
scientific advisor187 and the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD)188, Roosevelt requested recommendations for how to 
reallocate and organize peacetime efforts. A more cynical view is that the report 
was requested in order to politically confront Senator Henry Kilgore who was 
pushing (and would continue to push) for an egalitarian distribution of contracts 
and science grants throughout the US (as opposed to basing the system off of 
merit).189 The response, in the form of a report titled “Science, the Endless 
Frontier” was published several months after Roosevelt’s death in July 1945, but 
the ideas contained were both continued by the Truman administration and 
entrenched in discourse surrounding American R&D. 
“Science the Endless Frontier” was put together not only by Bush, but a team 
he had assembled of like-minded individuals who shared a vision of a pure 
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science ideology.190 The report repeatedly casts non-academic researchers into 
the shadows by: 1) creating a theory that innovation is linear requiring 
fundamental science before any other advancement is possible191 and 2) creating 
the illusion that non-academic researchers were not central to many of the 
advancements made during the war. For instance, the report states “With some 
notable exceptions, most research in industry and Government involves 
application of existing scientific knowledge to practical problems. It is only 
colleges, universities, and a few research institutes that devote most of their 
research efforts to expanding the frontiers of knowledge.”192 
The invocation of the American west in the title of Endless Frontier is a trope 
that has been used repeatedly throughout science (e.g., space as the “final 
frontier” in the 1960s). In the case of Bush, it was deliberately used to inspire and 
call to action both citizens and policymakers alike. 
Politically, the push to establish reliable funding from the federal government 
was calculated and picked up on the stalled efforts of research advocates and 
leaders from the interwar period. However, this push by Bush and the committee 
had to make it clear that industry was not enough to sustain R&D or fund 
research in academia. Of corporate research the report states: “Industry is 
generally inhibited by preconceived goals, by its own clearly defined standards, 
and by the constant pressure of commercial necessity. Satisfactory progress in 
basic science seldom occurs under conditions prevailing in the normal industrial 
laboratory. There are some notable exceptions, it is true, but even in such cases it 
is rarely possible to match the universities in respect for the freedom which is so 
important to scientific inquiry.” This statement neglects to mention not only the 
role industry played in technological advances in the early 20th century, but in 
orchestrating academics and independent inventors through funding and 
partnerships. This statement also casts aside the important role industry 
scientists had in collaborative war efforts. The report does make key arguments 
that it is government’s role to ensure the sustainability of research education, but 
completely neglects to mention the negative aspects of academia: individual egos 
driven by fame and career advancement above science, limited funding for truly 
uninhibited thinking, time constraints, university politics etc. However this 
report can, and is by many scholars cited within this section seen as a political 
calculation to take advantage of a moment in history in order to set up a federal 
190 This is discussed throughout Daniel J. Kevles’ work. For instance: Kevles, Daniel J. Principles and 
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infrastructure for federal R&D funding and education pipeline. 
Two other key political choices in the report had impacts on the narrative 
around US R&D. First, despite Bush’s training as an engineer, he carefully 
ensured the entire report emphasized the role of “scientists” instead of 
“engineers.” For instance, in the report it states “For more than 5 years many of 
our scientists have been fighting the war in laboratories, in the factories and 
shops, and at the front. We have been directing the energies of our scientists to 
the development of weapons and materials and methods, on a large number of 
narrow projects initiated and controlled by the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development and other government agencies. Like troops, the scientists have 
been mobilized, and thrown into action to serve their country in a time of 
emergency.” This storytelling scrubs the work of engineers funded by OSRD, 
directly implied even by discussing “factories and shops” where it is engineers, 
not scientists, who do most of the work. This erasure of engineers, or rather the 
intentional relabeling, is attributed by Narayanamurti, and Odumosu as a 
strategy to counter the American military’s “antipathy toward engineering 
salesmanship and British snobbery toward engineering” in general193. The 
strategic consequences of this narrative was that it propagated the notion that 
applied work done by engineers, often in industry, was not “research” or was less 
valuable. This monitor favoritism enforced the linear model of innovation 
implicitly, and as Narayanamurti, and Odumosu put it, “In some regard, the 
rationale of the linear model that places emphasis on science over engineering 
builds on some long-standing ideas in western culture (and other cultures as 
well) that favor the “head”—or intellect—over that of the “hand”—including in 
this case technical expertise.”194 
Second in political calculations, Bush recast “pure science” as “basic research” 
in part because of the urging of Bell Labs President Frank Jewett’s comments that 
this language implied that other types of research, specifically industry research, 
was “impure.”195 This switch to “basic” also reinforced a linear model notion that 
research occurs in three consecutive stages. Interestingly, Hounshell notes that 
with the exception of the assertion that basic research should only be done in 
academic environments, US industrialists largely embraced the tenets of the 
Bush model and Science, the Endless Frontier.196 
In part to Bush’s calculated strategy and advocacy, this moment of politics 
defined the R&D system that continues today, and has a great impact on how 
industry research is viewed with a modern lens. Instead of explicitly highlighting 
the many ways intellectual cooperation and infrastructure was shared between 
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government scientists, academics, and industry researchers, the story was told as 
a singular hero narrative. It was a strategic choice to fight for basic science 
government agencies and continual federal investment in fundamental research, 
but obscured key elements and lessons that can be learned from even today when 
thinking about potential roles for private industry in the advancement of social 
goods through technologies. 
Post-war industrial laboratory development (Post war lab development and 
boom; space race and remilitarization of R&D)
The story about basic science was not just heard by policymakers and 
scientists themselves, but also industry leaders who wanted to use the post-war 
economy to ensure their firms were successful in their innovation investment 
strategies. A bit ironic because many private firms had been so central to the 
successful efforts coming out of the war and yet in some cases seemingly 
neglected the key elements that made these partnerships so important, such as 
cooperative research and federal funding. 
International Business Machines’ (IBM) President and Founder Thomas J. 
Watson Sr. established what is now known as IBM Research in 1945—just prior 
to Bush’s report touting the virtues of basic science—and described their labs as 
“The First Corporate Pure Science Research Lab197.” The foundation of IBM 
Research was heavily tied to Columbia University—the first laboratory space was 
in a former fraternity house—however the deep ties to a particular university are 
not unique. RCA Laboratories had close associations with researchers at 
Princeton University, while Bell Laboratories had many universities. Both RCA 
Labs and Bell Labs had deep ties with US defense and national security efforts 
and were located on the east coast, which undoubtedly influenced their internal 
culture and practices. 
During this post war time, Bell Labs also expanded and repositioned their 
“human factors research” from the late 1940s to include social psychology, group 
psychology, and generally what was grouped together as “behavioral research” 
and “applied behavioral research.”198 This is particularly notable because it was a 
rare documented example of private industry investing in research that applied 
directly the social, behavioral, health, and public health states of their users (or 
customers). Hanson’s paper reflects primarily on the motivations and 
organizational structure of these research pursuits, but their mere existence 
stands out among any other industry research lab, and foregrounds later research 
in user experience from a much more academic and fundamental approach. 
Kenly Smith described the post-war 1950s industry development 
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succinctly, detailing the shifts in culture to move laboratories toward an academic 
research style. “The new research orthodoxy raised the status of the research 
laboratory and gave it an unprecedented autonomy. Corporate management 
believed that, if innovation was the product of science, then the process was best 
left to the scientists.”199 
 The antitrust narrative was still present in the post war period through the 
1970s. As Kenly Smith summed up, “Making this concept even more attractive to 
corporate management was the late New Deal antitrust attack on big business 
that continued into the 1950s and made corporate acquisitions or cooperative 
activities highly suspect. Companies had to rely on internally generated 
technology, but the Bush concept reassured executives that in-house science 
would generate an adequate supply of inventions.”200 According to Hounshell 
companies like DuPont had begun preparing for the post-war era before the US 
had even entered military conflict in WWII by expanding their antitrust 
divisions.201 This move was in part motivated by the anti-big business motives of 
the Roosevelt administration, and the antitrust actions that had been levied 
against them.202 Firms like DuPont had been saved by their R&D departments 
developing lines like nylon, and internal memos note that they read Bush’s report 
very carefully—buying into the linear innovation cycle and call to invest in more 
basic science. This is ironic considering that Bush’s report assumes this type of 
research isn’t happening in industry, but in the case of DuPont specifically this 
type of forecasting was almost a dare to double down on internal investments. It 
set up that the US would be investing heavily in basic science, and they would 
have to invest even more internally to keep their leadership. Other firms similarly 
invested in expanding their internal R&D or shifting to more fundamental 
research in the post war period for a variety of reasons, but likely due to the 
narrative poised by the report and as an effort to stave off antitrust. These firms 
included Kodak, GE, General Motors, RCA, Merck & Co and AT&T.203  With the 
way research ecosystem has evolved, it’s almost unimaginable firms would take 
this investment as a challenge instead of a free ride. 
Part of the singular focus of firms during this time to invest internally is that 
all innovation that happened outside of their own corporate spheres could be 
viewed as inaccessible due to the antitrust climate. Mowrey and Teece categorize 
this as the “golden years” of corporate research since firms focused their 
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innovation seeking (and thus investments) inward.204
Losing faith: Decline of Industrial R&D in the 1960s
After about ten years of large post-war R&D investments, firms grew weary. 
“Chief executives, who once accepted R&D on faith, are no longer willing to keep 
hands off and let the technological tail go on wagging the corporate dog. Many 
are beginning to look for ways to measure results, which they rightly suspect are 
not always what they should be.”205 
Kenly Smith Jr. states that many organizational experts were deployed to 
justify why scientists required such special treatment. “This literature was aimed 
at a new generation of research directors who, unlike their predecessors, defined 
their jobs more narrowly by insisting that the laboratories were responsible only 
for research, not innovation. They had grown up in a research culture and saw 
their job as sustaining a tradition, not as supporting corporate goals. Not 
surprisingly, their labs became increasingly isolated through the 1950s. The 
physical manifestation of this was laboratories built in suburban country-club 
settings far from the plant and corporate headquarters.”206 The way researchers 
were isolated and the entire research divisions were organized (or disorganized 
from other corporate efforts) played a large role. Additionally, other scholars like 
John Jewkes, a historian in the 1950s, concluded with his colleagues that many 
innovations came from outside of the laboratory.207 The original many of the 
leading firms (e.g., AT&T) separated their research labs physically and not just 
organizationally is that they were required or requested to do so by federal 
funders of classified projects.208  This infrastructure design choice was permeated 
in many corporate labs following the war because it was conflated with the special 
needs and role of the researchers, but instead propagated an ivory tower that set 
many of these R&D branches to fail. 
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According to Hounshell a variety of wavering social views (e.g., growing 
suspicion of government and technology) also contributed to the continued 
decline of federal R&D investment in the private sector during the Vietnam 
War.209 This coincided with a decline in the internal investment in research from 
firms that had previously been heavy investors in uninhibited fundamental 
research. Hounshell cites waning faith in the linear model Bush proposed, since 
many firms had invested large amounts of money in programs that reaped little 
financial reward for companies over two decades.210 Firms included DuPont, 
Kodak, and IBM. Critical to these points, Hounshell points out the inflation in the 
1960s and 70s meant that R&D budgets which were held flat through the decade 
were actually decreasing when calculated in constant dollars.211 The impact of 
budgets and overall changes to firm executive management style will be echoed 
later as an important factor in how firms invested in R&D. Unlike during the 
Great Depression, economic shocks during the early 1970s resulted in less faith in 
R&D investments. 
In President Nixon’s address to Congress on March 16, 1972212, in what 
would later be called “the Presidential Message on Science and Technology” 
called for a cooperative endeavor in order to harness the power of science to 
improve national progress. He stated: “Finally, we must appreciate that the 
progress we seek requires a new partnership in science and technology—one 
which brings together the Federal Government, private enterprise, State and local 
governments, and our universities and research centers in a coordinated, 
cooperative effort to serve national interest. Each member of that partnership 
must play the role it can play best; each must respect and reinforce the unique 
capacities of the other members. Only if this happens, only if our new partnership 
thrives, can we be sure that our scientific and technological resources will be used 
as effectively as possible in meeting our priority national needs.”213 What is 
fascinating about this address, is that Nixon famously had a strained relationship 
with his science advisor, Dr. Edward D. David, and that this statement—
considering the actual history of WWII 27 years prior—is unremarkable and 
entirely unoriginal. But the fact that the popular narrative that erased industry’s 
vital role in WWII technological and scientific advancement made the call for 
cooperation appear as a novel solution in a time of otherwise decaying R&D 
support. 
Part of the reason the investment had not paid off was “in part because the 
scientists were unwilling to undertake the mundane task of development and 
209 Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States,” 50.
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commercialization. To remedy this situation, in the 1960s and 1970s companies 
emphasized development and commercialization of new products, forcing 
reluctant scientists into new molds.”214 Once again, the total separation of R&D 
facilities from corporate goals and strategy was an unsuccessful approach that 
assumed the pragmatic matters of technology transfer could be solved by sheer 
intellectual ingenuity alone. Even in cases where that may have been the case, 
lack of successful business models (as was the case with Xerox, below) to help 
capture and exploit the technologies meant firms could not reap the rewards of 
their investments—thus disincentivizing R&D investment overall. 
As part of an organizational response to these commercialization failures, 
many companies in the 1970s began corporate “New Venture Divisions” which 
were found in large firms as an effort to address the gap between the ivory tower 
R&D divisions and the business strategy of the company. Norman Fast describes 
New Venture Divisions in his study of this emergent management approach to 
innovation.215 He states: “A New Venture Division (or NVD) is an organizational 
unit whose primary functions are 1) the investigation of potential new business 
opportunities, 2) the development of business plans for new ventures, and 3) the 
management of the early commercialization of these ventures.” Though his study 
tracks the rise of these organizational units throughout the 1960s and 1970s, by 
the conclusion of the study half of his cases had been disbanded, and he states 
that these were short-lived solutions. However, these NVDs served as a popular 
trend of the time to manage innovation and corporate diversification. Fast states 
that the 1960s saw a high number of acquisitions because of high price earnings 
rations and a general popularization of the “conglomerate concept,” but that this 
fell in the 1970s due to tighter available credit, declining price to earnings ratios, 
increasingly stringent accounting rules, and a tougher anti-trust climate.216 
Understanding how firms adapted organizationally to manage innovation 
activities in response to more global economic and policy climates gives clues to 
how firms could and maybe even should respond in contemporary day.
Many different industries reported pressures on internal R&D, and different 
approaches to try and remedy the stagnation. Alcoa (aluminum) reported their 
R&D organization began to struggle, and “the signals were vague at first but 
became clearer by the late 1970s, when a series of new corporate faces began 
showing up to ‘fix’ the labs.”217 In part this was attributed to the fact the company 
had exhausted their initial foundations of scientific knowledge, and that the 
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development efforts could only carry them so far. 
During this post-war time as federal research investment mechanisms were 
designed from scratch to seed basic and fundamental research within academia, 
private industry reallocated their wartime efforts back into formalized research 
laboratories intended to mimic academic settings. Threats of antitrust continued 
to be a motivation for industry to invest in R&D, but there was also wide 
acceptance internal research was the best method for innovation. This emphasis 
on internal and highly academic labs by industry began to disintegrate in the 60s 
and 70s as bureaucratic barriers to labs began to fade and the realization of the 
challenges commercializing various stages of research sunk into business 
leadership. This time period established several models for how many industries
—including the rising high tech industry—would come to think of gold standard, 
Bell Labs-like research operations and more porous internal research 
organizations. 
Rise of Personal Computer and Semiconductor 
Industries, alongside new research models
Focusing specifically on “high tech” computer and semiconductor industries’ 
research strategies, the 60s and 70s post-war laboratory boom and bust fostered 
a unique collection of models which modified and built off of the linear 
innovation schemas that dominated the post-war conceptualization of the role of 
the private firm in research. The demands for new models of cooperative 
innovation and collapse of formal laboratories in many firms builds the 
foundation for contemporary practices in tech, and was a unique phenomenon 
for the tech industry. This section explores the implementation of Silicon Valley 
R&D theoretical models introduced in Chapter 2, including examples such as 
Xerox PARC where a formal lab was created, and emerging consortia and joint 
ventures to foster cooperative research in the face of global competitiveness. This 
final section also examines firms like Intel that did not create a research division, 
and how research was incorporated and leveraged into the business strategy. 
Bush, in addition to his policymaking, was a cofounder of one of the central 
companies on Boston’s “Route 128” which was a high tech regional cluster. One 
of his students, Fredrick Turman—the co-inventor of the transistor—returned to 
Stanford after the war. Turman built upon Bush’s convictions about the 
importance of academic-industry,218 and went after key DoD grants in the late 
1950s and early 1960s which in part continued to spur growth in the budding 
218 G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier : Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. 1st MIT 
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Silicon Valley.219 With the assistance of notable individuals, such as Turman, the 
Bay Area became an alternative to the traditional east coast technology hubs—
particularly around Route 128 in Boston, but also in other areas clustered in 
upstate New York and New Jersey. The first computer industry instances are 
often traced back to the 1939 William Hewlett and David Packard collaboration. 
The establishment of Shockley Semiconductor—using technology stemming from 
Bell Labs—in 1956 is another key historical moment in the history of Silicon 
Valley. Interestingly, the moniker “Silicon Valley” originated in 1971 from Dan 
Hoefler who was a reporter at Electronic News after he wrote a three part series 
about the region’s history.220 
Xerox PARC as the formalized Silicon Valley research lab
Notably, some high tech firms did still establish R&D arms during this 
otherwise decline of corporate laboratory popularity. As with any trend, there are 
exceptions. Xerox’s first formalized research roots took shape in the early 
1960s,221 and is a company whose business strategy is the topic of many accounts 
and analyses—including Fumbling the Future—which222 are deeply intertwined 
with their relationship to R&D and innovation strategy over time. Much like Bell/
AT&T, only the parts most relevant are described here but entire dissertations 
could be written about these companies alone. Xerox of course is synonymous 
with copying, often serving as an eponym for the act of using the technology they 
deployed. Xerox began pursuing a central research laboratory under the direction 
of board member John Bardeen, and in 1962 recruited several senior research 
managers from General Electric’s Schenectady Research Center—continuing a 
long tradition of poaching other industry research managers to jumpstart an 
R&D division (according to Myers).223 The Webster Research Center (WRC) was 
dedicated in 1964 in upstate New York, and grew rapidly in reputation and size 
between the years 1968 and 1986.224 To continue the tradition set by WRC, 
additional research centers were established in Palo Alto (1970), Canada (1974), 
and eventually laboratories were installed in Rank Xerox in Europe and research 
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began at Fuji-Xerox in Japan225 (both of the latter moves representing initial 
international joint ventures that foreshadow trends about to come). Myers, who 
was senior vice president of research and technology, was involved with these 
strategic decisions, comparing the Xerox strategy with contemporaries of Xerox’s 
time—like GE, AT&T, IBM, and DuPont—who each took a centralized and 
consolidated approach to research.226 Xerox, on the other hand, exploited their 
geographic distribution and their associated cultures and missions by focusing 
each center on a particular core competency. Rochester (WRC) focused on 
imaging sciences, chemistry was consolidated in Canada, and Palo Alto [known 
as Xerox PARC (Palo Alto Research Center Incorporated)] on digital systems.227 
Myers attributes the continual increase in research investments during 
1976 and 1986, when the company was otherwise facing financial struggles, to the 
positive relationship between the head of research and Xerox’s chairman.228 
Myers quotes an expert who detailed the corporate philosophy, and how it 
influenced the aspirations to hire “the best, most creative researchers you can 
find,” providing the most supportive environment with advanced 
instrumentation possible, and working the business needs into the program via 
budget selection.229 Much like Bell, Xerox strove to create an intellectual 
environment that was in touch with (and a part of) the academic research 
communities. Xerox PARC had close ties to nearby universities including UC 
Berkeley and Stanford, and also broke the regional pattern of east coast 
laboratories. Some cite this regional jump as responsible for the free-thinking 
creative style of the organization, and its lack of ties to national security and 
military applications. 
This approach, particularly as it related to PARC, gave the company high 
visibility and respect from academics and the public alike. The inventions 
originating at PARC are considered ubiquitous technology including the laser 
printer, ethernet, modern personal computer, graphical user interface (GUI), 
object-oriented programming, etc. However, it became clear by the 1980s that 
the investments, though they earned this admiration and notoriety, were not 
making an economic impact on the company. Reputation is not enough to keep a 
business afloat.
Xerox’s ability to capture technology into their business model struggled. 
In order to try and keep up with Japanese competition and offer desktop laser 
printers (as opposed to low-end copiers), Xerox faced a dilemma to where—to put 
it in Myers’ words—“research” favored entirely new iconographic approach that 
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migrated away from already taxed manufacturing competencies, whereas 
“development” favored using traditional xerography.230 The senior management 
favored the research approach, and the project was designated as “skunk 
works231” internally and given special secret status. However, given what is now 
to be known issues with Xerox’s ability to deliver new products into the business 
model and move quickly to be among the first in the market, the entire operation 
failed. What is fascinating about this is that the failure came in the ability to 
properly move on new technology and integrate it into the business model of the 
rest of the company, not on the ability to innovate itself232. Which suggests in the 
case of Xerox PARC, where many of the technologies relevant to this dissertation 
were developed, it was a business model failure—or at least an integration failure
—not a failure on the design of the R&D department. As Myer’s stated: “Xerox’s 
proprietary, vertically integrated business model missed the open system, 
horizontal business structuring that ultimately characterized the advance of the 
distributed computing paradigm in the office workplace.”233
Relaxation of antitrust, beginning of cooperative research and technology 
development
Entering into the 1980s, global competitiveness became a driving force 
behind organizational and investment decisions by US firms and policymakers. 
Compared to the more inward domestic focus of the post-war decades, the late 
1970s and early 1980s began a shift to where US firms no longer had a lead over 
war-devastated economies across the world. Europe had not only rebuilt and 
revitalized the academic prowess and corporate strength of the pre-war years, but 
countries like Japan introduced massive competition on the US market. These 
economic forces in part led to a relaxation of the anti-trust polices as a way of 
making cooperative arrangements and collaborative R&D models possible for 
tech firms. Prior to the passage of any federal legislation, early semiconductor 
pioneers banded together to form the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) 
in 1977 to present a united front and state of the industry to both international 
competitors and the US Federal Government as a way of courting and demanding 
national assistance.234 This assistance was in part achieved by the passage of the 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-462), which established a 
research consortia to assist with technology competitiveness by forming 
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SEMATECH (a portmanteau derived from “Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Technology”) and the Microelectronic and Computer Technology Corporation 
(MCC). Eventually, the National Cooperative Research Act was replaced in 1993 
by the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA235; P.L. 
103-42) which further reduced the potential antitrust liabilities of joint ventures 
productions as well as standard setting organizations. Within the world of 
semiconductors, there were also the presence of advisory councils created to help 
innovators and firms work with policymakers to create policies that promoted 
American technological competitiveness. Congress established the National 
Advisory Committee on Semiconductors (NACS) in 1988 to help create national 
policies and strategy by connecting industry leaders and hosting workshops to 
coordinate with various public agencies, but most of NACS activities were 
concluded by 1991.236 This, however, set an important example of how even short 
termed advisory councils can serve as a bridge between industry actors and 
government, in the interest of national innovation style strategy.  
Additionally during this time, technology transfer policies were put into 
place to help encourage the translation of fundamental research from national 
labs or academia to the private sector as a way to spur the economy and increase 
American competitiveness. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 
1980 (PL 96-480) sought to encourage the transfer of federally-owned or 
developed technologies (usually from federal laboratories) by making transfer 
activities a requirement and budgetary obligation. Additional legislation 
bolstered these “tech transfer” priority efforts including the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 (PL 99-502) which specifically focused on the transfer of 
federal agency technology to the commercial private sector, and the National 
Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 (PL 101-189237) which made 
technology transfer of federal R&D agencies a mission and priority. Not only did 
these laws seek to establish tech transfer of federal investment to the private 
sector as a priority, but it enabled programs and made clear the ability to transfer 
technology that was not central to national security. 
This shift in national and private sector R&D strategy was spurred not only 
by the need to outcompete foreign companies, but because the cost of equipment 
and facility upkeep had drastically increased. This equipment was not readily 
available in infrastructure like federal laboratories to private companies (as is 
sometimes the case with fundamental research either by federal employees or 
through joint projects with academics in areas like experimental physics). 
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Splitting the cost of the facilities through joint ventures—explicitly allowed 
through laws previously described—also reduced the risk to any one firm. It was 
also impossible for universities to afford all of the necessary equipment required 
to conduct their own supporting and relevant research to industry to keep up 
with the state of the art in semiconductor technology. Because of these challenges 
and as part of the more cooperative approaches found between industry and 
academia like SEMATECH, other methods of connecting industry and academics 
were created. For instance, the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) was 
founded as a non-profit in 1982 and has since spawned many joint research 
initiatives (as well as graduate fellowships) with partner universities.
Though this section focuses primarily on the budding computer industry, 
this was a trend—like those previously—felt more broadly across all industries in 
the United States. In 1988, The Conference Board held an “R&D/Technology 
Management Conference” where they convened R&D Directors and other related 
management to talk about the challenges facing companies from agriculture, 
cosmetics, and technology companies. In the forward, the president of the 
association stated: “R&D and technology are key ingredients in sustaining and 
enhancing a company’s competitiveness. So it is essential that these functions be 
managed with that end in view. Yet doing so often entails a great deal of 
collaboration and cooperation, not just internally, but with outside organizations, 
like academic institutions, government laboratories, and other companies—
including, sometimes, competitors.”238  The explicit call out to maintain 
“competitiveness” and to view R&D as a cooperative venture gestures explicitly to 
the research strategy of the 80s and 90s. The conference organizers stated a 
desire to better understand how to fully capture the benefits of external 
collaboration without compromising company assets—something that is clearly a 
perennial struggle in the globalized age—and identify this skill as just as 
important as knowing how to manage internal R&D. 
Kenly Smith Jr. also noted that a large portion of semiconductor research 
was done by entrepreneurial firms who had been able to break free of large and 
bureaucratic R&D firms—the behemoths of its time—but the new firms were all 
dependent on the defense sector for funding, and Bell Labs for underlying 
technology and personnel.239 
Mowrey and Teece categorized the different consortia models in three 
forms: 1) international strategic alliances; 2) pre-commercial research consortia; 
3) university-industry research collaborations. The development strategies 
around alliances tended to be product specific, whereas consortia were more 
broad in approach and expansive.240
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International strategic alliances played an important role as new commercial 
technologies were being developed without standards, such as the Beta-VHS 
competition in videocassette recorder technology, where VCR architecture 
required getting buy in from not only Japanese but international firms.241 These 
partnerships were also vital in navigating new trade market rules and market 
practices, but these alliances challenged firms’ tested domestic innovation 
capacities. According to Mowrey and Teece, these partnerships tried different 
models of circulating research and engineering staff abroad to help capture (tacit 
and codified) knowledge, but it was hard to fully communicate these lessons and 
facilitate knowledge transfer back to headquarters since some of it required 
strong duplicate infrastructure at home to replicate or riff off of learned 
knowledge.242 Additionally, figuring out how to match contributions equally was 
a challenge. For instance, some partners would be contributing country specific 
expertise but gaining technological know-how in exchange.243 These 
international and cooperative arrangements put additional pressure on R&D 
management to adapt to an innovation process that was still yet to be perfected 
under more contained and traditional in-house laboratory models. 
As for pre-commercial research consortia, many in the US received 
sponsoring through legislation (cited above) and government programs, so they 
were explicitly restricted from accepting international partners. Firms forming a 
joint venture needed to register with the Department of Justice under the 1984 
National Cooperative Research Act, and there were over 450 registered by 
1994.244 
MCC was established in the mid-1980s as a response to Japanese 
cooperative programs VLSI (from the 1970s) and the Fifth Generation 
Computing project in the 1980s because computer companies agreed the long-
term research agenda could only be tackled to match the Japanese in a collective 
way. However, as Mowrey and Teece point out, MCC and others like the Electric 
Power Research Institute illustrate that these efforts lose long-range vision and 
began to focus more on generic technology that is of immediate interest to 
members.245 This suggests a failure of these collective efforts to commit and 
calculate risks and benefits of delayed research gratification. MCC was 
horizontally organized, where often direct competitors came together for a 
common mission, unlike SEMATECH (as well as the National Center for 
Manufacturing) which was vertically integrated in a way that evolved to improve 
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the relationships between users and suppliers of equipment. MCC also had 
special research staff, which made integrating new knowledge back into member 
firms more challenging and less likely to capture the externalities that can still 
benefit firms.246 Rigid bureaucracy made bending rules or working around 
constraints time consuming at MCC—which also meant the efforts intended to 
insulate competitors eroded the effectiveness of all members.247 SEMATECH on 
the other hand, was comprised of assignees from each member firm and more 
flexible—an arrangement made easier by the evolution toward vertically 
integrated firms—and ultimately led to a more effective model when compared to 
MCC.248 
Mowrey and Teece make a point that the Japanese consortia that promoted 
these US reactions by firms and the federal government were not oriented toward 
fundamental research, but rather focused on technological dissemination among 
members and developmental activities.249 The Fifth Generation Computing 
Project that did have a long-range research agenda was seen largely as a failure in 
1996 by Mowrey and Teece in the citation above. SEMATECH illustrated that 
given how hard it was to gain consensus from consortia members about specific 
products or processes to focus on, when the benefits of such models would only 
felt long-term by members and not in the immediate time relevant to profits and 
competitive advantage.250 
University-Industry research collaborations as the third model addressed by 
Mowrey and Teece are described as one off collaborations, that are often used as 
filters for hiring future research personnel (both in regards to vetting as well as 
an opportunity to transfer new skills into firms).251 This model is not as fully 
fleshed out as the other two, probably based on the fact that collaborations 
around the 1980s and 1990s between the private sector and academics were so 
narrowly constructed in order to be beneficial to both parties. In the information 
age, however, these partnerships can be much more varied since studies that 
reveal value in underlying user data may deviate from the intended business 
model yet represent new market opportunities or feed other corporate value like 
“data for good initiatives.” (See Chapter 2) 
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Popularization of Joint Ventures
Internal models of established in-house R&D departments were also 
developed to reflect the changing pressures of internationalization and changes 
to how technology was bought and sold. John Armstrong, longtime employee and 
lastly the Director of Research and Vice President of Science and Technology, 
reflected that “joint programs came about as a response to the competitive 
conditions of the 1980s” and that throughout the 1990s companies could no 
longer rely on technologies themselves as a source of comparative advantage.252 
Armstrong reflected that IBM developed programs that partnered internal 
researchers with developers and engineers from areas outside of their own (e.g., 
semiconductors, scalable supercomputers, database technology) in order to adapt 
to the changes in technology patterns occurring outside the company. They also 
began more partnerships with their researchers and customers (i.e., governments 
or businesses) to help improve the IBM product through collaborations. The 
company began offering to do the development in their own labs for customers at 
one third or less of the projected costs of the project if done on its own.253 This 
move mimicked some of the early research consulting firms that used their R&D 
infrastructure to offer outsourced research to small firms. Additionally, this also 
represented a small progression in what was considered “research” by companies, 
in that these services focused on product code testing and design that fit solely 
within the category of “product development.” 
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) established the 
Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) in the early 1980s to collect money 
from member firms to fund research that was important to industry. This was 
part of the broader movement toward collective action taken by firms to compete 
internationally and design new strategies to do so. Harkening back to 
unsuccessful interwar efforts to pool industry funds and jumpstart research that 
was not federally funded, this collective action to invest in market research 
continued until technology advanced enough to bring down the costs for firms to 
continue smaller scale and individualized innovation.
Emerging Implementation of Silicon Valley R&D Models
Chapter 2 establishes the changes in innovation theory outlined by Saxenian 
and Chesbrough that are specific to Silicon Valley tech industry. These changes 
were driven in part due to specific technological demands as well as cultural and 
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organizational changes. Silicon Valley made its name on the rapid flow of 
knowledge between firms thanks to the rich networks of practice and practical 
wisdom—not to mention shared goals and personal context. This became 
embedded in the innovation and research approach of the region. Saxenian 
documents the collaboration among even business competitors: “Information 
exchanges continued on the job. Competitors consulted one another on technical 
matters with a frequency unheard of in other areas of the country.”254 Saxenian 
then quotes an interviewee as saying, “this is a culture in which people talk to 
their competitors. If I had a problem in a certain area, I felt no hesitation to call 
another CEO and ask about the problem—even if I didn’t know him. It was 
overwhelmingly likely that he’d answer (my question).”255 These fluid 
information exchanges point to a shifting culture with high specialization and 
lessening competitive advantage of a fully integrated vertical firm. The pressures 
to cooperate externally, and find new ways to bring in the latest R&D in order to 
maintain competitive advantage formed the key components leading to the 
Silicon Valley model of innovation.
The entire semiconductor industry was set in motion by the invention of the 
germanium transistor at Bell Labs (and thus private industry investment) in 1947 
by John Bardeen and Walter Brattain under William Shockley’s direction. 
Shockley founded his own laboratory business in 1955 after leaving Bell Labs, and 
used the silicon transistor that had been placed within the public domain after a 
DOJ consent decree with Bell Labs.256 From Shockley Semiconductor, a group 
began collaborating with engineers from Fairchild Camera and Instrument and 
eventually formed Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation. Moore counters popular 
opinion that Fairchild’s development of the planer structure in the silicon 
transistor was influenced by Department of Defense R&D, claiming that the space 
program of the 1960s only had a negligible impact via the space programs. Which 
at most, according to Moore, only hurried the development by providing a large 
market volume for the final product. 
Moore discusses the “Silicon Valley effect” where Fairchild produced more 
ideas and innovation spurs than the company could keep up with, leading to a 
plethora of spinoffs that did nothing to dampen the market space or wealth of 
technological opportunity. R&D in the case of semiconductors had to come from 
the private sector and government since university labs (and the disciplines at 
large) had not kept up. “Chemically based electronics functions had slipped 
through the cracks in university research. Because it fit neither the chemical 
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engineering nor electrical engineering departments of universities, for a decade 
basic research in semiconductors was the province of the semiconductor 
industry.”257
Intel,258 and perhaps semiconductors on the whole, represented a departure 
in how R&D was pursued by firms. In 1996, Gordon E. Moore—former director of 
R&D at Fairchild Semiconductor and researcher behind Moore’s Law (and author 
referenced above)—spoke about Intel Corporations’ R&D approach. Founded in 
1968 after Moore and Robert Noyce left Fairchild (previously they had been at 
Shockley Semiconductor), the company reflected the rapid turnover of new firms 
within this small area of technology.259 Moore began his talk with a reflection: “In 
an industry in which survival hinges on conducting research, Intel Corporation is 
distinct among semiconductor manufacturers in that it has no formal research 
organization and yet it invests steadily in R&D.”260 
When Intel was established, the founders Moore and Noyce wanted to 
“forestall problems with technology transfer by establishing Intel without a 
separate R&D laboratory,” by performing development activities embedded 
within manufacturing—admitting that the move likely cost manufacturing and 
efficiency in the R&D process.261 Noyce established a principle of “minimum 
information” where instead of systematically studying to uncover an answer, one 
guesses the answer and goes all the way. If the problem isn’t solved, then another 
solution is tried. This reflects a very different approach than any systematic 
research or development study. As Moore put it: “Thus, rather than mount 
research efforts aimed at truly understanding problems and producing 
publishable technological solutions, Intel tries to get by with as little information 
as possible. To date, this approach has proved an effective means of moving 
technology along fairly rapidly.”262 
Not pursuing in house R&D does not mean Intel did not need it to stay 
competitive. Moore states in 1996 that they looked to Bell Laboratories for the 
materials and fundamental science behind semiconductor devices, RCA 
Princeton Labs for consumer-oriented product ideas, materials and metallurgy 
research from General Electric—thus citing that the biggest in-house labs were 
providing them with the cutting edge research they needed essentially for free.263 
Later Moore states that Intel began looking toward Fairchild and Texas 
Instruments as R&D leaders within semiconductors specifically. 
As a later strategy, Moore stated that Intel looked to universities for more of 
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the basic research—probably because by the mid-1990s many of the in-house 
R&D laboratories had been massively downsized. It was possible to begin mining 
universities for research because disciplines had caught up to the needs of 
industry—specifically the semiconductor industry—which was not only a result of 
federal investment but association investment through the SIA as well. 
Though Intel undoubtedly contributed to the pooled efforts via the SIA for 
university research, it otherwise piggybacked on the investment into common/
public goods of knowledge production from larger firms. Moore plainly states it 
as “the large, central research laboratories of the premier semiconductor firms 
probably have contributed more to the common good than to their corporations. 
Bell Labs, for example, did contribute much to AT&T, but its greater contribution 
seems to have been to the economy as a whole. Fairchild’s large research 
organization, particularly in its later years, probably contributed more to the 
many spin-off companies that exploited the ideas that surfaced within it than it 
did to its parent company.”264 He goes on to discuss the failure of Xerox 
Corporation to take financial advantage of the “tremendous contributions to the 
community at large” coming out of Xerox PARC.265 
Spinoffs here were enabled by the intellectual property regime of 
semiconductors, that allowed for cross-licensing of inventions and also made it so 
that the IP was not easily protected. Moore also calls out how difficult it is for 
large companies to exploit new ideas, and observes of the Silicon Valley 
ecosystem “running with the ideas that big companies can only lope along with 
has come to be the acknowledged role of the spin-off, or start-up.”266 He adds: “It 
is often said that start-ups are better at creating new things. They are not; they 
are better at exploiting them. Successful start-ups almost always begin with an 
idea that has ripened in the research organization of a large company. Lose the 
large companies or research organizations of large companies, and start-ups 
disappear.” 
There was also a perception of the computer industry in 1988 that it was the 
young, and presumably smaller and more agile companies who were able to 
“challenge and even bedevil older, larger, and better-known rivals” with their new 
technology, and it was speculated this trend would continue beyond just the 
personal computer industry to biotechnology and other industries.267 Goodman, 
the Executive Vice President of R&D at Calgene Inc.—a startup in the 
biotechnology field in Davis, California adjacent to the Bay Area—spoke of the 
increasing research partnerships between large firms and small startups, which 
could either cripple the younger partners by fostering an over dependence on the 
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resources of the large firm, or create a mutually beneficial relationship between 
the two. “To exploit these opportunities, we have sought and developed several 
kinds of relationships with major corporations in the various markets to which 
our technology applies. This strategy has provided Calgene with extensive 
experience in R&D collaborations.”268 The small firm bringing agility and 
innovation, whereas the large firm provides resources and market share (for 
instance). 
This sets up a first time where there was a need for partnerships between 
small and large firms at least in the same competitive space, even if they were not 
direct competitors. This perhaps is because there were more market 
opportunities where firms complemented each other rather than posing direct 
competition as siloed and vertically integrated firms. 
IBM and other Early Secret Keepers
Not all research and innovation was conducted under porous and open 
innovation structures and models. IBM was infamous for its firm secrecy at the 
dawn of the computer industry, building its first PC in under a year at their Boca 
Raton facility in 1981.269 The buildings in Boca Raton were built to be low profile 
and unmarked, even though over 20 were located in the general region in 
1983.270 “The company doesn’t need to draw attention to itself (it doesn’t even 
have a boldface listing in the local telephone book); everyone knows IBM is 
here.”271 The secrecy went beyond modesty. Access within the company was 
controlled by badges at every corridor—the opposite of the modern open office 
space. When asked how security was maintained, Howard Davidson (plant 
general manager) responded: “Our employees know that success of the company, 
and thus their jobs, depend on security. Apparently, they want to keep their 
jobs.”272
IBM was an early adopter of the employee NDA. An article from 1993 
attributed the changes in innovation cycles and employee information access due 
to personal computers. “The widespread use of interconnected personal 
computers, along with the recent drive to flatten out corporate hierarchies, 
means that many companies have widened the internal access to detailed 
information about their unique manufacturing processes or business strategies. 
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As well, in highly technical fields such as biotechnology, advances often come in 
small incremental steps, rather than huge leaps. As a result, even one employee's 
scrap of knowledge can be worth millions of dollars in a highly competitive 
industry.”273 Given the rising stakes, an attorney for IBM is interviewed and 
describes how each employee now signs a “so called nondisclosure agreement” to 
spell out what information employees can share outside the company, during 
employment and afterwards.274 However, lawyers interviewed noted that it was 
hard to enforce what “employees know in their heads” and prevent that transfer 
to other firms in the future.
There are also other examples of secret projects, like the 1980 unveiling of 
Sony Corporation’s automated at home office software. “Hush-hush 
communications among a small, select circle of Sony Corp. executives in Tokyo 
and New York over the past couple years regularly contained references to 
Snoopy, Lucy, and Charlie Brovim. On Dec. 17, Sony caught the office-equipment 
market flat-footed and unveiled its "Peanuts project"—a major move into the so-
called automated office.”275 Even though Apple may have the most recent legacy 
of corporate secrecy (described in the proceeding section), IBM was known for its 
practices long before and other companies made use of surprise unveilings and 
discrete development missions.
Vestiges of Formalized Corporate Laboratories and Modern Instances
The closure of corporate labs and R&D divisions around the same time in 
the late 1980s and 1990s is in part attributed by the authors of “Beyond Sputnik” 
to a “realization by corporations that the reductions or closure of their research 
centers would likely result in an immediate improvement in the company’s 
bottom line (since the operating costs for advanced research would vanish” and 
that the downsides would only appear much later—likely after the CEOs 
departure.276 Given the decreasing tenure times of corporate CEOs over time, 
long-term R&D investments have become harder cases for expenditures.  
When RCA was purchased in the 1980s by General Electric, most research 
operations were closed down with the exception of a portion transitioned to the 
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Sarnoff Corporation (created during the acquisition by GE as a tax write off.)277 
The Sarnoff Corporation was later donated to SRI International.
Bell Labs was fractured and mostly spun off in the mid-1990s to Lucent 
Technologies (later Alcatel-Lucent), and it was purchased by Nokia in 2015. 
Nokia Bell Labs continues to conduct research, but at a much smaller and more 
focused scale. 
Intel Research Labs was formed in 2000 to promote “proactive computing” 
where users would interact with surrounding things and have a fully digital life. 
In 2001 Intel Research moved toward a more open collaborative model with 
surrounding universities that employed very liberal research agreements that did 
not retain IP ownership. This model was designed around the concept that 
research and technology developed in the labs was not central to Intel’s core 
business areas. There are still many labs across the world, and under different 
CEO leadership, Intel Research has taken on different research and collaboration 
models.278
Microsoft Research was also formed around 1991, and still hosts some of 
the most prominent researchers bridging the industry/academia divide. 
However, there are not many public accounts about the organization, political 
forces, and other key elements to help reflect upon the limited instances of 
formalized research laboratories.
PARC Incorporated was formed by Xerox in 2002 and works on a much 
smaller scale compared to what it was. The de-emphasis of these once formalized 
and organizationally insulated research divisions and labs opens up the line of 
inquiry explored in this dissertation. 
Apple: Secrecy made Sexy and Departure from elements of the 
“Silicon Valley Innovation Model”
Apple built an entire reputation around the company’s notorious secrecy and 
paranoia around new inventions. This was an important note in how companies 
approached research that was not simply confined to a discrete set of teams or 
siloed, skunkworks style lab. These practices expanded upon those previously 
discussed with IBM.
Apple was far from the first Silicon Valley tech firm to invoke practices of 
secrecy—Skunk Works and other forms of innovation seclusion explored above—
but Apple took legal contracts, employee surveillance, and soloed cultures to a 
new level of sophistication. Even though much of the technology underlying their 
hardware would be patented (thus protected while guaranteeing “blueprints” 
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would eventually become public), the company thrived off of the pageantry of 
model releases and mystical design. This pomp and circumstance fueled early 
market edge by fostering a reputation for the behind the scenes attention to detail 
touted by the firm’s illusionary Steve Jobs.  
In 2006, one article described the transition from being one of the most open 
companies in the mid-1990s to one of the most closed, even compared to its 
peers.279 “Apple's singular focus on secrecy is unusual, even among high-tech 
companies that closely guard their product plans.”280 Apple’s product strategy 
was a departure from other large computer manufacturers, who reportedly would 
go to great lengths in order to make their product lines known in order to fit into 
corporate IT strategies and procurement plans which are set well in advance. 
“Microsoft has never been known for its modesty either and can certainly be 
irksome. But it will bend over backward to get you product information, 
particularly about future plans. So much so, it's considered the world leader in 
FUD -- the fear, uncertainty and doubt it inspires throughout the industry as it 
details what's on its drawing boards is more than enough to make IT managers 
hesitate before moving to another vendor's technology…Apple, in contrast, has 
mastered the art of FAPP -- forget Apple for product planning. The company's 
"loose lips sink ships" attitude works well for its consumer market, where pre-
announcing a cool new gadget can kill the sales of your suddenly has-been 
widget.”281
 This switch in strategy was in part to market directly to consumers, and the 
secrecy became part of the branding. The level of transparency described here in 
2004 about Microsoft is now the exception rather than the rule. Companies may 
release vague plans about a product, e.g., smart watch or home assistant, either 
close to the product launch to build press or as a move announced by an 
acquisition. 
The surprise element and aura had long been a tool of Steve Jobs. In 1998 
Jobs took a handful of sales reps and a bowling ball bag to a meeting at a local 
university to convince them to invest, and after going on a long rant about how 
screwed Apple was as a company ordered the sales reps out of the room 
(signifying privilege in audience) and pulled the new iMac out of the bowling ball 
bag and announced with fanfare how they were going to save the company.282
279 Wingfield, Nick. "Core Value: At Apple, Secrecy Complicates Life but Maintains Buzz; Maker of 
Mac and Ipod Keeps Customers, Workers in Dark; Watermark on the Memo; Frustration for Business 
Buyers." Wall Street Journal (New York, NY), 2006, Eastern.
280 Wingfield, Nick. "Core Value: At Apple, Secrecy Complicates Life but Maintains Buzz; Maker of 
Mac and Ipod Keeps Customers, Workers in Dark; Watermark on the Memo; Frustration for Business 
Buyers." Wall Street Journal (New York, NY), 2006, Eastern.
281 Hall, Mark. "Secrecy Eating at Apple."  (2004). https://www.computerworld.com/article/
2565666/secrecy-eating-at-apple.html.
282 Kaihla, Paul, and Paul Sloan. "The Secrecy of Success." Business 2.0 6, no. 3 (2005): 78-78.
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A June 2009 New York Times article titled “Apple’s Obsession with Secrecy 
Grows Stronger” described the company’s practices as follows:
“Secrecy at Apple is not just the prevailing communications strategy; it is baked 
into the corporate culture. Employees working on top-secret projects must pass 
through a maze of security doors, swiping their badges again and again and 
finally entering a numeric code to reach their offices, according to one former 
employee who worked in such areas.
Work spaces are typically monitored by security cameras, this employee said. 
Some Apple workers in the most critical product-testing rooms must cover up 
devices with black cloaks when they are working on them, and turn on a red 
warning light when devices are unmasked so that everyone knows to be extra-
careful, he said.”283
Apple made secrecy practices alluring within the industry, and built the 
accompanying aura of mystery to seem like a vital component not just in its 
public communications, but as a strategy for rapid disruptive innovation. Don 
Melton described in 2013 how his team went to great lengths to keep the Safari 
project secret while it was developed, accessing the open web from the Apple 
campus, and described how the team “operated the project like some CIA black 
op — loyalty oaths and all.”284 These secrecy practices were not just preventative 
but also punitive; focusing on spreading false information to identify sources of 
leaks to the press.285  
Apple was aggressive with its own employees: suing suspected leakers and 
reportedly compartmentalizing teams (à la IBM Boca Raton interiors) so that 
even managers were unsure what others worked on.286 Apple hired a former 
parole officer, Robin Zonic287, to work on physical and information security. 
Zonic reportedly tells new employees “if you leak, we will find you, we will fire 
you, we will sue you, and we will prosecute you.”288 The internalized focus on 
general employees—not just those working on sensitive topics—ushered in (or 
was part of a shift) of a shift in many tech corporate cultures. This shift ushered 
283 Stone, Brad and Vance, Ashlee. "Apple's Obsession with Secrecy Grows Stronger." The New York 
Times, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/technology/23apple.html.
284 "Keeping Safari a Secret." 2013, https://donmelton.com/2013/01/03/keeping-safari-a-secret/.
285 Stone, Brad and Vance, Ashlee. "Apple's Obsession with Secrecy Grows Stronger." The New York 
Times, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/technology/23apple.html.
286 Stone, Brad and Vance, Ashlee. "Apple's Obsession with Secrecy Grows Stronger." The New York 
Times, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/technology/23apple.html.
287 Zonic worked at Apple from 1990 to 2008 according to her LinkedIn, and according to news 
sources was tasked with sealing leaks in 1997 when Jobs returned to the company. 
288 Stone, Brad and Vance, Ashlee. "Apple's Obsession with Secrecy Grows Stronger." The New York 
Times, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/technology/23apple.html.
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in a reputation for punitive consequences rather than mission-focused and 
necessary secrecy.
Though the culture of wanting to keep activities secret was known among 
employees, as reported by tech companies such as IBM in the 1980s, the 
threatening nature of Apple, and the popularization of these techniques among 
other firms over time, suggests a more recent and widespread cultural shift. 
Regardless of the influence Apple’s culture played on the actions of other firms, 
there has been a large response among tech firms to chase leakers to the press. 
This fear of leaking information to the press bleeds over into academic discourse 
and any general conversations between firms.289 
Conclusions
This chapter provides important historical contextualization of industry of the 
role of the private sector in the research ecosystem. It details R&D practices 
which are foundational to arguments within this dissertation and referenced 
throughout. This historical documentation, bringing together unique primary 
sources as well as the scholarship from historians establishes a foundation so that 
this analysis can be conducted grounded in facts rather than historical 
perceptions.
An essential overarching element in this chapter is where research activities 
were located in proximity to private firms. In early examples, research was 
completely externalized and individualized with independent inventors, and 
partnerships with academia were limited in the United States unlike countries 
like Germany with a more advanced research-based graduate education and 
programs to foster these partnerships. There were limited early cases of 
information sharing between firms and external researchers—usually for market 
research or for organizational efficiencies. These information exchanges were an 
important predecessor for understanding information exchanges in a modern 
context. Research was only brought in-house in limited and exceptional 
circumstances, but later paved the way for American firms to recognize the 
importance and strengths of having in-house talent, partly because of expiring 
patents driving the need for new competitive innovation and the need to stave off 
antitrust regulation in the early 1900s. The world wars and interwar period raised 
the stature of private sector research significantly, and began conversations about 
a government funded pipeline to help educate researchers who could later be 
employed by universities. The wartime also popularized the importance of 
internal research, and established a post-war time period where private industry 
289 This is especially due to some of the activist-style research orientation among some critical theory 
scholars, who also often write tech opeds in the press as well as conducting research.
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invested heavily in internal R&D and academic style laboratories. However, as 
struggles to commercialize technology developed within industry and create 
seamless and flexible business plans that could follow the whimseys of invention, 
many laboratories were shut down and research was moved outside of the firm to 
external partners once again. The high tech, computer, and semiconductor 
industries brought new shifts in how firms developed and used their innovations. 
Firms spun ideas off into separate companies instead of attempting one 
overarching business model, and research was often no longer insulated within 
firms into formalized research divisions but democratized across all areas of the 
firm. Cooperative research and joint ventures also became an important trend as 
equipment necessary to innovate became too large for an individual firm, and 
university research struggled to keep up with new disciplinary norms demanded 
by the emerging technology. These later models broke down the organized and 
formalized internalized research of earlier decades, and instead ushered in hybrid 
models where firms looked to new models (e.g., cooperative research and 
consortia) to fill research gaps, and also the slow collapse of any internalized 
research. This lack of internalized research placed tech firms back into the 
position of looking to academia or to other externalized units for research, and 
partnerships began to supplant internal activities—a trend echoed today.
The following chapters begin to document and examine contemporary R&D 
trends in private industry, including the forces that pull research-related 
activities inside a firm, outside of the firm, or where they help broker industry/
academic partnerships. With the exception of early industry R&D where some 
information was exchanged between firms and outside researchers or analysts 
(the term consultant was not used yet), there were few instances where data alone 
was shared between industry practitioners and academics. As discussed in the 
introductory Chapter 2, data has emerged as a new vital currency for research, 
and presents new challenges (e.g., privacy and ethics) in facilitating and 
organizing these arrangements. By understanding practices of early private firms, 
different models for internal research and external partnerships, and the unique 
pressures and strategies embraced by high tech firms, the rest of this dissertation 
work can be grounded in historical context to explore the implication of returning 
ideas, and new paradigms. 
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Chapter 5
Illustrative Cases from Exemplary 
Firms: Vibrators, Thermometers, and 
Smart Watches Research and Data 
Sharing Strategies 
Several companies interviewed employed unique data collection, sharing, and 
innovation strategies as it related to social, behavioral, health, and public health 
research. They each illustrate how the relation of the private firm to fundamental 
research inquiry is evolving and challenging existing models and theories of 
practice. The key pivot illustrated is twofold: First, these firms generate 
biosensed data by users in real-time and in the real world, which has previously 
been prohibitively expensive for researchers, ethically complicated, and near 
impossible to replicate at scale. This infrastructure and access enables previously 
unobtainable fundamental research questions within academia and medical 
research.290 Second, these firms require knowledge feedback from independent 
research and through partnerships in order to improve and validate their 
algorithms, which flourish best when built upon findings rooted in science rather 
than correlation. These cases were selected because they exemplify particular 
elements and themes from this dissertation, and were accessible to provide an in-
depth story that make this dissertation’s concepts and findings more clear. These 
illustrative cases provide unique research contributions and their stories may not 
be understood simply by viewing publicly available material online. 
The firms selected for these illustrative cases include: Lioness, Kinsa, and 
290 These particular cases (as well as other firms interviewed) focus predominately on observational 
studies and A/B testing style comparative analysis rather than more manipulative experimental 
techniques. Experimental manipulation of users carries a higher ethical weight and risk of public 
backlash, and was not discussed by interviewees. Experimental study was also not the best methodology 
to study the fundamental and basic research questions craved by firms and researchers, just ask 
researchers did not need to experimentally manipulate government survey data to find great research 
utility.
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Basis Sciences. The Lioness smart vibrator illustrates how data, uniquely held by 
the private sector with regard to users’ intimate lives, can be used to address a 
dearth of federally-funded women’s sexuality research. Data sharing and inquiry 
are in part motivated by the desire of users to enrich basic scientific 
understanding, in a way that circles back to inform the firm on their own product 
and algorithm design. Lioness’ voluntary data from users is both a fertile 
repository for novel research inquiry, as well as an important long-term pivot for 
the company—not only empowering their users by supporting this knowledge 
generation but by filling a literature gap blocking advancements toward a better 
vibrator with features and algorithms rooted in science. 
Kinsa smart thermometers stands out among health sensors connected to 
phone apps. This firm created an information infrastructure and data 
surveillance291 program designed for public health officials, researchers, and 
policymakers to generate new insights—insights that could in turn feed back into 
algorithmic development and better serve Kinsa users, as well as the public good. 
Unlike other Silicon Valley innovation models in Chapter 2 that are usually 
unidirectional with knowledge flows feeding into the firm, Kinsa represents a 
firm that has mutually beneficial and porous potential from the data 
infrastructure built into their smart device and platform. 
Basis Science (also known as Basis Labs or by their product name: Basis Peak) 
was an early entrant to the smart watch wearables in 2010, and stood out on the 
market because of the quality of the product and the designed portability of the 
data. Even with a strong internal research and algorithms team, the firm was 
pushed to pursue external research partnerships in order to leverage external 
research infrastructure, outsource knowledge sharing publications, and obtain 
external “truth data” to validate internal algorithms. The strategy of Basis 
demonstrates how information-intensive firms continue in the model of Saxenian 
and Chesbrough in outsourcing expertise, but differentiate themselves in that 
these emerging strategies are lack consistent structure and rely more heavily on 
researchers than other specialized private firms and services. This reliance on 
researchers and their infrastructure illustrates the importance of fundamental 
research inquiry to information-intensive firms.
Interviewees for these companies agreed to have their firm referred to by 
name, and these cases were developed through the cooperation of employees and 
updated over time or pieced together using publicly available material. The 
purpose of these illustrative cases is to provide a more in-depth view of how a 
firm makes decisions, structures data collection, sharing, and internal inquiry in 
order to better understand the emerging practices within information-intensive 
innovation. In addition, these cases provide key insights into the motivations, 
limitations, barriers to desired activities, and workarounds created by the firms 
291 “Surveillance” in this case refers to public health surveillance (the systematic collection of data) 
which is almost always distinct from “surveillance state” discussions.
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and their partners. 
The phrase “illustrative cases292” was selected in order to distinguish them 
from more formal comparative case study methodology,293 which involves a 
detailed analysis of a particular aspect of a historical episode in order to develop 
(or test) explanations of this event that may then be generalized to other events. 
These cases are told from the viewpoint of willing participants—and therefore 
limited by their recall of events and processes—or available materials. Responses 
are filtered through the desired presentation of contemporary firms and occurred 
at different times (and many are ongoing).  The limitations of participants and 
bias of companies is addressed fully within the methods section. Unlike 
government offices or programs, the activities of these companies are not subject 
to public records requirements or releases of any kind—let alone systematic 
archiving efforts. Without qualitative interviews and material preserved on the 
web, many of these cases and programs would never be brought into the 
academic or public discourse.
Understanding the culture and context of each of these cases—and the 
motivations underpinning decision making and strategy with regard to data 
sharing and research uses of user data—illustrates how biosensed user data is 
changing the relationship of the firm to fundamental research via partnerships 
and internal inquiry. 
 
292 Vignettes, though not a formal and recognized methodology within other disciplines, implies that 
the details and instances described are brief yet evocative accounts or episodes of events. Vignettes from 
interviews are utilized where appropriate in following sections, but these illustrative cases are more 
substantive than fleeting or brief portraits of an encounter and more focused around the motivations, 
limitations, and decision making of unique firms. Vignettes from this research, and from interviews, are 
presented conceptually throughout this dissertation, while these illustrative firm cases stand alone. 
293 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. BCSIA Studies in International Security. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 5.
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I feel it coming: Lioness and the 
desire to share data for underfunded, 
understudied women’s sexuality 
research 
“…Like a Fitbit for your cooch.” Gizmodo via the Lioness Website
Data collected from a smart vibrator—specifically, a vibrator to stimulate and 
measure sexual arousal and climax in women—seemed like an unlikely candidate 
firm for studying research data sharing activities. However, this firm became the 
most provocative example of how incentive structures around sharing user-
generated data were evolving within the context of information-intensive 
innovation. These new competitive and innovative forces are placing pressure on 
firms to seek knowledge from fundamental research and reconsider the risks and 
costs associated with sharing user-generated data.
Lioness, the data collecting and biosensing vibrator company, exemplifies a 
firm with unique imperatives to share data, and support external research 
partnerships to inform their own internal product development. Women’s 
sexuality294 research, and specifically sexuality research that connects 
physiological experience—especially experiences validated by data—to sexual 
satisfaction, is chronically underfunded by governments and grant-making 
entities. The inequality in funding and attention to women and hormone-specific 
health research has been a longstanding challenge, which made the even more 
politically sensitive funding of women’s sexuality research an impenetrable 
issue.295 Recognizing the gap in available research on women’s sexual 
experiences, Lioness became a surprise guardian of data that would enable 
entirely new studies examining the link between physiological experiences and 
satisfaction. Encouraged by their user base, this illustrative case explores the 
challenges of a small startup to empower their users by supporting data sharing 
for research purposes. This case illustrates how unique and sensitive data held by 
294 “Women” is intended to include all women-identifying individuals.
295 This is discussed and cited in detail in the following sections.
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the private sector could enable entirely new research streams, and stands 
defiantly against an industry often dominated by pornographers (who may not 
always value or place monetary value on women’s personal satisfaction) and 
gender-biased technology. Even without an assured “happy ending” to solving the 
women’s sexuality research gap, this data sharing case illustrates important 
realignments in incentives and obligations to participate in basic research 
partnerships and pursuits. Lioness shows how information held by a private 
sector entity can empower both users and reinvigorate research streams through 
data access, and walks through the barriers experienced by a small firm taking on 
managing these research relationships and data sharing initiatives. 
Lioness: A pride of women’s data and a dearth of global research 
investment
Lioness was founded in 2013 in Berkeley, California with a stated goal of 
“destigmatizing women’s sexual health through information and conversation”296 
with their smart vibrator product and platform.297 
One of the founders, Liz Klinger, describes their motivations to start a smart 
vibrator company on the company website FAQ and blog.
“A lot has changed since the 1980s, but research on female sexuality hasn’t 
advanced much since then. It’s not for a lack of interest—global taboos, personal 
discomfort, and lack of funding have held us back, and it doesn’t look like things 
are going to get much better on their own.
What happens in research doesn’t exist in a bubble. We know that sexual 
pleasure is more than sex and is an essential part of everyone’s lives. However, 
the lack of information available affects all of us - in our self-confidence, 
relationships, health, and even our ability to talk about sex and sexuality.
That’s why the kind of work that we’re doing at Lioness is especially important 
right now. We’ve created a platform for self-experimentation to help women 
learn about their own, unique bodies, and to learn more about female sexuality as 
a whole. There’s so much more to learn and we’ve barely gotten started.”298
296 "Organization Overview." 2019, 2019, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/
lioness#section-overview.
297 Data about the company are from the website and Crunchbase Pro (Updated Feb 2019)
298 "Frequently Asked Questions." 2019, accessed January 2019, https://lioness.io/pages/frequently-
asked-questions.
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The Lioness Vibrator was outfitted with force sensors (to measure vaginal and 
pelvic floor muscle contractions), an accelerometer and gyroscope (to measure 
and track movement in space, similar to a smartphone), and a temperature 
sensor (to assist in triggering data collection and tracking core body 
temperature). The device connects to a smartphone app via a Bluetooth 
connection, only when explicitly synched by the user. The device provides users 
with a visualization of their session, history of all logged sessions for comparison 
over time, and uses the app as a diary to reflect on a variety of open factors, 
feelings, and influences that may have impacted the session. These patterns and 
sessions over time, with analytics provided by Lioness, help the user to reflect 
and explore their orgasms. 
Exploring orgasms and finding resources for help is not always easy. As CTO 
James Wang put it, “a lot of women have that experience and they've been 
rebuffed by medical practitioners, like gynecologists where the older ones will go, 
‘This isn't my area. You shouldn't talk to me about this. I'm good at helping you 
deal with infections and babies but that's pretty much it.’”
Women’s medical research has lagged for decades and is well documented.299 
The difference arises from several different factors: 
1) Many diseases or medical conditions related to female anatomy and 
hormones like ovarian/endometrial cancer do not receive much research funding. 
Breast cancer300 has received more publicity due to its high prevalence and 
attention from advocacy groups, as well as research foundations like the Susan G. 
Komen Foundation.301 
2) There are known gender and hormone biases in many medical studies, 
because male rodents or hormonally male presenting humans are tested first to 
decrease confounding variables hormonal cycles.302
299 See for instance this 2010 report from the National Academies: Committee on Women’s Health 
Research. Women's Health Research: Progress, Pitfalls, and Promise. National Academies Press (2010). 
https://www.nap.edu/read/12908/chapter/2.
Though this case focuses on the challenges of women and women-identifying individuals, gender non-
conforming and fluid individuals experience a profound lack of research support for their health decisions 
that should and needs to be addressed by the wider research community. Additionally, there is much 
needed health research support for gender transitioning individuals.
300 It is important to note and emphasize that breast cancer does occur in men, just at lower rates 
than women.
301 "About/Budget/Data/Research Funding." 2019, accessed March 2019, https://www.cancer.gov/
about-nci/budget/fact-book/data/research-funding.
"Hematology-Oncology/Gynecologic Cancer." 2019, accessed March 2019, https://www.healio.com/
hematology-oncology/gynecologic-cancer/news/online/%7b3a17f7e9-435c-4f11-9e44-211c4a44537d%7d/
gynecologic-cancer-research-disproportionally-underfunded.
302 Within the rodent model, the fact hormone cycles complicate studies is debated, and interestingly 
often male rodents are thrown out of studies because they fight with each other—an issue exasperated by 
testosterone. 
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3) The gender and hormone component of well-studied diseases or injuries 
such as heart disease, diabetes, and brain injury are not well researched.303
4) Gender and hormone-specific side effects to treatment are not well 
understood.304 
5) Pregnant305 women are not included in medical research for obvious ethical 
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and safety issues. However, as a result of not collecting any data about 
prescription drug use during pregnancy, women are often forced to make life 
changing decisions about whether or not to continue medication for their own 
well-being and health without the support of any studies or doctor advice.
6) Reproductive studies such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) have been 
politicized and de facto banned at various points, for instance during the Reagan 
Administration. In the 1980s, publicly funded research on IVF was halted 
because of lack of funding appropriations and because the Ethics Advisory Board, 
which was required to evaluate and approve or deny all proposed experiments 
that raised questions about medical ethics, was disbanded.306 Without the board 
in place, no proposed research or experiments could be evaluated for over a 
decade. This policy move, pushed by the anti-abortion lobby, influenced other 
aspects of women’s health research outside of reproductive technology as well, 
including the role the reproductive system had on female and hormone-driven 
cancers.307 As a result, most of the reproductive technology research was carried 
out by the private sector given the monetary potential of these technologies, but 
foreshadows themes in this case about the role of the private sector in picking up 
the slack for federally funded research in the US. 
Some of these issues have been addressed through private sector initiatives 
(e.g., IVF technology which was largely funded by the private sector). Others were 
addressed through policy directives that targeted the inclusion of women and 
minorities in medical research studies,308 in animal studies,309 as well as new 
approaches to studying the risks and impacts of drugs during pregnancy and 
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providing more guidance to patients and healthcare providers.310
There are also less measurable and hard to address challenges in women’s 
healthcare, such as studies that show women are less likely to be believed when 
they report pain to a doctor (particularly women of color). Women also are often 
not believed when they report symptoms,311 or are given blanket dismissals such 
as patronizing as “you are probably just stressed” and not given any tools or 
resources to investigate further. There are also documented cases within medical 
contexts such as “the husband stitch”312 after delivery where women are, most 
often to the detriment of their own pleasure (even going so far as to cause pain), 
310 "Pregnancy and Lactation Labeling (Drugs) Final Rule." US Food and Drug Administration, 2014, 
accessed January, 2019, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/labeling/pregnancy-and-lactation-labeling-drugs-
final-rule.
Food and Drug Administration. "Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products; Requirements for Pregnancy and Lactation Labeling." Federal Register, 79 FR 72063 
(2014). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/12/04/2014-28241/content-and-format-of-
labeling-for-human-prescription-drug-and-biological-products-requirements-for#citation-6-p72075.
Dinatale, Miriam. Presentation: Two Years In: Lessons Learned with the Pregnancy and Lactation 
Labeling-Rule approaches to Human Data. (2017). https://www.fda.gov/media/111774/download.
311 Kiesel, Laura, "Women and Pain: Disparities in Experience and Treatment," Harvard Health 
Publishing ed. Harvard Health Blog, 2017, https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/women-and-pain-
disparities-in-experience-and-treatment-2017100912562.
UPI. "Researcher Says Women Less Likely to Get Painkillers." UPI - United Press International, 1989. 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/03/11/Researcher-says-women-less-likely-to-get-painkillers/
2047605595600/.
Fassler, Joe. "How Doctors Take Women's Pain Less Seriously." The Atlantic, 2015. https://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room-wait-times-sexism/410515/.
Nabel, E. G. "Coronary Heart Disease in Women--an Ounce of Prevention." [In eng]. N Engl J Med 
343, no. 8 (Aug 2000): 572-4. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM200008243430809. https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10954767.
Fetters, Ashley. "The Doctor Doesn't Listen to Her. But the Media Is Starting To." The Atlantic, 2018. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/08/womens-health-care-gaslighting/567149/.
For instance, famous cases like Gilda Radner who reported symptoms of ovarian cancer for 10 months 
before she was believed and then it had progressed so far she died a short time later. More recently, 
Serena Williams revealed her struggle to receive a CT scan and heparin drip to treat blood clots she knew 
she was at risk for after recognizing symptoms in her own body and knowing her own health history. It 
should be further underscored that Serena Williams is one of the top athletes in the world, and as a 
professional athlete knows her body even more than the average person.
Wilder, Gene. "From the People Archives: Gene Wilder's Tearful Goodbye to Wife Gilda Radner." 
People, 1991/2016. https://people.com/movies/gene-wilders-tearful-goodbye-to-wife-gilda-radner/.
Haskell, Rob. "Serena Williams on Motherhood, Marriage, and Making Her Comeback." Vogue, 2018. 
https://www.vogue.com/article/serena-williams-vogue-cover-interview-february-2018.
312 Murphy, Carrie. "The Husband Stitch Isn't Just a Horrifying Childbirth Myth." In Healthline, 
2018. https://www.healthline.com/health-news/husband-stitch-is-not-just-myth#1.
103
sewn up in such a way that is thought to benefit their male partner(s). The 
horrifying list of bias and inequality in women’s medicine that persists even today 
is a topic that deserves its own dissertation. It should be noted predictably there 
are critics of these claims, even when there is evidence to the contrary. For 
instance, a 1994 Atlantic article—written by a male doctor—to respond to calls 
from then President Clinton to increase breast cancer research, claimed medical 
gender bias does not exist when most of his citations date back to the 70s and 
80s. The article also misses the nuances of gender bias in research and medical 
contexts as discussed above, and illustrates how at critical times when the system 
was being reevaluated, voices worked actively to deny their validity, without data.
For the purposes of this case, it is important to simply understand the 
dramatic extent to which bias infiltrates both care and wellness for women. With 
all of these challenges to achieve parity within the medical R&D space, advocating 
for studies understanding women’s sexual experiences remain low on the list. 
Reportedly, nobody has ever died from the lack of an orgasm.313 Though 
discovered by accident, drugs to treat erectile dysfunction in men have been 
massively profitable for the pharmaceutical industry.314 Yet, the physiological 
variance and changes over time isn’t even documented for the female anatomy. 
John Bancroft, former director of the Kinsey Institute is quoted in a 2004 paper 
(shortly after Viagra reported record profits) saying: “The recent history of the 
study of female sexual dysfunction is a classic example of starting with some 
preconceived, and non-evidence based diagnostic categorization for women’s 
sexual dysfunctions, based on the male model, and then requiring further 
research to be based on that structure. Increasingly it is becoming evident that 
women’s sexual problems are not usefully conceptualized in that way.”315
Part of this disparity could be attributed to the lack of—or inability to collect—
such data. Smart vibrators like Lioness open up entirely new opportunities for 
personal introspection and broader, collective study. Doctors traditionally view 
sexual dysfunction as a purely anatomical problem that can only be addressed 
through tools and diagnostics available to modern medicine so far. 
Further, collecting intimate data—quite literally, sexually intimate data—is a 
challenge in most contexts. IRBs within universities may not be equipped to fully 
weigh the ethics and privacy/security needs of this type of data collection, and 
313 Kadar, Andrew G. "The Sex-Bias Myth in Medicine." The Atlantic Monthly Digital Edition 274. 
(1994): 66-70. https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/96jun/cancer/kadar.htm.
Editorial note: it is also odd that this is still a top Google hit for generic terms in 2019.
314 Quartz Staff. "Big Little Blue Pill: After 20 Years, Viagra Has Impacted So Much More Than Just 
Sex." Quartz, 2018. https://qz.com/quartzy/1238783/its-the-20th-anniversary-of-viagra-heres-how-its-
changed-the-world/.
315 Mayor, S. "Pfizer Will Not Apply for a Licence for Sildenafil for Women." BMJ 328, no. 7439 (Mar 
6 2004): 542. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.328.7439.542. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
15001492.
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most doctors who conduct medical research are not equipped to do this type of 
study due to ethical or perception issues. Additionally, women who may fear the 
authority of a doctor or researcher may avoid participation in such studies. 
Women’s sexuality certainly does not make sense within the context of a federal 
government laboratory. Studies conducted within these academic contexts also 
might be a much smaller “n” group than a collective group of users who choose to 
donate their data in a large pool. Considering the constraints of traditional 
contexts for research and its underlying data collection, it makes sense that a 
private company who sells a product designed to collect these intimate data will 
become the arbiter for the next wave of data-informed sexuality studies. 
(Limited) history of research in sexuality
 The lack of study around sexuality—and specifically women’s sexuality—has 
been consistent throughout research history. Alfred Kinsey pivoted his career as a 
biologist (specifically, in entomology) toward a lifelong career studying human 
sexuality when he discovered the lack of scientific literature on sex after teaching 
a course at Indiana University (IU) on “Marriage and Family.”316 He then began 
collecting information from his students about their sexual histories, which 
eventually caused the IU president to demand he choose between his job at the 
university and studying sexuality in 1947.317 He chose the latter, and founded the 
Institute of Sex Research as a way of creating a separate entity that could be 
insulated from the politics of government and universities.318 This need for 
institutional separation foreshadows the unique role the private sector could play 
in sexuality data collection and use 70 years later. The institute created a path for 
other groundbreaking work like Masters and Johnson studies that illuminated 
new findings about sexual orientation, and the physiology and experience of men 
and women during orgasm. The institute that was designed to be insulated from 
political influence, renamed The Kinsey Institute, has been under recent 
influence to evolve their original mission in sex research into intimacy and 
wellness research319. Part of this shift was due to not only shrinking funding, but 
explicit political pressure from groups that were set up to directly counter the 
work of the institute, including the 2014 “Stop the Kinsey Institute.” The institute 
was set up as an independent nonprofit organization so it was mostly insulated 
from external political pressure, but the institute merged with IU in late 2016 
which challenged its previous immunity and forced it into less politically 
controversial research topics. The reasons behind this merger remain unclear.320
316 Hallie Lieberman, "Desexing the Kinsey Institute." The New York Review of Books  (2018). 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/20/desexing-the-kinsey-institute/.
317 Lieberman, "Desexing the Kinsey Institute."
318 Allen, Judith A. The Kinsey Institute : The First Seventy Years. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2017.
319 Lieberman, "Desexing the Kinsey Institute."
320 Lieberman, "Desexing the Kinsey Institute."
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James wrote in an October 2017 blogpost that: “Lioness is dedicated to 
providing our customers and community with services and insights that are 
backed up by real science. The problem is, there’s just not a lot of research and 
data out there. We’ve found that research in the field of female sexuality has been 
pretty neglected. There are a lot of great researchers out there, but between 
societal taboos around the topic and scarce funding, it’s been hard to push 
forward.”
Without public support or even institutional support, research and technology 
development in sexuality has been left to the pornographers—who often do not 
prioritize women’s individualized experiences.
Free Love…Data
Lioness, as part of their stated mission, is dedicated toward advancing the 
data-driven science behind female sexuality and orgasms. In a blog from October 
2017 James wrote: “Here at Lioness, we are committed to destigmatizing and 
demystifying female sexuality. For us, that means fostering conversation, 
spreading knowledge, and yes, selling vibrators that help you explore your body. 
But we’re also focusing on one area where you might not expect a vibrator 
company to contribute: scientific research.”321
According to James, this motivation to advance the state of research came 
both from the need internally to find academic/medical research for product and 
algorithm design, as well as to improve the overall quality and state of the 
foundational literature.
“It's like this observational data is basically doing what was left off by research in 
the 1980s. That was sort of the heyday in terms of the confluence of lots of federal 
funding before it sort of sharply dropped off at all sectors basically. Lots of 
federal funding, but also the technology was at a point where you could more 
easily collect a lot of this data. It was after Masters and Johnson originally did 
their stuff, so there was better instrumentation as well and understanding of how 
to collect data. That was the golden age, but even with that in terms of pelvic floor 
patterns, if you do a literature review there's definitely the right way of doing it in 
terms of not having ... because for example, the other ways of doing it, like blood 
flow and heart rate more or less are derivatives of that. Super noisy. All sorts of 
things will cause heart rate and blood flow to go up so it's not really a good 
indicator. This seems to be a great indicator—of what I am aware of—there is an 
N of like 22, in terms of the overall research literature.”
321 Lioness, "Orgasm Patterns Using the Lioness Vibrator," Lioness, 2017, https://blog.lioness.io/
orgasm-patterns-using-the-lioness-f9b55b7834de.
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There is another important dimension that furthered the dedication to this 
data-driven scientific mission. Early users often voiced their enthusiasm to use 
these data for knowledge and scientific advancement. James reflected:
 “The attitudes towards this [data sharing] are interesting because there has been 
so little information around it [orgasms and women’s sexuality]. It's been so 
stigmatized, people are actually quite happy to take away some of that stigma and 
work with researchers to do that. We actually had people and some of the in 
person get togethers where it's like, ‘Hey come visit our office and come meet us,’ 
actually bring up to us directly. ‘Hey your privacy stuff is great and all, can I share 
more data if I'd like in terms of for research and stuff because I don't care and I'd 
like to have better research in this area.’”
This push to use their data for a greater good signifies an important role 
Lioness as a company has taken on, in part, because of the needs and wants of 
their users—not to mention the company mission.
Finding the love (orgasm data) research connections
A side benefit of a small research community is that researchers reached out 
to Lioness before the opt-in research program was ever created. However, the 
shortage of researchers in this area still impacts potential outlets for these data.
“We've gotten introduced in various channels. I think being part of Berkeley 
Research community and academia being such a small space, it sort of bounces 
around. Perhaps less so because the massive bouncing is less in this particular 
area just because there is so little sex research left in the US in general. UCLA 
recently closed their well-regarded program. Cornell is on their way to trying to 
shut off the lights as quickly as possible for their program. Canada is the 
promised land in terms of sex research and a lot of folks have moved up there.”
There is interest both on the research side and on Lioness’ side on creating 
data sharing mechanisms, but even when the incentives align there are 
challenges with facilitating the data exchanges in a responsible yet effective way.
Data Stewardship and Approaches
Lioness minimizes data collection by design. Demographic data is limited 
during sign up, and names of users are hashed so that if the database of users was 
ever somehow compromised, it would be very difficult to even obtain a list of 
users and their volunteered names. Also in order to limit any potential 
107
vulnerabilities to data, Lioness does not have an API because although it would 
give users access to their own raw data, it would also open up the possibility users 
could opt in to connecting third parties who could then take all of their data. Even 
though the monetary value is low, as is the potential to use in other harmful ways 
such as revenge porn—it’s only the data, no photos or audio—the company still is 
mindful of protecting their users. Lioness is also mindful of potential celebrity 
clients who would be at an increased risk of exposure. 
“You can't lose what you don't have. Just in terms of it, we basically try to do it by 
levels where it's like try to minimize the attack surface. It's going to get broken or 
whatever into. If it is going to get broken into make it as low value as possible for 
this level if they decide to steal this. Make it as low value as possible for this level 
if they decide to steal this. We would like no one to actually steal our entire 
database or anything, but if they do we'd like it to be as useless as possible in 
terms of identifying the individual user.” 
However in this unique case, the need to create another option for users to 
volunteer their data for these greater good purposes—which require more 
demographic and background data to be useful—emerges. This incentive puts 
Lioness in the role of advocating both for their user by brokering these data 
sharing connections, but also guarding these data exchanges to protect user 
privacy and prevent harm. In this unique case, the need for more underlying 
research aligns with the company’s interests as well. Not only is Lioness 
interested in empowering their users and sexual experiences, but the firm would 
like more research to help them improve their product line and algorithms. 
Lioness’ business model is not primarily oriented around selling data, 
marketing to individuals, or otherwise profiting off of the experiences of their 
users. In thinking about future opportunities to use data for observational studies 
for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology relating to sexual experiences, James 
reflected: “The goal of it ultimately is to have better safer products faster, and 
more effective products that go out to market. Also, with a lot of companies, it's 
usually marketing data, so the end buyer actually wants to know who the hell this 
is. In terms of the pharmaceuticals and the biotech companies, they really don't 
care [about identifying individuals]. They would like to know the demographics 
in order to actually do their studies and all these different things. They want the 
aggregate data because they couldn't care less who the individuals are because it 
has no monetary value to them. For marketing companies, obviously the 
monetary value, regardless of how much they say, "Oh we anonymize it, blah, 
blah, blah," the value is the individual.”
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Knowledge Sharing
Lioness regularly posts blogs about their product, shares articles and press 
around vibrators/orgasms/trends as they relate to Lioness, and includes findings 
and information backed up from user generated data. This is one way in which 
the team at Lioness shares the data-backed findings with their users and the 
general population. The Lioness team, and specifically James, is very clear about 
the limitations of the internal study findings. Yet the company is able to use the 
blog medium as a way of disseminating new information to users and general 
public, thus setting up further discussions, collaborations, and knowledge 
sharing. Instead of keeping preliminary findings behind closed doors, this 
approach both acknowledges the limitations of this type of work while openly 
circulating the state of the art on orgasm science. 
James322 tempers the findings in one blog with: “To be clear, this isn’t itself 
a scientific paper with a rigorously controlled methodology, sampling, and error 
bar estimation—but this is preliminary data we’ve found really interesting and 
will evolve over time.” He later reflected on this statement in an interview.
“The reason why I made this statement in that particular blog post is because I've 
worked with researchers, I know what research is or isn't. In terms of this, if we 
tried to push it as research, well, one it's not. Like not in the formal sense in 
terms of academic research. Also, we'd probably get, rightly so, flack in terms of 
that. "Oh you didn't control this study. This is just random observations." Which 
is what it is because the difference between commercial research and academic 
research is basically we're trying to figure out what works and tends to be 
something that's correlated with other things that ... well, what tends to be 
correlated is fine with us, where if it largely works, in terms of the root cause 
why? Which is a lot of the aim of science and academic research.”
   The emerging theme that the role of academic research on user data is to 
help generate the “whys” and “hows” was shared across many interviewees, and is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
For the case of Lioness, James went on to clarify that this pragmatic reality 
was not driven by a lack of interest or desire for answers to these questions 
internally, but that digging deeper would require accurate demographic 
information which conflicts with the privacy stance of the company. “The privacy 
that we try to give the users in terms of not having perfect demographics and 
everything, makes it a lot harder to do the controlled research that you would 
ideally do in an academic setting.”
In terms of the drivers of the research or investigation direction, it often 
comes from the team or James himself, but occasionally the users through 
322 Lioness, "Orgasm Patterns Using the Lioness Vibrator," Lioness, 2017, https://blog.lioness.io/
orgasm-patterns-using-the-lioness-f9b55b7834de.
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product feedback surveys or customer feedback. James reflected that it’s often 
the team that comes up with the easier questions, and the users who pose the 
harder challenges since they are likely topics close to their personal experiences 
and priorities. For instance, users have asked for an orgasm predictor which is 
something that would take a much longer time to roll out and test—something 
the company is working on but knows will take time to properly develop and 
manage expectations in the highly personal and sensitive world of orgasm 
experiences. 
“Turns out, you can easily measure these pelvic floor movements with the Lioness 
Vibrator in the comfort of your own home (no need for bulky lab equipment!). 
We’re actually starting to replicate some of the research, but we’re also seeing 
different things from our data— patterns that appear to fall outside of the 
boundaries of previous research.” (Blog October 2017)
In the case of Lioness, research findings (including informal and small scale 
research) are openly disseminated on forums, like the blog, to facilitate 
conversation. The next steps for research investigations are driven by team 
questions, but also feedback from users who usually ask tougher questions based 
on their own personal experiences. 
Enthusiastic Consent By Design
With the incentives to use private data uniquely aligned with voiced user 
perspectives on wanting to share data, Lioness took it upon themselves to design 
a special opt-in mechanism to recruit users for research.
The Lioness Privacy Policy (dated May 1, 2017; accessed November 27, 2017) 
contains the following statement about research uses of data:
 “Aggregate Data (Non-identifying Data): Lioness may share or sell aggregate 
data that does not identify you, with partners and the public in a variety of 
ways, such as by providing research or reports about health and sexuality. 
When we provide this information, we perform appropriate procedures so that 
the data does not identify you and we contractually prohibit recipients of the 
data from re-attributing it back to you.”
Yet even with this statement which would have allowed sharing, Lioness 
wanted to have explicit consent to opt into research. By opting in, it also would 
allow Lioness to collect important demographic and medical information that 
would make these data more important for researchers. “Our philosophy on it is 
if you can't stand the scrutiny of daylight it might not be a good thing to do. The 
benefit for us is that our incentives align with our users pretty well.” At the time 
of the interview, these mechanisms were still under design and consideration.
110
Prevailing Bias in Tech
There is important context to acknowledge about the challenges of women-
centric startups face. Though it is not explicitly tied to information-intensive 
innovation emerging strategies, it is influencing which firms and players are a 
part of this budding ecosystem—Lioness is an important outlier in this regard. 
The research rat lab or doctor’s office are not the only places where bias 
infiltrates science and tech. There are known disparities in funding female 
founders, and funding tech products for women.323  Most tangible to this 
particular case, there are gender biases in sex tech as brought to the spotlight 
through the experiences of companies at the annual Consumer Electronics Show 
(CES). At CES in 2019, sex toy company Osé was selected as an honoree in 
Robotics and Drones but later had the distinction taken away because it was 
labeled “immoral” and “ineligible.”324 The Gismodo article that helped break the 
story, aptly titled “CES Will Honor Your Innovation so Long as it Doesn’t Fuck,” 
highlights that other women focused tech and platforms have been excluded in 
past years—including Lioness—despite the fact that sex robots and VR porn have 
been frequent exhibitors in the past.325 The difference is, those instances of sex 
tech were often oriented toward men—like Naughty America’s VR/AR Stripper 
323 Matveeva, Sophia. "Why Tech Products for Women Are Underfunded and Why This Is a Great 
Opportunity." Forbes, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sophiamatveeva/2018/08/16/why-tech-
products-for-women-are-underfunded-and-why-it-is-a-great-opportunity/#36e19aaa3145.
Volkman, Elliot. "In Startups and Business, Women Receive Less Money [Infographic]." Tech.Co. 
(2017). https://tech.co/news/startups-women-less-money-infographic-2017-05.
Titlow, John Paul. "These Women Entrepreneurs Created a Fake Male Cofounder to Dodge Startup 
Sexism." Fast Company, 2017. https://www.fastcompany.com/40456604/these-women-entrepreneurs-
created-a-fake-male-cofounder-to-dodge-startup-sexism.
Titlow, John Paul. "Here's Why That Story About a Fake Male Cofounder Went Insanely Viral." Fast 
Company, 2017. https://www.fastcompany.com/40462125/heres-why-that-story-about-a-fake-male-
cofounder-went-insanely-viral.
Segran, Elizabeth. "Here's Why Nobody Wants to Buy Birchbox, Even after Vcs Spent $90m." Fast 
Company, 2018. https://www.fastcompany.com/40567670/heres-why-nobody-wants-to-buy-birchbox-
even-after-vcs-spent-90m.
324 "CES Will Honor Your Innovation So Long as It Doesn't Fuck." 2019, 2019, https://gizmodo.com/
ces-will-honor-your-innovation-so-long-as-it-doesnt-fuc-1831621873?rev=1547076565381.
325 Dreyfuss, Emily. "Women's Sexuality Is Still Taboo for Tech - at Least at Ces." Wired, 2019. 
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2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/style/sex-toy-ces.html.
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demo that include many female models and only a single male.326 These 
challenges make thriving in this industry a certain challenge.
Reflection on the privacy interests at stake
Information and content involving sex and money often rank highly among 
privacy-sensitive data. The data-driven vibrator evokes immediate responses 
from others about the privacy risks and security vulnerabilities, but these snap 
judgements require further probing. For instance, the binary of whether or not 
someone owns a vibrator may be seen as sensitive to others or sexual partners, 
and the frequency and timing of use might be sensitive. Beyond these attributes, 
the biosensing data collected by Lioness is less provocative in a privacy sense. 
Does an individual woman’s unique physiological orgasm experience compared 
to others matter? Can an individualized temperature and muscle contraction 
pattern be captured for discriminatory or monetary ransom? These perspectives, 
values, and risks are—much like orgasms—unique to each person. Data that 
seems to be the most sensitive may actually be less privacy sensitive than banking 
or personal communication data. The privacy sensitivities of these data derive 
more from the ownership binary and use than the underlying biosensed data. 
This requires a deeper probing of how privacy interests and public good utility 
should be balanced.
Further, most of our sexual explorations involve some compromise on 
personal privacy, by design. For something so deeply personal and intimate, 
there’s a paradox in practices that seem counter to how we protect other types of 
sensitive information and data. Hook ups with strangers are common among 
singles and non-monogamous individuals. Pornography is also a very large, 
digitized industry. It is notoriously hard to estimate the size of the porn 
industry327. According to Crunchbase, Pornhub—a popular online pornography 
site—has over 3 billion monthly visits and ranks as one of the 8th most visited 
websites on the internet.328 There are numerous documentaries, personal 
accounts, and conversations around gender bias in the pornography industry, 
including the treatment of performers, health and safety, content skewed for the 
preferences of heterosexual men, and issues with the financing and ownership of 
the industry that further exasperate gender bias. These are issues that are 
326 Joho, Jess. "Female Sex Toys Are Immoral, but Vr Porn Is a-Ok at Ces." Mashable 
(Mashable.com), 2019. https://mashable.com/article/ces-2019-sex-toy-controversy-lora-dicarlo-ose/
#TPLa8D7vPmqE.
327 Pinsker, Joe. "The Hidden Economics of Porn." The Atlantic, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/04/pornography-industry-economics-tarrant/476580/.
328 "Organization Overview." 2019, 2019, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/
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difficult to study329 and it is difficult to estimate which gender consumes more 
porn. Regardless, this is a massive industry that operates under a fair amount of 
opacity on the internet. 
Both in-person hook ups (e.g., strangers in your home), web interactions 
with others or “Cam Girls,” and accessing online porn all involve privacy 
compromising activities. These activities are prevalent in modern American 
society. Yet when I bring up the Lioness case with others, the first reaction I 
usually received was censure and judgement that this is something that should 
not include data collection because it was too private and security sensitive. 
I had a privacy enlightening conversation with Liz after a talk at Berkeley, 
where predictably many of the questions centered around how privacy infringing 
and vulnerable Lioness data could be—despite a technical discussion about the 
measures taken to protect users and minimize data collection as discussed above. 
In a slightly exasperated yet seasoned and measured tone, Liz told me she felt 
privacy was being used almost as a proxy excuse for controlling data that could 
empower women. Pornography, which is often widely thought to be consumed 
primarily by men given some of the biases within that industry discussed above 
(or at least within the mainstream industry—there are certainly notable and 
important exceptions) is taken largely as normal erotica and a popular aspect of 
male sexuality in the Internet Age. There are rarely lectures on the dangers of 
ISPs and website hosts collecting data about users accessing porn. Nor are there 
public censures and shaming of anyone who accesses pornographic material from 
the “privacy” of their own computers on the open internet without assurances. 
Instead there are often industry led pushes to make the industry more data 
secure by advocating for security certificates that allow for HTTPS connections 
and even broader internet health advocacy for net-neutrality legislation.330 The 
difference here is it’s rare to find consensus that nobody should access 
pornographic erotica online because there are leaks and vulnerabilities in the 
data flows. And yet a smart vibrator intended to empower women in their own 
bodies is seen as a superfluous and privacy dangerous activity. When Strava 
released its aggregate data as heat maps, it uncovered hidden military bases in 
329 Grudzen, C. R., G. Ryan, W. Margold, J. Torres, and L. Gelberg. "Pathways to Health Risk 
Exposure in Adult Film Performers." [In eng]. J Urban Health 86, no. 1 (Jan 2009): 67-78. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11524-008-9309-4. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18709554.
Klaassen, M. J., and J. Peter. "Gender (in)Equality in Internet Pornography: A Content Analysis of 
Popular Pornographic Internet Videos." [In eng]. J Sex Res 52, no. 7 (2015): 721-35. https://doi.org/
10.1080/00224499.2014.976781. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25420868.
330 Garun, Natt. "Pornhub Now Turns on Encryption by Default." The Verge,, 2017. https://
www.theverge.com/2017/3/30/15125048/pornhub-youporn-https-encryption-privacy.
Dale, Brandy. "Pornhub and Youporn Move to Keep Your Taste in Privates Private." Observer, 2017. 
https://observer.com/2017/03/pornhub-youporn-tls-secure/.
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foreign countries and had international security implications. It is doubtful 
anyone’s—even Helen of Troy’s—pelvic floor contractions could incite a national 
security crisis.
In thinking about privacy and security implications of data collection, it is 
particularly important for scholars to examine their own personal biases and 
gendered views on internet-empowered and sensor-enabled sexual experience. 
Any data collection exposes opportunity to uncover risks or expose personal 
information, but in this smart world of gadgets the choices we choose to make on 
what we don’t measure has implications. 
Conclusions
The Lioness illustrative case represents not just a provocative data type, but a 
provocative portrayal of the role private companies—including startups—can play 
in the research ecosystem. In this case, data previously unmeasurable and 
uncollected by traditional research actors is held by the private sector, and the 
firm in procession of these data needs more fundamental research in order to 
continue to improve the product services. At the urging of both users and driven 
by internal need for research in the absence of federal investment in women’s 
sexuality research, Lioness is in a unique position to provide data and guide novel 
research. Generating basic scientific understanding can inform the firm in their 
product design, as well as the greater research community. However even when 
incentives to share and collaborate align, there are many challenges to setting up 
the research-specific infrastructure to ethically collect and safely share these data. 
These intimate sexuality data are uniquely held by the private sector, and 
challenges persist to accomplish these responsible exchanges without friction 
even when incentives align. Lioness’ voluntary data about users has potential as 
both a fertile repository for novel research inquiry, as well as illustrating an 
important long-term pivot for the company that could fill a literature gap in order 
to design a better and more empowered vibrator using algorithms derived from 
science. 
 
114
Hot Takes: Using Kinsa Private 
Temperature Data to Augment Public 
Health Information Systems and Fuel 
Public Interest Feedback Loops
Introduction
Kinsa is a San Francisco based startup that designed a smart thermometer 
and app service to create a distributed real-time data generating network with 
public good uses. This information infrastructure was designed to be used by 
public health officials, researchers, and policymakers to generate new insights—
insights that could in turn feed back into algorithmic development and better 
serve Kinsa users, as well as the public good. This unique business model and 
innovation strategy—informed by a founder’s past experiences working on the 
ground in a data-poor health policy environment—to work with distributed 
research stakeholders represents a unique alignment of interests evolving around 
sharing user-generated biodata. Unlike other Silicon Valley innovation models in 
Chapter 2 that are usually unidirectional with knowledge flows feeding into the 
firm, Kinsa represents a firm that has mutually beneficial and porous potential 
from the data infrastructure built into their smart device and platform. However, 
associated data sharing agreements and research collaborations are not always 
easy to broker, and this case illustrates the need for established models that 
facilitate these partnerships and information flows. This public interest 
orientation additionally opens up other market opportunities for users as they 
select between smart products and have the additional selections to choose a 
platform that contributes aggregate data to the greater public good and research-
derived policymaking.
Public Health Information Primer 
Public health is the science aimed at protecting and improving the quality of 
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health of individuals and their community.331 Public health operates at a 
population level, while focusing on regions (geographical and political) and 
individual communities in order to target responses or prevention efforts. Public 
health efforts include a range of actions including:332 1) identifying, tracking, and 
remediating communicable diseases or pathogen outbreaks; 2) researching new 
prevention methods and treatments; 3) improving access to medical care within 
communities; and 4) addressing long-term and chronic conditions including 
social and behavioral actions that create population health risks.  
Public health has been around for over a century, and has a long-standing 
relationship to the collection of social or community data to inform centralized 
decisions. For instance, in 1854 a large cholera outbreak was spreading through 
London and there was no centralized and accepted theory for how cholera spread 
from patient to patient. British Physician John Snow began talking to residents 
and charting the cases of cholera on a map, which revealed that most of the cases 
centered around one particular water well. Microbes were too small to be 
visualized with equipment at the time, so examination of the water was futile.333 
This founding instance of epidemiology research, however, coupled with one of 
the most canonical examples of data visualization helped to curb the deadly 
outbreak. The efforts Snow took to gather data from individuals and synthesize 
the data for study are similar to public health efforts still in effect in 
contemporary society. For instance, in a large-scale foodbourne illness outbreak, 
samples from patients are sent to CDC approved labs and bacterial genomes are 
sampled to track common infectious agents. If the source is unclear 
epidemiologists are sent to patients to talk about what they ate and find common 
sources (e.g., contaminated food from a restaurant or bought from a larger 
national distributor). These information sharing systems are set up so that they 
trigger automatically when possible, and help identify cases that may be 
geographically dispersed and asynchronous in timing. 
Within the United States, data that are collected and distributed by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are from a diverse network of 
public health agencies and private actors, and do not all originate from data 
331 "What Is Public Health?", 2019, accessed February, 2019, https://www.cdcfoundation.org/what-
public-health.
332 Loosely based on the CDC website’s categorization of activities. "About." Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention,, 2019, accessed January, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/
mission.htm.
Note: The link had already expired by the time archiving took place and it could not be retrieved on 
the WayBack Machine. It appears it was similar to https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/cio.htm 
(April 2019)
333 Interestingly, this investigation even without microbial proof showed that a local brewery—whose 
water came from the contaminated well—did not have any infections because the water had been boiled 
before consumption. 
"1854 Broad Street Cholera Outbreak." Wikipedia, 2019, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
1854_Broad_Street_cholera_outbreak.
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collected by the CDC itself. A variety of data are held by the CDC including 
disease surveillance data, population health statistics and demographics, 
behavioral survey data, and merged datasets from diverse sources. These data 
may be entirely collected by the CDC (e.g., survey data), other federal agencies 
(e.g., NIH, VA, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), international partners 
(e.g., WHO, other national health departments), state/local health departments 
(e.g., mandatory disease reporting or state level data such as morbidity data), 
non-profits or foundations (e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation), and private entities 
such as health insurance companies.334 Each of these broad categories breaks 
down into practitioners and healthcare providers who are among first reporting 
entities. This network of private and public institutions is vast and distributed, 
and most often relies on voluntary reporting that has been fostered over time 
through trust and mutual partnerships. As much data as possible are made 
publicly accessible through reports, memos, and open data so that researchers, 
healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, non profits, community 
organizers, and private citizens can access data that will help inform decisions 
and generate prevention/remediation efforts that improve public health. An 
extensive discussion of this sharing ecosystem and how privacy concerns and 
governance decisions are made is included in the paper “Public Health as a Model 
for Cybersecurity Information Sharing.”335 
Big Data Cataclysm: Google Flu Trends
Flu tracking and Silicon Valley have a somewhat complicated recent history. 
In 2008 and in the foreshadow of the swelling “Swine Flu” epidemic, Google 
researchers published in Nature a method of detecting influenza outbreaks using 
Google search queries to find a highly correlated trend to physician visits and 
reported influenza-like symptoms.336 Google boasted a 1 day reporting lag, 
334 See for example data sources for: 
“eWorld Appendix." Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019, accessed January, 2019, 
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/eworld/Appendix/SourcesOfData.
"Cancer Prevention and Control." 2019, accessed January, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/cancer/dcpc/
data/other.htm.
"HIV Statistics." Center for Disease Control and Prevention,, 2019, accessed January, 2019, https://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/statistics_Lab_reporting_DCL_final.pdf.
"Datasets  CDC Wonder Systems." Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019, accessed 
January, 2019, https://wonder.cdc.gov/datasets.html.
335 Sedenberg, Elaine M, and Deirdre K Mulligan. Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing. University of California Berkeley (Berkeley Technology Law Journal: 2015). http://
btlj.org/data/articles2015/vol30/30_3/1687-1740%20Sedenberg.pdf.
336 The paper made a correction to the reference list, so the updated February 2009 is often cited as 
the reference date.
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whereas the CDC took 1-2 weeks in order publish data on regions hit by the flu.337 
The time lag for federal data is caused by the logistics of collecting data from 
distributed sources, but also because the CDC and most federally-released dataset 
require an extensive amount of quality assurance and cleaning to make sure data 
are accurate and representative. This decreased reporting time could improve 
response and prevention actions by public health officials, and help with 
allocating resources—particularly in a severe influenza outbreak like the Swine 
Flu. Big data had delivered on its promise to usurp conventional information 
sharing mechanisms and offer convenient insights from our perfunctory routines 
into matters of life an death. However by 2013, Google Flu Trends had missed the 
peak of flu season by 140% and researchers documented these failures in 
Science.338 The takeaway was not to discredit attempts to utilize big data 
generated by the private sector to supplement or replace traditional models—in 
fact their calls state the opposite and underscore the responsibility to use these 
data in the public interest—but rather intended to call out the “big data hubris” 
that clouds the potential uses of these data. In the case of Google Flu Trends, the 
methods and data were kept opaque so that policymakers would not have been 
able to interrogate these data if real high-stakes decisions were being made 
around it. The algorithm tailor to track these outbreaks was also left vulnerable to 
overfitting to other terms that seasonally occurred at the same time as outbreaks 
over time. Google also introduced suggested search features and health based 
add-ons that helped users find information relevant to their illness, but had an 
unintended side effect of driving more clicks and searches relating to the flu.339  
Google stopped producing the trends around 2014, including their efforts to track 
Dengue Fever.340 
Despite the failures and cautionary “big data” parable, Google Flu Trends 
represented an important shift in thinking about how public good oriented 
research—including public health—could leverage real-time data from the private 
sector to enable new analyses and research. Further, this seeded a larger theme: 
that data held by the private sector was beginning to offer granularity and 
insights unmet by the traditional and canonical government data sources and 
methods. This belief was not cured by the failure of this one instance of execution 
and data source. 
337 Ginsberg, J., M. H. Mohebbi, R. S. Patel, L. Brammer, M. S. Smolinski, and L. Brilliant. "Detecting 
Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data." Nature 457, no. 7232 (Feb 19 2009): 1012-4. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature07634. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19020500.
338 Lazer, David, Ryan Kennedy, Gary King, and Alessandro Vespignani. "The Parable of Google Flu: 
Traps in Big Data Analysis." Science 343, no. 6176 (2014): 1203-05. http://science.sciencemag.org/
content/343/6176/1203.full.
339 Lazer, David, and Ryan Kennedy. "What We Can Learn from the Epic Failure of Google Flu 
Trends." Wired, 2015. https://www.wired.com/2015/10/can-learn-epic-failure-google-flu-trends/.
340 "Google Flu Trends Data: Thank You for Stopping By." https://www.google.org/flutrends/about/.
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Flu Data
The CDC tracks multiple elements of influenza throughout the flu season, 
and works with other countries (e.g., Australia in the Southern Hemisphere 
which indicates the severity and type of influenza to hit during Northern 
Hemisphere winter) to understand the trends and make decisions. Data on the 
influenza virus and severity inform the vaccine formulation for each year.341 The 
CDC collects data on influenza from many different partners including public 
health and clinical laboratories located in all states and territories as part of the 
WHO Collaborating Laboratory system and the National Respiratory and Enteric 
Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS). These laboratories test for the type and 
strain of influenza, and share viral specimens with partners and the CDC for 
testing so that antiviral resistance and the antigenic or genetic characterization 
can be documented and tracked. The CDC also collects data from over 3,500 
healthcare providers on all “influenza-like illness” through the US Outpatient 
Influenza-like Illness Surveillance Network (ILINet) on age profiles and number 
of cases seen. These data are also reported automatically when enabled by 
electronic health records. Further, each state health department reports an 
estimated level of influenza cases each week and documents it through the State 
and territorial Epidemiologists Reports which serve as a summary of influenza 
activity and does not relay the severity of an outbreak. To track more severe 
illnesses, the CDC collects data from the Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance 
Network (FluSurv-Net) that reports laboratory confirmed cases (as opposed to 
NREVSS which reports all cases with flu-like symptoms). This network includes 
70 countries, but does not include all states (only ten participate)—it also 
contains data gaps in cases where testing is not performed or symptoms are 
attributed to other similar illnesses. Finally, mortality surveillance is conducted 
through two larger mortality surveillance systems that monitor cause of death in 
adults and minors and report “Pneumonia and Influenza (P&I)” as a cause of 
death code. 
These systems are distributed and not perfect, but designed to have 
representation among geographic regions, socio-economic statuses, ages, and 
levels of healthcare. There is also redundancy and known gaps in the information 
systems that are meant to be taken together in order to inform public health 
decisions and preparation for future influenza seasons. These data include 
information from private healthcare providers, but do not leverage other types of 
sensors or “big data’ surveillance.
341 Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Overview of Influenza Surveillance in the United 
States. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 
Diseases (NCIRD): 2018). https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/overview.htm.
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Kinsa
Motivations
Kinsa was founded in 2012 by Inder Singh, who was a former Executive Vice 
President of the Clinton Foundation’s Health Access Initiative (CHAI) which 
worked with over 70 governments and 22 pharmaceutical companies to decrease 
the cost of diagnostics and drugs for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB.342 According to 
one employee, Inder became frustrated by the lack of current data about 
outbreaks and incidence levels in countries where the disease spread rapidly. 
“He was incredibly frustrated by the lack of quality information and data around 
where people needed those medicines and even just how to allocate billions of 
dollars of funding. If you asked one team how many people get malaria every year 
and you ask another team, we'll get orders of magnitude different answers and 
that was just crazy.”
Believing that modern sensors could provide more frequent and granular 
data, Inder founded Kinsa as a company that could distribute a product and 
service while collecting population—or at least community—level data. Kinsa has 
a stated mission to create “the world’s first real-time map of human health.”343 
This knowledge and analysis could then be leveraged on an individual level to 
algorithmic predictions and feedback to users.
Thermometers have been around as a biosensing modality since 1625,344 but 
the acceptance of use and normalized body temperature was not made until 
around 1868. The first electronic thermometer based on a Carboloy thermistor 
was invented in 1954.345 Since then, digital thermometers of improving accuracy 
as well as decreasing size and cost have become a part of at home and 
professional medical care. Unlike other biosensing companies where the sensor, 
342 "Inder Singh, Kinsa Founder & Ceo." CrunchBase, 2019, accessed January, 2019, https://
www.crunchbase.com/person/inder-singh#section-overview.
343 "Kinsa Organization Overview." Crunch Base, 2019, accessed January, 2019, https://
www.crunchbase.com/organization/kinsa-inc#section-overview.
344 Pearce, J. M. "A Brief History of the Clinical Thermometer." [In eng]. QJM 95, no. 4 (Apr 2002): 
251-2. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11937653.
Impressively, Carl Wunderlich published over 1 million readings from 25,000 patients in order to 
establish the normal temperature range of a healthy person. One can imagine how much easier these data 
collections could have been in the modern digital world.
345  "Fast Clinical Thermometer Takes Temperature in Seconds." Popular Mechanics, 1954, 123. 
https://books.google.com/books?
id=sdwDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA123&dq=1954+Popular+Mechanics+January&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Pv4YT5SlG
5PoggekxISEDA&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=true.
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or set of sensors, has not been used in orchestration for that particular purpose 
before (e.g., Lioness) or where algorithmic development and choices on sensor 
design are still being developed (e.g., Basis), the digital thermometer has an 
established history. What makes the newest generation of “smart” digital 
thermometers unique are the platforms to help organize data for tracking or 
healthcare appointments, as well as the recommendations and personalized 
suggestions based on other demographic health information (i.e., personalizing 
responses based on if the individual measured is an infant which follows different 
guidelines). 
Kinsa has a platform that organizes user data and information, and offers 
recommendations on treatment and when to see a healthcare professional. The 
device is available for purchase at stores like Target and Walgreens, and connects 
to a mobile app. There are also enterprise versions of the device—service 
packages designed to connect communities like workplaces and schools—that 
have been used to track illness at a smaller scale and offer guidance to promote 
proper care and limit spread.346 The enterprise modeling of this smart device is a 
standout example of an innovative biosensing business model that focuses on not 
only larger population health trends, but trends within smaller communities. 
“Kinsa was founded and the initial phase of the company was building the first 
smart thermometer, first FDA cleared smart thermometer, and proving that 
consumers see value in this device and building out the sensor network to have 
sufficient scale. And now that we have over one point 5 million users across the 
United States and three years of history of data that we can validate the end of the 
value of that aggregated information.”
The founders of Kinsa made a deliberate choice to not make the company a 
nonprofit so that they were not relying on small grants and gifts in order to 
sustain data operations, all of which can be unreliable and under pressure from 
political trends over time. The company also wanted to prove that they could 
collect these real time health data and establish private public health information 
infrastructure, all while providing a product that consumers wanted to buy. As of 
June 2018 when this interview was conducted, Kinsa had over 1.5 million users.
Kinsa worked with academics to establish how their data could be used by 
external entities for study and as a way to obtain external validation: 
“As a part of our development process, we knew that for most customers they need to 
have some sort of external validation that this data is accurate, that is accurately 
346 It should be noted that this coordination can occur without sharing others’ individual health data. 
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representing their illness, some sort of that real world behavior. So we started reaching 
out to several academic groups that have done a lot of work in the flu forecasting space, 
knowing that they would likely be really interested in working with us because no one's 
ever access to this kind of data before.”
The startup reached out to researchers who had done flu surveillance work 
before to propose the partnership. By providing the clean data, many academic 
partners felt there was only minimal work left to provide a literature review and 
run the correlation analysis to see how well the data tracked to flu trends. In one 
case, a researcher had moved away from that line of influenza tracking research 
but was able to give the data to a graduate student for their own research. The 
structuring of the hypothesis and execution of the research was conducted wholly 
on the academic side. These data would not have been possible to collect and 
study without the partnership of a private firm like Kinsa—both in its scale, 
overall feasibility from a university research perspective, and on the return on 
investment for creating the sensor infrastructure at scale for these fundamental 
questions. Yet this exchange provided mutual benefit: enabling academic inquiry 
by supplying fundamental data, and by helping the startup validate their models 
and approach.347 
When asking about barriers and friction to these academic partnerships, an 
employee told me that timelines were the biggest hurdle. Academic timelines 
predictably run much more slowly than the highly competitive startup space, and 
there were concerns about properly constructing the data use agreement so that it 
could not be generally released for non-academic purposes. Additionally, Kinsa 
confided there were fears that these data could be used to show that these data 
did not correlate to influenza trends and released publicly before the company 
had any recourse to examine why or make adjustments. To be clear, this did not 
happen and the independent review showed there was a correlation between 
Kinsa data and influenza patterns. However, this illustrates the challenge of 
companies—particularly small and vulnerable startups—sharing their data with 
external partners. For instance, it is possible that research could make a mistake 
with the data and publish a damaging, albeit incorrect, result. Whether or not this 
error is later fixed still damages the reputation of the young company. Further, 
identifying a true problem without offering recourse to find a solution would 
likely sink a young company. Taking a risk and having these academic 
partnerships led to commercial validation and future research partnerships that 
have been important to the continued development of the company, but 
introduces friction by forcing startups to create mechanisms that decrease the 
chances of these occurrences. Without accepted practices on how to broker these 
relationships, each company interviewed had to come up with their own way of 
creating a collaborative review process—Kinsa illustrates this point clearly. 
347 See, for example: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29432526
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Google Flu Trends, though a vanguard in private sector public health data 
surveillance, has also clouded the ability of other companies to break through in 
the wake of the big data failure—despite some key differences to other business 
models. One team member reflected: 
“Well, I think on the positive side, Google Flu Trends drew a lot of attention to 
the need for illness surveillance and the fact that it's a pain point for a lot of 
organizations. So in that sense it was really good at raising awareness. I think it's 
not just in my time at Kinsa, but my prior world in data analytics, you know, it 
was just a classic example of, of hubris in many senses. To be fair to Google, they 
never intended for this to be a product. It was a free tool. It was just the PR hype 
machine really amped this up to another level. And then they set expectations on 
the performance of the product that they weren't investing in. Where for us, I 
think it becomes a strong point of comparison. Like, “hey, you all latched onto 
Google Flu Trends because there's clearly an unmet need in what you're doing 
today. Understood that you feel a little burned by that in some capacity. Here's 
the difference.” Like the raw data itself, the signal to noise ratio for us is 
extraordinarily high. You know, we're getting a medically accurate signal from an 
FDA cleared device. They're looking at a proxy of a proxy like, um, to our entire 
company is focused on building this [public health] surveillance system. This is 
our mission and our core point of being for Google that was a side project and 
like 20 percent time. So this is not something that we're just gonna launch it and 
put a press release out and not invest in anymore. Like this is our sole reason for 
being. So it's, I think that we haven't ever gotten any serious pushback because 
people are like, oh, Google Flu Trends didn't work so this won't work. But it is 
pretty fascinating. The people that are like, yeah, we tried that thing. Tech 
companies have burned us in the past. We're going to approach with caution.”
Kinsa clearly articulates how Google Flu Trends illustrated a need for 
fundamental data that did not exist, and that their sensor platform was creating a 
novel public health surveillance system that would fill a fundamental data need 
within the community. This sensor network arguably is best suited to be deployed 
by the private sector, and a public sector deployment of sensors for these data 
would not only be a prohibitively high investment but probably be contracted and 
purchased from private sector contractors.
Many startups simply synthesize open data from public health agencies as 
part of their business model, such as Benetech, to serve communities and 
healthcare providers, but generating data specifically to contribute to the system 
created a unique case.
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Rethinking a data-rich public health world
It is unlikely that any supplemental data would supplant traditional 
influenza surveillance systems—particularly because some are built into 
monitoring other illnesses and causes of death. However, rethinking how private 
sector, sensor generated data could complement these public health initiatives is 
provocative and worth policy consideration. Beyond the obvious real-time 
tracking of reported illness and general geographic region, a platform like Kinsa 
offers unique opportunities to assess the severity of the illness (something 
notably lacking in many distributed surveillance reporting mechanisms) and 
offers real-time health interventions by watching for dangerous symptoms or 
urging caregivers to seek healthcare (or refrain and save time/money). Kinsa also 
could benefit from improved public health analyses stemming from a more 
integrated and robust system. A private firm like Kinsa could not only use its 
user-level data and proprietary algorithms to make recommendations, but 
supplement it with trends and data from the improved and integrated public 
health information system in order to make their product better—creating a 
public interest feedback loop where their own microdata contributes to a better 
system overall.  
Brokering relationships with health officials is difficult, and understandably 
large government agencies like the CDC may be wary to work with each 
individual startup. Kinsa’s approach to work with local health officials first is a 
prudent and logical step, since state and local public health departments feed into 
the larger system and may be more aware of local needs, as well as more 
receptive to on the ground data.
Creating programs to collect and experiment with the public/private data 
partnerships outside of the mainstream data reporting ecosystem should be a 
priority for public health agencies. The CDC published a Surveillance Strategy 
Report entitled “How Sharing Data Digitally Benefits Heath” but mostly focuses 
on digitizing existing sharing infrastructure and including new types of 
information like digital health records348. The report broadly states a desire to 
build strong relationships with the private sector by leveraging innovation 
through public-private partnerships, but does not mention the use of user-
generated sensor data. However, understanding the fiscal realities of public 
health agencies and existing lack of resources, simply making tools and 
348 Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Surveillance Strategy Report - How Sharing Data 
Digitally Benefits Health. (Atlanta, GA: 2018). https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/innovation/sharing-
data-digitally.html.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Public Health Surveillance Preparing for the Future. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018). https://
www.cdc.gov/surveillance/pdfs/Surveillance-Series-Bookleth.pdf.
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recommendations on the types of data and analyses that could be easily picked up 
by decision makers and public health officials could stretch resources further and 
encourage these types of novel exchanges. This is particularly important in 
considering the potential for passive or active biosensor use, since many of the 
firms that run these devices are not considered (or otherwise involve) traditional 
health care providers.
The Kinsa case reiterates the need to have boilerplate data sharing 
agreements available for not only brokering exchanges with researchers or 
academics, but also larger institutions like public health entities. Creating clear 
mechanisms that simply accept input, data, analyses and ideas from the private 
sector at local and national levels is a first step that can later lead to incentives 
that help bridge the public/private divide and better leverage the strengths of the 
private sector for public interest technology applications. 
Representation across SES, age groups, and regions may be one of the 
biggest challenges smart-device enabled platforms face. At a price point of $18349 
(compared to $4 for a traditional oral digital thermometer), not everyone can 
afford the device nor does every individual trust how these devices use their data. 
Underrepresented populations that have felt the burden and harm of past 
research (e.g., Tuskegee deterred African American men from seeking healthcare 
for decades and may avoid blatant data collection.350 Establishing programs to 
distribute devices outside of the average smart device purchaser is an important 
step, as is acknowledging openly where there may be limitations in the data 
collection and how it might be addressed in the analysis or in future work.351
There is a public tradeoff present when the monitoring devices and public 
health analyses enter the home. Most individuals have no idea their data has 
been reported in the past to public health agencies—the collection and sharing 
was invisible. With a tangible device like Kinsa, this collection and exchange may 
become more clear to the individual. While that might cause some discontent 
with individuals, it opens an opportunity to educate citizens about these 
important data systems and offer a direct point of public health intervention—
instead of disseminating all information through doctors/healthcare providers, 
349 This price point was from Amazon in February of 2019, and the price has fallen over time.
350 Alsan, Marcella, and Marianne Wanamaker. Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men. Stanford 
University (2016). https://economics.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9386/f/
tuskegee_22may2016-1.pdf.
Scharff, D. P., K. J. Mathews, P. Jackson, J. Hoffsuemmer, E. Martin, and D. Edwards. "More Than 
Tuskegee: Understanding Mistrust About Research Participation." J Health Care Poor Underserved 21, 
no. 3 (Aug 2010): 879-97. https://doi.org/10.1353/hpu.0.0323. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
20693733.
351 There are of course limitations in privately funded infrastructures. In lieu of public data 
alternatives and without awareness of these limitations, private data may be used to make policy decisions 
that disproportionately impact those not in the data. See, for example: Crawford, Kate. "The Hidden 
Biases in Big Data." Harvard Business Review  (2013). https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-
big-data.
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community advocates, or even the popular press.   
Lack of understanding
There is a lot of misunderstanding in how information flows from the 
private sector (or any entity) into databases that inform decision-making public 
health.352 For instance, on April 18, 2018 US Representative Ryan Costello told 
NPR: “Well, for one, when you post on Facebook that you're not feeling well or 
you may have the flu, oftentimes that's a signal to the CDC that the flu virus is 
evolving in ways or in geographic areas that we may not be aware of. The issue of 
artificial intelligence and being able to understand how people are feeling or what 
is being said and to be able to self-police or self-regulate ourselves is another 
broad area.”353 This is—according to public information—not yet a real program 
or practice. There is great potential to incorporate AI into public health decision 
making, particularly as it relates to incorporating private sector data.354 
The business model and approach to collecting sensor-based public health 
data makes for a provocative framework for future companies to design their 
product around the generation of public good-oriented data. By understanding 
the incentives to construct a business model that incorporates these public good 
data sharing initiatives, Kinsa can help illustrate how public good orientations 
can make a successful company (as opposed to a non-profit model or closed 
information firm). The barriers encountered by Kinsa to augment existing public 
health information exchanges also illustrate policy opportunities that help 
incorporate this type of supplementary information while maintaining and 
growing existing information systems. 
Conclusions
Kinsa was designed to generate a network of real-time health surveillance 
that could fill a void in current public health information systems, and offer the 
opportunity to build fundamental research that could feedback into their 
platform and provide microtrend-based health recommendations to users. Filling 
in the information gap left by Google Flu trends, Kinsa represents a new model 
for building a private information infrastructure that can also benefit researchers 
and public health officials—both of which have insight that can provide basic 
352 This not exclusively a public health problem, but given the salience of health decisions it is often a 
common example of fictitious AI and data sharing examples.
353 King, Noel. "Rep. Costello Hopes House Facebook Hearings Will Dig Deeper." NPR, 2018. https://
www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601437148/rep-costello-hopes-house-facebook-hearings-will-dig-deeper.
354 Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Application of Artificial Intelligence Approaches to Tackle 
Public Health Challenges - Workshop Report. (Toronto, ON: 2018). http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/
51018.html.
It should be noted Elaine was a participant at this workshop. 
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scientific findings to improve the firm’s algorithmic development.
This firm illustrates the potential for companies to build and market their 
data-driven services off of public or social good intents, and use networked 
biosensed data to generate social externalities that are rooted in research. Kinsa 
reinforces the importance of external academics in providing validation and 
research input for small companies who do not have the ability to hire devoted 
researchers. However, this case and others suggest that larger companies benefit 
from external and independent researchers to provide validation. This case also 
points to the challenges faced by small businesses when attempting to work with 
government entities, and demonstrates the need to have more accessible points 
of contact and posted mechanisms for data agreements, exchanges, and methods 
of collaboration. Especially considering public/private partnerships are often 
touted as a goal by governments—particularly the US government—there needs 
to be more clear avenues to enable these relationships without placing all of the 
burden on small startups.
127
On the Basis of Science: Internal 
R&D and External Complements
“If an academic institution can somewhat be involved with that early on, in a 
startup process that's more valuable than any investor investing in a startup. 
Because I've been in situations where I'm juggling both of trying to collect data 
and trying to develop the product and it's difficult doing both at the same time.” 
—Former Basis Engineer
Introduction
Basis Science,355 commonly referred to simply as “Basis” or by their product 
name “Basis Peak,” was a wrist-based health tracker that provided an online and 
mobile analysis hub for their health data. The company was founded in 2010 in 
San Francisco with a wrist-worn biosensor product designed to measure steps, 
calories burned, sleep quality, and physiological metrics including heart rate. The 
startup had a long kickoff, and took over a year before they launched their first 
product. The product was known for its data portability that allowed users 
autonomy over downloading and analyzing their own data, in addition to using 
the analysis provided by the firm. This data portability distinguished the device 
from others on the market, like the products offered by FitBit and Jawbone. The 
startup was acquired by Intel in 2014,356 and in August of 2016 the product was 
recalled after an overheating issue—pulling the device from the market and 
effectively shutting down the product.357 When the product was discontinued, the 
tech columnists mourned the loss with “digital obituaries” like one entitled “RIP 
Basis Peak: The Best Wearable You’ve Never Heard Of, too hot to handle in more 
ways than one.”358
355 According to Crunchbase’s records (where the firm is under Basis Science), the legal name was 
Basis Labs.
356 "Intel Completes Acquisition of Basis Science Inc." Intel News Release, 2014, 2018, https://
newsroom.intel.com/news-releases/intel-completes-acquisition-of-basis-science-inc/#gs.1xzc98.
357 "Safety Recall Notice for All Basis Peak Watches." Intel, 2016, accessed December, 2018, https://
www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000025310/emerging-technologies/wearable-
devices.html.
358 Cooper, Daniel, "Rip Basis Peak: The Best Wearable You've Never Heard Of," Dana Wollman ed. 
Endgadget, 2016, https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/09/basis-peak-obituary/.
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Basis was a biosensing startup with a robust internal research and algorithms 
team that focused on fundamental research inquiries about measurement and 
prediction of biorhythms. Yet even with this strong internal team, the firm was 
pushed to pursue external research partnerships in order to leverage external 
research infrastructure, outsource knowledge sharing publications, and obtain 
external “truth data” to validate internal algorithms. The strategy of Basis 
demonstrates how information-intensive firms continue in the model of Saxenian 
and Chesbrough (Chapter 2) in outsourcing expertise, but differentiate 
themselves in that these emerging strategies are lack consistent structure and rely 
more heavily on researchers than other specialized private firms and services. 
This reliance on researchers and their infrastructure illustrates the importance of 
fundamental research inquiry to information-intensive firms. Additionally, Basis 
provides unique insight into emerging ethical challenges research teams face as 
their research becomes more personal to users. 
This particularly in-depth view was made possible because participants could 
talk freely about the product, and most importantly, their process creating and 
improving their algorithms and sensors since it is no longer on the market. As 
former employees of a dissolved company, it was easier to talk about their 
experiences and reflect on the process.359 The startup was acquired because of its 
success, but illustrates how the culture and market whims of a larger company 
can stifle the innovative spirit and momentum of a product. 
Product Development, Direction, and the R&D Team
Basis was notable in part because of how active their “research” team was 
throughout the development of the product, and the focus this team had on 
fundamental research questions. As a result, many technical individuals and 
sensor experts viewed the Basis product as one of the superior smart watches on 
the market. This firm exemplifies an advanced strategy pursued as a result of 
competitive pressure from information-intensive innovation in that the team not 
only focused their internal research on basic science, but leveraged outside 
academic partnerships to provide necessary (and missing) research 
infrastructure. Access to past employees and their reflections made this in-depth 
analysis possible. Though Basis was exemplary, the strategies employed are not 
unique to this one firm.
One of the engineers gave a lengthy and informative description of how the 
“R&D team” evolved over time, which gives a glimpse into how a research-based 
startup morphs based on the internal location of talent and drive of the company. 
359 It should be noted that even though all interviewees for Basis still worked the field for sensing 
companies, they did not feel comfortable even anonymously talking about their current experiences.
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“When Basis started, there was a science team, which did algorithms and 
firmware. There was a hardware team, and a software team, and I think a product 
team. Then, I’m just gonna leave manufacturing and marketing off to the sides, 
cuz they’re always there, and they’re stable. 
Then, we ended up merging. The firmware team went to the hardware team, 
cuz that made sense. Then, I was on the firmware team. Then firmware team was 
basically translating algorithms of the algorithms team. Then, we ended up 
writing our own algorithms that were just as good, if not better, than the 
algorithms team. Then basically, at some point, the algorithms team dissolved. 
Then, I went from firmware to becoming algorithms, and led algorithms, some of 
the people that stuck around from algorithms, as well as some of the firmware 
people that were doing algorithms, too. 
Then, we basically hired a new firmware team. Then algorithms basically, 
because of that, stayed under hardware, for whatever reason, because a lot of the
—so, I say that, but all the while, there was one small research component, with 
one engineer that was still not on algorithms, but doing algorithm research. 
Then, after Intel, my team and that team of two or three merged together. 
Then I just went back to doing engineering stuff, which was a good consolidation. 
We were all colluding on stuff anyway, so it was nice to be all under the same 
roof. Yeah, still stayed under hardware, for whatever reason, which made things
—so, that was the—so, in terms of background of people, on that team it was very 
much EE folks that had done signal stuff, or biomedical people that have done 
signal stuff, those types of folks. 
Then, there was also this business Intel team, which is [under] this huge 
umbrella of data science. You have, at one end, your very mathematical, machine 
learning folks that are doing math all day. Then you have your analysts that are 
trolling, doing word heap maps of user reviews, and just basic statistics, nothing 
too crazy. That was on the product testing and development side. 
In terms of time series data analysis and generating new features, that was 
definitely on the research side, with strong machine learning folk, and EE 
[electrical engineering] signals folks. Then, the product testing development stuff 
was more biz Intel analyst folks, which I think makes sense, cuz I don’t think 
there’s—I don’t think either group would wanna necessarily switch jobs. I think it 
worked well. Yeah, it’s weird, cuz now data science involves all of that. Hiring for 
data science is awful. I won’t even use the term in a job title anymore. It’s like I 
need a machine learning/signals engineer, or product is looking for a business 
analyst. It’s totally different thing. Resumes is like oh, I analyze click-through 
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data of marketing, or online ads, and did—that’s certain its own niche field.”
What was commonly referred to by the interviewees as the “R&D team” was 
not officially labeled that within the firm. It loosely included titles of firmware, 
algorithms engineers, data scientists and some researchers. Many individuals 
changed titles as the company evolved, and everyone I spoke with felt they had at 
least in part contributed to the R&D of the product. There were several teams 
(with some overlap) that included a science team, then after that was disbanded 
the algorithms and development team took over the work. Eventually the team 
was loosely known for research and development on the whole—illustrating the 
fluidity of research teams from an organizational perspective. 
Engineers reflected that data acquisition was a key goal early on, which 
quickly led them to external partnerships.
 “So data acquisition was probably one of the key goals early on, in terms of 
looking at different hardware prototypes, acquiring data from that, processing 
the data, storing the data, and then developing algorithms around the data. I 
think that's usually the steps you need in an R&D team from start to finish. The 
data acquisition process, it's pretty important, and then quality control, and then 
pre-processing, storing, and then developing algorithms and then implementing 
them into prototypes, essentially.”
Data was collected internally, usually from fellow employees and then friends/
family (a popular test category for testing startups). There were also what the 
engineers referred to as “beta users” early on, and participants that were 
recruited by the firm using TaskRabbit or Craigslist, though no one could 
remember the particulars.360 External recruits were given a consent form, and 
paid to wear the device in the lab so that the team could get a variety of data to 
test if the sensor was working.  
“So there were a lot of different phases where we would get data. Early on, it was just 
internal data collection between whoever's on the company team. When we started 
growing and getting a little more funding, we were able to build partnerships with some 
institutions and some clinics, where they would give us data, and they would also give us 
reference data as well from calibrated devices, which we could essentially do anything 
with. And as we grew, we started building more partnerships, so that internal data 
collection was still there, still constant, but we also had a parallel stream of a third party 
source, which was more trusted, going on at the same time as well… Internal data 
collection was more for our own purposes, where we can test out futuristic devices and 
future concepts. The external validation source where we team up with institutions and 
360 It is also possible interviewees felt uncomfortable telling me the details since they knew I study in 
part research ethics. Usually in the interviews I attempted to signal that this was all in attempt to 
understand practices, not place blame or judgment. 
131
clinics, was more for where we currently stand and how we compare ourselves to 
anything else on the market.”
Others on the team remember more of the struggles to coordinate the initial 
data collection, and reflected on how important this step is to making or breaking 
a startup R&D team
“Yeah the whole data collection process I think starting from recruiting subjects, 
developing the protocol and then consistently getting quality data is very difficult 
for early stage startups because usually an R&D team is small for an early stage 
startup, so it's like their time spent on collecting data it's essential but it's not the 
best use of their time on a small R&D team [given other priorities]….and that 
data collection process can kill or make a startup.”
While in some ways this reflects Chesbrough’s Open Innovation paradigm 
where firms need to look outside the firm at different stages for specialized input, 
but challenges this construct in that specialized data flows are hard to scale and 
lack institutionalized forms. This pushes the firm to create ad hoc, and more 
involved research partnerships tailored to fit the exact innovation needs of the 
firm.   
The team also had to grapple with ethical questions stemming from their data 
collection efforts, especially since in the beginning they were testing on each 
other and friends or family.
“There were times where the algorithms would be doing something clearly wrong 
and narrowed it down to a piece of someone's day and then you were wanting to 
know what they were doing, but depending on who it was, you can't ask people. 
And sometimes you don't ... And a lot of times when it was friends and family, 
you wouldn't exactly know who it was. If it was an employee, like if it was [Name 
redacted of a close colleague] or someone I'd try to dig into [the anomaly], but it 
was one of those things that, every now and then, it was an employee and you 
couldn't go ask them. And I remember one time there was someone who was 
someone's friend who had a particular pattern and it look like they had some sort 
of arrhythmia. [We discussed], ‘Should we tell this person?’ I think it was like an 
employee's friend or something.”
The team had discussed, but they didn’t feel qualified to make a diagnosis. 
“It's kind of like you can't ... I feel like there's an ethics thing, I can't try and 
diagnose someone, but if you just say, ‘You might want to check this out.’ I don't 
know how that evolves within that category…We obviously weren't qualified to 
diagnose people, but at the same time there are things that you can tell are fairly 
obvious.”
These ethical dilemmas demonstrate how sensitive these data and analysis 
could be at a core level, and how lack of protocol and norms led to ad hoc 
132
decision making and internal discussions.
Research Direction
The research team at Basis usually got a lot of discretion on what they wanted 
to do. Several engineers remarked that they were able to decide what problem or 
question to work on next, and had the support to start tinkering. The team self 
described as having “pretty good drive” and they felt they had both the autonomy 
and motivation to push forward. One engineer remarked that the team all had 
similar personalities, so they had a lot of self-direction and internal motivation. 
“We didn't really need to be told to go do something, it was our curiosity taking 
us to the next technical limitation.”
Despite some fuzziness around their title, and the small status of the firm—
which meant they were not an R&D team that could be isolated from others and 
insulated from bureaucracy like a traditional corporate lab—the research team 
was able to hold some of the coveted R&D traits including autonomy and freedom 
to tinker. This is remarkable not in that it differs from fundamental elements in 
Bush’s linear model of innovation, or Stokes’ quadrant model of motivation, but 
it is remarkable that this research climate could be found at a lean and scrappy 
startup developing biosensor algorithms. 
However, this culture was not without traditional economic and pragmatic 
pressures. There were several ideas that did not make it into the final product, 
due to some of the growing pressures to perform well on the market against 
smart watch competitors.
“One idea we were looking at was—this is where I think, for a triathlete wearable, 
is just really keeping track of how recovered that person’s body is, and really 
being prescriptive in how much training you’re gonna do that day. We actually 
started looking at that stuff, and had some cool preliminary results, but just 
didn’t really fit in with what the company was trying to do, I guess.” 
One of the engineers remarked on how the most interesting problems to the 
research team were not always what the users wanted, and thus were not 
prioritized and able to be released.
“We were looking at body recovery as a research. We were looking at stress as 
research. We were looking at swimming as research. Also, on this open-ended, 
unsupervised activity clustering per user research. None of that, unfortunately, 
saw the light of day. What did see the light of day was a lot of data export, smart 
alarm, more product-type stuff, which was—I think one of the most requested 
features, actually, despite all that data, was just having your watch vibrate you 
awake. Then, the next one was, I think, data export. Not as glamorous, for the 
scientists at the company.”
The R&D team expressed dissatisfaction because they were held to an 
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arbitrary holiday shopping season market, which was when the startup could 
expect to make more of a profit. Additionally, the key features that users wanted 
and were featured in their competitors product determined what the R&D team 
could prioritize.  
“One reason why swimming never probably saw the light of day is because people 
were super keen on smart alarm, or smart vibrate awake, or whatever it was 
called. There was limited product and iOS resources, so they went to building out 
that feature. Despite the fact that the algorithm was close to done, it didn’t really 
get the support it needed to be productized, essentially. Yeah, you make some 
algorithm to do something, and you say that it’s this accurate, or it’s got these 
classification performance numbers. Then, there’s definitely that time to say how 
are we gonna present this to a user. What is the feature? Detecting swim is one 
thing. Do we just say this is how many minutes you were swimming? Is it how 
many laps you did? Is it how many laps you did of each stroke? Is it what was 
your average number of strokes per length? It’s all this. It really creates a rabbit 
hole—like MVP, I don’t know if you’ve heard of that. It’s the name of the game 
around—Minimum Viable Product. It’s always just—so, MVP is always just like 
yeah, start time, end time, basically, for activities.”
As an interesting point, the company would regularly deploy product testing 
and development, and release user surveys and ask how the update was working. 
Frequently, users would respond commenting how one feature got worse, while 
another got better—while none of these features had been altered. This was seen 
with more rigorous Q&As with the beta test group, who would also randomly rate 
things that had not been changed as better or worse. 
In developing the initial algorithms, the team felt it was very important to be 
able to follow up with the users who were testing the device. But once the team 
was acquired by Intel, general privacy protocols—put in place to protect even 
early beta or inside users—interfered with the ability to conduct work. 
“I would say Basis took users’ privacy pretty seriously. Only a few people had keys 
to the castle, in terms of being able to associate a user account with the user data. 
There was definitely internal data collection studies, which was less—until Intel 
acquired us, we didn’t anonymize it. Then Intel legal was like you have to 
anonymize this stuff. It was only vaguely anonymized, because it’s like, when 
something didn’t go right in an experiment, we’d always wanna follow up directly 
with the person that did it, so we’d always—one person had the key. I’d just be 
like hey, who did this, and then she’d tell me. Yeah, just random—I guess one 
thing that was definitely, I think—that I told my team to keep hush was just vague 
how healthy—we had personal assessments around how healthy some people in 
the office were, based on how they performed in these studies.”
Had the team been able to run large studies and have identified data in a 
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controlled setting once acquired by Intel, this anonymization policy likely would 
not have been a problem.
Reflections on wearable business models 
The team separately all shared reservations about the current business model 
for wearables and the implication it had on internal R&D and longevity of the 
products. 
“Having been through the whole Basis thing, I think we all have different 
perspectives on the value proposition of wearables now. Some of us are, I think, 
more pessimistic than others… I’d say wearables, as a consumer product, I think, 
when your goal is shipping hardware and market capitalization, you’re not 
necessarily—I don’t think there is a large value proposition, because you just buy 
this thing, you wear it, and then you get bored of it.  If you were to go after very 
specific demographics with smaller market cap, I think there’s huge value, 
especially the triathlete thing, which is you’re doing one device. It needs to track 
running really well, swimming really well, bicycling really well, and have really 
good heart rate. Then, just check heart rate while sleeping, and build out this 
whole over-training thing, that someone that is a triathlete can digest, but doesn’t 
need to have so much product or find—a lay user’s like I don’t care if I shouldn’t 
run that far today. A triathlete cares very much about that. I think that’s really 
where these small niche areas it would be really helpful, I think.”
There are issues when hardware is purchased, and there is not a built-in 
subscription model. This was the case with Basis.
Interviewee A: “I think that’s a huge business model problem for wearables, 
because I think very strongly that it should be subsidized hardware. It should be 
subscription-based. Then you can add on features. Because I think that kinda 
revenue stream would really support the development of those features, whereas 
I think a lot of these companies are struggling to make money in one month of 
the year. All focus is on what are we doing to make this holiday season great. It’s 
not necessarily answering that value proposition, the long-term value 
proposition. It’s about answering short-term sales.”
Interviewee B: “The market incentives to create a product that can truly last a 
long time are not there.” 
Interviewee C: “If you ask a company what they wanted to do, in terms of a single 
product, it's never, ‘We want this product to last 10 years.’”
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In thinking of the future of wearables, understanding the market incentives 
that drive the true innovation are important from a business and policy 
perspective. 
Truth Data and a Reverse Information Flow 
In much of this dissertation research, the emphasis has been on data flows 
from the private firm to the researcher to enable new questions. In Basis’ case—
and some other sensing startups—devices were given to researchers and 
researchers shared data back as part of the partnership. 
During the development of a sensor-based algorithm, there is a need for (as 
one engineer put it): truth data. Truth data is used to validate and see if the 
algorithms synthesizing the data collected from the sensor are working, and 
accurately making readings. 
“There were a couple [researchers] that approached us, which we were really 
surprised, because at the time we were needing data, because we needed a truth 
validation source, and they had heard about us through our marketing applications 
essentially, like Facebook possibly. I don't know exactly how they found us, but this was 
pretty surprising to us that they approached us, and they wanted to run their own 
studies using our devices so we were able to supply them devices, and we were able to 
gather all this truth data in return, which helped classify our algorithms' accuracies, and 
further develop them.”
It is interesting and important to note that the firm was approached by 
potential academic research partners, and not the other way around. So called 
’truth data’ from partnered researchers was used a number of different ways.
“So a couple different applications [for the truth data]. The truth data, we would 
parse it and kind of organize it in a way where a certain percentage of it would be 
used for training purposes, and we would isolate that. And when I say training, I 
mean developing algorithms and improving those algorithms. Another set would 
be isolated for validation purposes, so we wouldn't ever touch that, that would 
just stand by itself and say, okay, whenever we make these improvements, let's 
test it on an isolated set. To understand that these improvements are actually real 
and they're not conflicted in any sort of way. And then the third set would just be 
a free for all. We can do as we please with it. If we wanted to use it for marketing 
purposes, we would use it. If we wanted to have interns play with it, or kind of 
grow on that set of data to improve their own skills, we would let them use it.”
Not all of the data from the external research partner was shared, and these 
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splits would be decided upfront. According to one engineer, the split was usually 
60/40 or 50/50 so that there was data the firm would need see. This would be a 
way to confirm the algorithm would not just be tailored to the data provided and 
not the intended ground truth of the readings. 
“That would be essentially a way for them to confirm that the algorithms are not 
going to be changed if a white paper was supposed to be written. For example, if 
we had access to all 100% of that data, we could essentially make our algorithms 
work perfectly on that data set. And that white paper would essentially be perfect, 
in terms of results. If we didn't have access to 50% of that data, it's a way for them 
to say, ‘Okay, this is kind of set in stone, and this is what the results were at the 
time of data collection, and this is what the results are.’ It's just a way for us to be 
blinded by making adjustments that are wrong.”
This data arrangement was seen as common in the partnerships Basis formed 
with various external researchers. It was also common for the startup to depend 
on external research partners to provide specialized equipment that the internal 
team otherwise would not have access to, such as a metabolic cart and equipment 
for a full sleep study. This infrastructure extends as well to other forms of 
expertise, knowledge sharing, and ethics infrastructure as seen in Chapter 6. 
Some partnerships that relied on contracts when the partnership was based on 
a very specific need or requirements, such as the study of “normal” participants 
(those without sleep disorders) in a partnership to study sleep using sleep study 
equipment. The engineers usually did not remember the particulars of the 
agreement, just that one was in place and why.
“There were [contracts in place]. Depending on the size of the study, depending 
on the invasiveness of the study, depending on the type of subjects we would 
need. All of this would need to get agreed upon. For example, for the sleep studies 
we were mainly interested in subjects that had normal sleep patterns, and not 
any issues with sleep. So we had to make sure that that study would confirm that 
these are normal sleepers. So they had to go through a series of questions and 
analysis for that subject, before they could enroll them, make sure they're not 
taking any other drugs, things like that.”
Partnerships were fluid with this firm, and matched experiences the engineers 
had at other similar sensing startups. 
“That [forming agile partnerships] was pretty normal. I mean usually in the 
cases, for startups, they don't tend to go on and on. It's pretty quick. Once we 
agree upon it, it's like both parties don't really want to dwell over these little 
litigations, and they just want to get the study rolling.”
Partners needed to be able to move quickly, since the startup was on a rapid 
live-or-die timeline.
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Interviewee: We would usually push for that to happen, because we're on a time 
base, we're on a time crunch. Academia is usually not on a time crunch, things go 
a lot more slower.
Elaine:   Oh…. I know that.
Interviewee:   So we would have to usually light the fire and keep pushing for 
that, until they topple over. 
Sometimes the partnerships resulted in coauthored papers, usually white 
papers that could be turned out more quickly. Some findings made it to 
conferences, but the preferred method of sharing new knowledge was through the 
use of technical white papers found on the website. The Basis engineers tended to 
view the data as the sensitive and valuable asset that needed to be protected from 
public disclosure. 
“When we'd talk about algorithms, it's not like the person hearing about the 
conversation is really gonna go out to a computer and go do something about it. 
It's more about the data integrity itself, and if they don't have access to that 
similar data, it's going to be hard to reproduce those results anyways. So it was 
more about keeping the data confidential.”
Other Facets of External Research Partnerships
There were more salient features of the external partnerships Basis formed 
during their startup years. Another benefit of the academic partnerships were 
that the studies were covered under their respective IRBs, and the interviewees 
from Basis recognized this as a feature of the alliance. This is echoed by other 
firms and see within Chapter 7. 
In another version of loose externalized partnerships, sometimes companies 
who ordered large sets of the devices provided feedback on its use case to the 
company. Even if these aren’t externalized research partnerships, it was still a 
case where casual but applied knowledge generated from use cases flowed 
between the firm and users.
“Here’s another really weird one, is we had a—some company tested our product 
and thought it was the best sleep tracker that they could get for a reasonable 
price. It was a South American gold mining company. They wanted to strap it on 
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their truck drivers, who would—if they didn’t sleep well, would drive trucks’ gold 
off the road in the middle of the night. They reached out and just bought a ton of 
units, for whatever reason. I don’t know where that falls.”
In general, Basis viewed external research partners as a mutually beneficial 
relationship.
“I know from talking to people recently that they can get a lot of inbound requests 
for stuff, but usually it was like mutual ... If it was research, it would be mutually 
beneficial. Whereas that, the one I remember, at least the first one, and I think 
they did subsequence settings after I left, but the original was very just like 
forward Basis, it wasn't like a "we're going to partner and we're interested, the 
universities are interested in this" and I think it was like we contracted them to 
do it for us kind of deal.”
Some of the partnerships were difficult to form, and one team member felt 
that universities could do a better job of connecting to local startups and helping 
bridge these academic and private connections.
“The one thing I really want to see change is the academic relationship between 
let's say a school for example and a growing company, a startup company…If 
there was something to help the startup validate their sense of technology or help 
them grow in terms of data collection I think it could be very beneficial mutually 
for both if there was an easier way to establish that connection.”
A theme that emerged over and over in the Basis interviews was how 
important the academic partnerships were both for Basis and other companies 
the scattered team went on to support. 
“Yeah for sure, even taking the data collection aspect of it, if an academic 
institution can somewhat be involved with that early on, in a startup process 
that's more valuable than any investor investing in a startup. Because I've been in 
situations where I'm juggling both of trying to collect data and trying to develop 
the product and it's difficult doing both at the same time. “
Publishing
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“I’m not sure if Intel Labs published. We didn’t really keep track on them. I don’t 
think we published externally because a lot of the—it was all trade secreted 
algorithm stuff—outside of like—a couple, I’d say, “white papers,” cuz they’re not 
white papers, but scientific/marketing. It made sense. It was like here’s the 
protocol we did. Here’s how many subjects. This is the—this is the data. These are 
the activities. It’d just show it. It was also—okay, so we did it in cahoots with 
another university, but we don’t talk how the algorithm works or whatever. Just 
this is how the data compares to truth, or ECG.”
Sharing knowledge through public postings, even unofficial ones, also helps 
employees because otherwise they often cannot talk about or reference what they 
did while at the firm. Having a reputation for talented staff, not to mention the 
advancements themselves, provides some incentives to firms to allow 
information to be shared externally. This incentive is more powerful in the 
absence of a strong reputation, like those from a larger firm.  
“I think we put them out on blog posts. I don’t know where they actually landed, cuz 
I was actually, unfortunately, gone. Then they validated my algorithm and wrote a paper 
about it. I fortunately got my hands on them, on those documents, cuz I obviously keep 
those for resumes and stuff.”
One engineer remembered that they used a blog post from another company 
on how to use heart rate data to detect heart arrhythmias, and that it was 
specifically just a simple blog post and not a validated published paper. 
Knowledge did not have to come from formal or traditional sources to be useful, 
and these networks of “unofficial” knowledge shared on the startups websites was 
a useful way to exchange findings. 
Interesting findings
There were interesting findings on general knowledge on applications and 
accuracy of wearable sensors that generated more generalizable knowledge.
“Another fun, interesting tidbit is that the calories algorithm ended up being 
more accurate, using the heart rate data coming off the—if you were just to take 
the calories algorithm and send in the heart rate data stream from the Basis 
watch, versus the heart rate data stream in from the 12 lead ECG, and then 
compare its outputs to the caloric cart, the Basis path was actually more accurate 
than the ECG path. I think it’s because people were like oh, we need medical 
FDA-grade certified stuff, but you put 12 leads on people and have them run on a 
treadmill. You have so much—you have so many noise problems. It’s almost like 
you’re just as inaccurate—you’re more inaccurate than you were using the Basis 
watch, which is interesting. I don’t think FDA equipment, unless it’s a good chest 
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strap, isn’t necessarily designed around working for exercise, which was 
something interesting.”
On reflecting on an observational study the group ran, one recalled a 
humorous accidental finding of trying to understand sleep patterns.
“We had a motion camera, to monitor sleep, to see how many times people 
moved in the middle of the night. People knew what it was. Obviously, they didn’t 
engage in any activities that would’ve been compromising. Yeah, actually one 
funny story. This lady had these cats, and they’d fly across the screen in the 
middle of the night. We’d be like this is not helpful….“
Learning on the job
The Basis team had interesting reflections on how they continued learning on 
the job. They mentioned that some of the team would occasionally attend 
conferences, but the most useful time spent was on MOOCs, which they would 
take and help each other out with. 
“The one thing we did often do, though, is sometimes we’d all enroll in MOOCs 
together, and try to get better at stuff. I had taken it, and another guy had taken 
it. It was really helping us a lot, in our daily work. I actually told a guy that I was 
managing, take this class. Spend work time doing it. It’s fine. You’ll be better, as a 
result. He did. I think it worked out well.” 
Acquisition
Once Basis was acquired by Intel, the motivation of the team began to fizzle 
due to new constraints and cultural influences that stymied the momentum of the 
R&D team.
“This was right after Intel picked us up, so it was like, what’s our road map? We 
don’t really know. We had just launched, so we were dealing with press and 
feedback and that kinda stuff. Rather than dive headfirst into the new features, 
people really wanted to try to figure out the splash that happened. What do we 
need to do now? Mind you, I don’t think they ever figured that out, because they 
still haven’t done anything. I still talk to people there. I’m not gonna say anything 
else.” 
The motivations of Intel in picking up Basis also seemed unclear, other than 
an obvious superficial status-quo play to invest in a smart watch. 
“One of the big groups at Intel that was really keen on our device was Intel Labs. 
They were really interested in having a [smart sensing] watch, but having a phone 
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[and other sensors] with all of it’s better. Then everything else in your life is even 
better. They were really keen on trying to figure out how to do this huge multi-
modal sensing thing, and what all of it can tell you about people. That was very 
high on the research. Frankly, I think that’s all it really was.”
Another engineer mused similar motivations.
“I think the motivation [to acquire Basis] was to ... Or at least they said they 
wanted ... I think they ultimately wanted to develop wearable technology or at 
least capability for it. Intel I think wants to make their processors more than just 
desktop. That was our understanding. “ 
Moving the team into the larger environment and muddying the product goals 
was challenging.
“Within the team ... the R&D team was still pretty focused on making 
improvements and developing features, and what not. That wasn't really effected 
the first year of the acquisition. So we were still on that mode of, "Hey, let's try to 
make this product better, let's be a little more consistent with developing new 
features, or whatever we want to do." There came a point after the acquisition 
where things started getting layered in terms of management and production 
direction wasn't really coming directly from the R&D team at this point now. It 
was like, "Hey, someone from up above was saying you guys should do this," or, 
"Let's wait on figuring on what we want to do before we actually do it." So that 
started slowing the ship down a little bit, which caused just the sense of and drive 
of wanting to go out and do something creative or new.”
It may not have been the bureaucracy, but rather the lack of direction that led 
the teams to stall. 
“Well, they didn't want slow R&D down specifically. I think they were more 
confused about what direction to take the product in, because when they acquired 
us, we didn't know if we were going to be an everyday consumer, like day to day 
wearable device, or were we going to be more on like the high end sporting 
device? Or were we going to be a medical grade for clinics and hospitals and 
researchers? So we didn't really know that ourselves. They were given the 
responsibility after the acquisition to figure that out for us, and give us that sense 
of direction, but it seemed like they weren't really sure on which direction to take 
either. And not making a decision sometimes is not a good decision.”
Some of the team felt stifled by the rules Intel imposed on them, and the lack 
of intellectual freedom. Others felt the product had run its course. 
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 “We kind of hit diminishing returns on what we were able to do and change, so 
before we launched, and even a little bit after, there was a lot of improvements we 
could make or features we could add and just kind of stopped and we weren't 
sure another product was in the pipelines.”
It is unclear what, if anything, is happening now with the technology 
developed by Basis, and data collected by the team. The Intel website only 
contains information on the product recall.
“I think they're just going to sit on it. I mean they haven't really announced any 
wearable type product. Last I heard on the Intel Labs Group was they're trying to 
focus more on artificial intelligence...There could've been for sure. Yeah I mean 
there's a lot of apps and interest there on the backend data processing side where 
it's, just you can imagine personalized medicine like for personalized tracking. All 
the data was available. We have data for over three years of system users which 
was just sitting there if they decided to do something with that data, or analyze it 
in AI type ways, there's a lot of things that could've happened.” 
This point was corroborated by one of the other interviewees.  “I think they 
just forgot about it. Yeah I would've heard something that, they're doing 
something with that data but I don't think so.”
Conclusion
Basis exemplifies an advanced strategy arising from the competitive pressure 
of information-intensive innovation. Their research and algorithms team focused 
heavily on basic scientific inquiry, but still needed to leverage outside academic 
partnerships for research infrastructure, expertise, validation, and knowledge 
sharing.
There are several other notable takeaways from the Basis illustrative case. The 
“R&D team” was not officially labeled the R&D team for most of the time, yet 
identified and functioned through their other capacities as data scientists, 
algorithms engineers, and firmware engineers as such. The loose formation of 
this team is indicative of the lab-less innovation structure in open innovation 
paradigms, yet there was a fair amount of autonomy given to Basis’ team that 
enabled deeper internal inquiry and the pursuit of external partnerships. 
The importance of considering the impact of gray literature, in the form of 
blog posts and white papers, was reinforce several times by most interviewees. 
Not only was this a way Basis picked up on what other firms were doing and 
advancing the underlying science, but it was a way for their team to demonstrate 
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the viability of their own product. External research partners helped produce 
some of these publications, and also lent some credibility to the work. These 
publications were later used once employees left after the acquisition. 
There are also lessons in how an acquisition can interfere with the innovative 
cohesion of a team, and stifle the key new elements of open innovation that 
require customized partnerships and internal freedom. It is also important to 
consider the reflections on the wearable industry as whole, and how challenging 
it is to move beyond market pressures to produce only the minimum viable 
product and need to establish subscription based services so that these 
improvements can continue over time.
“Yeah, and internally obviously we had a bias on how great the product was, but 
we ran a lot of studies on competing devices. And it's like the numbers don't lie at 
that point, so we were really pleased with where we all kind of left it, but certain 
things happen after acquisitions that are out of our hands so.”
As an interesting final note, just because a product has been discontinued does 
not mean it stopped its user base. Because of the way the product was designed, 
allowing users to download and synthesize their own data, it is still possible to 
use the recalled device.
 “I had a lot of friends that had to send it back, too. Yeah, some people have still 
got them. I see them out on the street. People just deal with it not sending data to 
the cloud. I’m like oh, that’s cool.”
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Chapter 6
Emerging practices, changing 
definitions, and new collaboration 
strategies for information-intensive 
innovation
The illustrative cases provide in-depth examples of how information-intensive 
firms are pursuing partnerships and internal inquiry in a way that is increasingly 
focused on fundamental research. These strategies arise from competitive 
pressure keep up with the demands of data science-derived inquiry and algorithm 
development, resulting in new strategies and formations of research—both 
through internal pursuits, external academic partnerships, and new forms of 
collaborative data sharing instances. These cases and strategies provide evidence 
of the changing position of private firms in the R&D ecosystem. 
This chapter builds upon key elements and findings from the illustrative cases 
within the context of other interviews and firms. This chapter presents additional 
analysis on important shifts and emerging trends in how private firms are 
working within data-rich and information-driven innovation. These findings help 
support the argument that the role of firms within the research ecosystem is 
fundamentally shifting as private companies both hold data valuable for 
researchers, and basic inquiry in turn is driving commercial innovation. 
This chapter first explores the changing boundaries and evolving definitions of 
research through the explanations and mental models of interviewees. In contrast 
to definitions that were dependent upon assumptions within the linear model of 
innovation presented in Chapter 2 and within the “Key Concepts” section, this 
section highlights how the porous nature of research activity influences what is 
viewed as “official” research and what is viewed less concretely. It further adds 
color to challenges practitioners have in categorizing their own work, especially 
in their understanding of how their inquiry and work within UX research blends 
experience, methods, and motivation. Further, this section highlights the 
important nuance approaches that separates firms which dive deep into 
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fundamental questions that probe the “why’s” of phenomena, rather than only 
seeking correlations that achieve limited ends.
Next this chapter explicates changes to knowledge sharing processes, and how 
they are evolving to fit the changing research ecosystem and needs of private 
firms, with increasing reliance on outside academics. As the private firm becomes 
more interested in fundamental and basic research questions, there are new 
challenges with allocating resources or embracing mechanisms that allow the 
freer flow of research findings—as well as publication challenges working with 
outside researchers. Knowledge sharing is heavily influenced by larger external 
forces shaping how firms seek competitive advantage in the age of information-
intensive innovation, and where firms place perceived risks. 
Complicating factors to these new research and innovation strategies are 
explored in the following Section III on research ethics, specifically focusing on 
the role individuals and organizations play in instituting discussions around 
privacy and ethics—as well as the growing reliance on external research partners 
to provide research ethics review infrastructure via Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) access. Finally, this chapter presents new practices of secrecy that are 
counteracting open and innovative models that require external collaborators 
and input, which is complicating tech firm cultures from the Silicon Valley 
models of innovation. These emerging practices and policies are in tension with 
other strategies and values, and likely to cause challenges moving forward. 
This chapter, alongside Chapter 5, present findings that support the claim the 
private firm’s role within the larger research ecosystem is changing, and 
challenging the existing models and theories of research and innovation. This 
analysis offers findings about how firms are adapting to these new pressures 
through external collaborations and pushing internal definitional boundaries, 
and how emerging practices to grapple with ethics and secrecy are complicating 
these practices.   
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Section I: Changing Boundaries and Evolving 
Definitions: exploring the boundaries between UX 
and R&D
As illustrated in the key concepts in Chapter 2, the definitions around 
research have always been fuzzy. These definitions were built primarily around 
definitions that embed assumptions about the linear model of innovation, and 
have challenges when taken out of traditional laboratory contexts or applied to 
contemporary information-intensive inquiry. Some research inquiry carried out 
on fundamental and basic research about the social, behavioral, health, and 
public health aspects of individuals and society are obvious—others challenge 
traditional notions of what constitutes a research activity. This section explores 
the definitions offered by interviewees on what constituted research activities 
within their practices and firms, and the ways in which these offered definitions 
align and contrast to traditional definitions. This section also considers important 
nuances to research and information-intensive innovation within the private 
firm. These nuances are partially weighed by grappling with the surface studies of 
mere correlation compared to deeper inquiry that aims to understand the 
fundamentals and “underlying why” in contemporary practice. These challenges 
and explorations on the boundaries of research illustrate the pressures on 
traditional linear-derived definitions that constrain activities to particular 
contexts or assume limitations in motivation depending on the researcher. 
There is rarely consensus in public statements or documentation or among 
practitioners on exactly which practices constitute R&D, or how their 
organizations define and structure these activities. Interviewees were asked about 
their experiences and mental models about this boundary of research and 
practice, including the distinction between UX (user experience) research and 
research that contributes to general knowledge.361 Many interviewees understood 
that many of the practices within their firms or daily jobs involved gray areas: 
making inferences about users, writing algorithms based on user-generated data, 
designing new interfaces or hardware with user feedback, or conducting A/B style 
testing in real time. For the private sector, the distinction between product 
development and research—or more generally R&D—remains blurry. As this 
361 “Generalizable Knowledge” is a term frequently used in policy to determine what counts as 
research. For example, if your findings are only interesting and applicable to your team or supervisor, 
then it would not be considered generalizable knowledge. However, if your research, say in UX, uncovers 
something about human biorhythms, the findings may be important for experts (or research) in that field, 
not to mention the general population. This blurry line is further discussed in this section.
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section will put into context, this distinction has always been vague and 
contested, yet understanding the contested points and boundary space can help 
frame what is included (or not) from additional discussions in this dissertation 
and beyond.
Contemporary Boundaries of Research
The boundaries of research, particularly as it is practiced within the tech 
industry, are placing new pressures on existing definitions of what counts as 
research. The introduction of user experience (UX) researchers and data 
scientists present new questions into professional categories and classifications of 
industry inquiries and knowledge acquisition. Additionally, increasing numbers 
of PhDs are being hired by industry for their research skills and subject matter 
expertise, but for research ambiguous positions.
The Basis illustrative case (Chapter 5) introduced a discussion on the 
differences between what the interviewees described as “business analytics” in 
contrast to the descriptions of the role of the research team within a sensing 
startup. Other interviewees frequently categorized academic style research, 
design (including UX, as well as some parts of product design), and business 
analytics articulated as three different areas of “research”—each with their own 
varying levels of rigor, relevance, and generalizability. Continuing to build off of 
the traditional definitions of R&D above, often practitioners interviewed used 
place (e.g., context of a lab or formal R&D team), the motivation of inquiry (e.g., 
to develop generalizable knowledge), and metrics used to evaluate success (e.g., 
peer reviewed publications) as elements of a definition. Often in practice, 
however, these constructs were messy and operated in boundary challenging 
ways. 
Interviewees often used methodology, scientific rigor, and the qualifications of 
those on the team as qualities and elements to reflect on differences in research 
outputs within the firm. 
“I don’t think there’s anything flagrantly wrong with the other groups and their 
research, but we have a very academic approach from how we do things and think 
it through. [We do this by] making sure the study design is as objective as 
possible, [considering] where the participants are at, and what they are 
representative of and so on. It’s just not the same kind of rigor because other 
groups tend to be scrappier on ‘let’s get data and just move with it,’ and at the end 
of the day they are just a product group….”
In grappling specifically with UX research, there were mixed reflections. For 
instance, some interviewees stated that it mattered what the UX team found, and 
how actionable the findings were outside of the team. This implies that it is 
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possible for a UX researcher, who does not traditionally produce generalizable 
knowledge, to begin depending on the subject matter at hand—meaning UX 
research cannot be wholly cast as non-research but rather operates at the 
boundaries. One of the missions of UX teams is to find where users get stuck in 
using the platform or device, and improving the usability and experience of the 
user. If that friction was caused by a deeper underlying behavior or need within 
the app, there was sometimes crossover in teams to handoff developing and 
understanding these capabilities. One engineer from Basis reflected on this 
handoff:
“Studies about user experience. That’s, I think, probably…probably more on the 
business intelligence side. They would see where things are going well, where 
things are going not so well. Then, if that information was actionable, by the 
algorithms team, then we would start researching ideas on how to improve it.”
This perspective introduces UX as an important gateway to other research 
(either by the same individuals or a different team) and almost like an 
exploratory or feasibility study to prepare for more formal inquiry. Many other 
interviewees talked about the motivation for conducting the user experience. If 
the study was narrowly focused and very applied to fixing one particular 
functional problem, practitioners classified UX as less of a traditional research 
activity. This directly relates to the traditional definitions, where the formal 
research activities depends on the goal and generalizability of the findings.
Interviewee A: “It feels like UX research tends to be a little bit more short lived 
and singularly focused, whereas research with a big R is a bit more longitudinal. 
It’s sort of, yeah, I would say it's longer lived and it's more rigorous in way, and 
reproducible.” 
Interviewee B: “UX research is more connected to, there's a business opportunity 
and we're building a thing. And that can start at any point, right? From really 
early research about the [customers], but it's product oriented, or output 
oriented, whatever that output is, and big R research is being much, much more 
exploratory and the output is the discovery itself.
Other interviewees added nuance, that exploratory UX work could lead to 
more fundamental investigations, that potentially opened up larger questions.
“I would tend to lose sight of this because my training is in people, and sociology 
and such, but like, there is also the test of like, can we build this thing at all? Can 
the technology be made to do the thing we're trying to do? Which is maybe a third 
kind of, half uppercase R. Whatever you want to call that.”
This interviewee was reflecting on how sometimes the UX teams within their 
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firm led to some broader underlying questions about human behavior and 
technological limits, which they found to fall between the two classifications of 
research and non-research.
Many practitioners interviewed also thought research, in its most pure sense, 
was not for any applied knowledge—thus framing only within the definition of 
traditional “basic research” classifications, even in technology fields that were 
from the onset of contemporary research heavily focused on applied uses. This 
framing focuses only on the goal of the activity.
“[Formal research is] without like, a goal of how you would actually apply that 
knowledge, it's more …it's more for the discovery and the knowledge.”
Similarly, another interviewee underscored the importance academic style 
outputs—thus further reinforcing the definition linkage to the goal. One 
interviewee who had worked within UX at a formal lab commented: “It's for the 
knowledge and the output. I mean, the measurement of how successful people 
were in that role was how many papers you're publishing. So, it really was like 
you're a professor essentially.”
Location and designation within the company mattered to respondents, thus 
relying on institutional designations and professional contexts to define the 
underlying activity.  For instance, Interviewee A referenced above made an 
immediate disclaimer after their statement about UX research being more short 
lived and singularly focused: “Unless of course like you're a UX researcher in a 
research lab, like at Microsoft or Intel or something.” This respondent overrode 
their previous caveat by placing the institutional context as the most important 
designation in determining what constituted a “formal” research activity.
This perspective was echoed by other interviewees. In these cases, the location 
(or institutional context) under these formalized institutions trumped, for many 
practitioners, any other discussion of research motivation, applicability of 
findings, methodological rigor, etc. If the UX activity was done at these 
formalized research places, then it must be research. 
Definitions reflected by the practitioners included the ways in which data 
collected about users were used, not just the type of data. For instance, one 
engineer provided the following classification in reflecting how his own team 
sectioned data for algorithms and research and how it was used by others like 
those on the UX team within the startup.
“Well, I guess there’s maybe three buckets. There’s the sensors, which we’re 
passively monitoring. Then, the data that we use—the derivative data, like were 
you sleeping and what’s your heart rate. That’s the sensor data. The user inputs 
might be self-login. Some apps, you can add activities.  Then, there’s, I’d say, user 
or almost usage data, which is where are people spending time in the app, what 
buttons are they pressing, where are they getting hung up. That latter one is 
definitely, for me, [related to] product testing, because that’s a lot of how the 
product designers really critique their designs. They wanna see where people are 
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getting hung up, what’s confusing, where people are spending time in the app. 
Then, that drives product iteration.“
Not every practitioner I spoke with reflected the canonical arguments that 
“basic” research was a “pure” line of inquiry. One UX researcher, in thinking 
aloud about the differences and boundaries between UX and traditional research 
pushed back on the idea that industry UX was always biased because it was 
oriented toward a product or articulated goal. This researcher pointed out in her 
reflection that both industry UX and university research—despite the 
protestations of academics—are both money (i.e., grant or profit) oriented, and 
that both are aimed at finding something that worked.
“That also like reminds me things that kind of happen in the sciences a lot where 
you are looking for a gap because it presents a grant opportunity, and so 
everything is still, in its own way, motivated by money. So even for like the UX 
research, there's a clear business opportunity and it's got to be stated up front 
like, 'Okay, we want people to shop more so we're going to do this research.’ 
Whereas even the academic research guy has a cloud that may not be right on top 
of you, but it's in the near horizon… Science is supposed to be tangible and it's 
supposed to produce direct output , then there's kind of this, this need to [make 
it] work because this will get us funding, or this will get us an invention or 
something. So that's kind of like, that's always been like a weird issue to me, 
research.”
Many industry UX interviewees, or interviewees who worked with UX teams, 
reflected that the culture of the firm directly influenced the style of approach, and 
thus the resemblance of UX to more traditional research. This often had to do 
with the way activities were labeled, or expressed goals of the activities either in 
the formation of questions or the framing of outputs. 
“It's not necessarily a number of studies, even though like, different leadership 
has different interest and investment in promoting a culture of testing, and 
learning, and iterating.”
Many interviewees also felt frustration that since they worked between the 
boundaries of pure research and simple product testing, that they were frustrated 
they did not have more clear ways to evaluate success on their jobs clearly for the 
management. 
There may not be a clear line between UX and formalized research, but 
characteristics here including professional organizational context, goal of inquiry, 
flexibility to iterate and use rigorous methods all define the boundary space 
between these two concepts. A formal line is not necessary to begin to consider 
where UX activities may bleed into research, and should be considered part of 
knowledge production within firms. 
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Correlations and Asking “Why?”
Several interviewees reflected more generally on a key difference between 
academic research and similar activities within industry. One of the key 
components reflected was the drive industry practitioners had to achieve a result 
(e.g., click the button), identify a pattern (e.g., blue pill achieves more purchases 
than red pill), or optimize prediction without understanding the underlying and 
deeper questions of “why.” The “why” sometimes corresponds to deeper human 
behaviors or underlying causes in why reaction was occurring. In industry, 
particularly in fields and jobs generally related to data science, the emphasis was 
on prediction and performance, not deeper understanding. The questions these 
data scientists were trying to answer stopped at achieving a practical result. 
 “I feel like I'm really old school, like I'm just like the old school academic there. 
But I do know that, like I was saying, at Intel Labs there are like, and probably at 
IBM too, there's like groups of people who they bring them in who are really 
trained scientists who are adding a lot of rigor to how they are thinking about the 
future of technology and the relevance of where it fits. The folks that I worked 
with at Intel would be great to talk to about that because they're doing really 
interesting research that's applicable about kind of probing into the whys to 
understand the cultural context for technology because if they're gonna make a 
new thing they need to know really what people want this and where it's going to 
fit, and they're doing real research.  But what I've seen in kind of this more 
smaller scale setting is very parochial kind of just focused on optimization or 
something. Like, making a repetitive task faster or automated or improving the 
performance of an ad campaign and all that kind of stuff. But not really invested 
in knowledge advancement or theory testing or solving long standing 
conundrums of the human condition or something like that.” 
This interviewee also commented: “There's no thinking, there's no 
understanding and just getting to your point about it. The research that goes into 
machine learning is generally focused on prediction and performance not an 
understanding. So, there isn't that kind of that mindset of inquiry about, like, why 
is this model doing that? Why is it predicting that? And is it something we want 
to be doing?”
Understanding the deeper and sometimes more philosophical “whys” is not 
without some drawbacks, as the interviewee noted.
“Yeah, and it's funny now because I've been [working in industry] and now, when 
I come here and go to a seminar, I'm just like, ‘Oh my God. You guys are so in the 
weeds.’ It just feels so esoteric and so like, ‘What are you doing?’ In some of the 
ecology seminars I'm like, "Why are you doing that?" You know, like, where is 
the ... And it's kind of cool but because it seems like there's a lot where you can 
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tell that it's science for a career so I just need to find this little niche and publish 
the least, you know. Like, just get as many papers as I can out and I don't care 
how kind of weirdly just sort of narrow it is.”362
An engineer, when talking about how they use data on their own research 
team within a startup, expressed the same difference between straight forward 
analysis and deeper inferences. 
“Inferring user behavior habits, that one’s like—for me, it’s both, very much so, in 
that, if we know—for example, you’re like I wanna go out and detect slang, or 
walking, that’s something that we know is doable. You just go out, get the data, 
and develop it. If it’s more of this higher-level—or, I guess, more abstract, like 
how are people spending their times, we don’t know necessarily what they’re 
doing, but let’s do something on—let’s do something with activity that no one’s 
really done before, but maybe it doesn’t work out. That would be very much on 
the research side, if that makes sense.”
Interestingly, James Wang of Lioness had previous experience working at a 
hedge fund, where the whys underlying market correlations mattered a lot, and 
was emphasized by the firm. He reflected during his interview on the need to 
understand the deeper root causes of identified correlations, and the ways in 
which Lioness requires more correlation than a marketing company, but still less 
demand on resolution on the underlying causes.
“Which is interesting, and this is now going a little farther afield. I think it's an 
interesting comparison. For example, at Bridgewater, the hedge fund that I 
worked at before, we were very concerned about root causes. The reason is 
because if you didn't actually find the correct root cause, guess what? You might 
actually have this signal. You might have this thing that you expected would work 
suddenly snap back in your face and oh it didn't work at all because something, 
the correlation we thought was true will become false in a different market 
environment or something. 
   This is far closer to what we do, just because of the nature of the consumers that 
we're with, or looks far closer to what a lot of marketing companies have in terms 
of their attitude towards their marketing research. They're still pretty rigorous in 
terms of it. They still try to do as much as they can to try to figure out why's, but 
they're fine with correlational views. For the most part, in terms of consumer 
environments, it works. The problem with trying to do that in markets is they 
362 This interviewee quickly went on to assure me this particular study was not one of those useless 
ones in the weeds.  “And not to ... I think what you're doing is really interesting and very important and 
it's, like, really timely.”
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mutate on you far more.
   In terms of consumer behavior and whatnot, there's far more consistency, 
especially in the aggregate and in our particular case when we're trying to give 
insights that are similar in the sense of consumer consistency or user consistency, 
correlational tends to work fine and doesn't suddenly change or have super bad 
consequences generally speaking. There are some, where there are areas where 
there might actually be super bad consequences, at least psychologically if you 
say the wrong thing. We've been actually pretty careful with some of those areas.”
In the case of Lioness, (See full case in Chapter 5) as long as the correlation 
appeared to work for the user they did not feel a need to hold back on a release 
until it was fully validated. 
“That's a big difference, and for us we're okay with it seems to work. Most users 
seem to say, "Hey this thing does correctly or accurately reflect my experience 
and that's a really interesting insight that you're giving me." We're totally fine 
with that and if it turns out that root cause-wise it's different, it was correlation or 
whatever it was, we are largely fine with that. That's more the job in terms of 
academic researchers, which we are actually talking about working with and 
some folks we are working with to get to. Different roles, for us, it's like 
correlation is fine because if it works we're running with it and we're launching it. 
We're not going to wait until it's completely validated.”
However, this choice to release the correlations within the product’s analysis 
features was something James and his team had carefully evaluated—knowing 
what they were giving up and gaining for users experiences. This is not to say 
Lioness in this particular case did not care about underlying causes, which is why 
there was an emphasis to work with academics and propel basic research in 
women’s sexuality as discussed in the illustrative case.
In discussing these underlying motivations, the emphasis in the definitions of 
research as activities that contribute to generalizable knowledge and advancing 
scientific/technological fields is reemphasized within these industry applications. 
Understanding the “whys” and deeper meaning of correlations is not impossible 
within industry, but varies by firm and even by team. Even when the explicit goal 
of the inquiry was not to uncover the why, in order to build successful behavioral 
models moving into the future it is possible that data science and UX teams will 
begin to stumble upon deeper meaning by the developing demands of the 
industry—even when this intent was not expressed in the beginning. This tension 
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in explicit (and implicit) motivation suggests a key strategic nuance between 
firms that cannot be sussed out on the surface of methods and mode of inquiry, 
but rather only understood through deeper consideration of the practitioners and 
organizational structure. Further study is required to understand the 
implications these internal commitments to underlying “why’s” have in the 
success for firms seeking competitive advantage in information-intensive 
innovation inquiries. 
Conclusion
Definitions, as much as they can present “false dichotomies,” are important 
constructs and institutional framings that have important implications on how 
actions are pursued, shared, and reviewed by the internal teams and outsiders. 
This section explores how interviewees viewed the line between research and 
practice, particularly in areas like UX research where pressures and potential 
within the industry are further blurring previous boundaries. Interviewees 
reflected that the goal of the research (in the form of the inquiry and by proxy the 
output goal of the activity) and organizational labels lend credibility and 
categorization to a research-like activity. Further, this section discussed 
additional differences within the industry context of distinctions in practice 
seeking only correlation when this leads (or does not) to deeper probing on the 
underlying “why.”
Ultimately, these challenges and explorations on the boundaries of research 
illustrate the pressures on traditional linear-derived definitions that constrain 
activities to particular contexts or assume limitations in motivation depending on 
the researcher. (See Chapter 2) This section did not intend to clearly determine 
the boundary between research and practice, but rather clearly establish known 
definitions and how interviewees viewed their work within industry at different 
places within the boundary space. These reflections are merely meant to illustrate 
how subjective some determinations of what constitutes research—and thus 
should be shared, ethically reviewed, or made more rigorous—and how these 
boundary spaces are under some flux because of changes within the industry and 
insight potential of data collected. 
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Section II: Knowledge Sharing: Private Firm 
Reliance on Academic Partners and New Informal 
Publishing Methods to Externalize Knowledge 
Publications, patents, and other forms of knowledge transfer and sharing 
within private sector research are often misunderstood historically. Though 
publications and other mechanisms for exporting research knowledge out of the 
firm for the public benefit was possible, it was not always as seamless as it 
appears in retrospection. There are lessons from how knowledge stemming from 
internal research (and external partnerships) is transferred out of the firm and 
into the public sphere, as well as new complications to consider moving forward. 
As the private firm becomes more interested in fundamental and basic research 
questions, there are new challenges with allocating resources or embracing 
mechanisms that allow the freer flow of research findings—as well as publication 
challenges working with outside researchers. This section explores how these 
knowledge sharing practices are evolving to fit the changing research strategies, 
and the increasing reliance on outside academics to assist in knowledge transfer 
from the private firm.
Historical Perceptions and Transformation
Bell Labs is often cited as the golden standard for private sector research. Yet 
many internal policies are misrepresented in the contemporary and constructed 
history recounting the place and practices. For instances, many state there were 
no publication reviews for researchers employed. This is inaccurate. Bell Labs 
had deep ties to national security partnerships, and often worked with entities 
that had tight control and review over research, determining what was made 
classified or approved for release. For instance. Claude Shannon wrote a 114 page 
paper on “A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography” in 1945 which introduces the 
concept of the Theory of Information for the first time.363 The paper was 
immediately classified and thus kept out of public discourse for 12 years because 
it revealed too much about cryptographic practices.364 Later as Bell Labs 
363 Gertner, Jon. The Idea Factory : Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation. (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2012), 124.
https://www.iacr.org/museum/shannon/shannon45.pdf
364 An important detail relevant to current practices is that Shannon was allowed to write the paper, 
and even though the information was controlled for a set period of time the paper and ideas within were 
documented so that they could later be released and studied by the academic community. If the control 
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distanced itself from national security work, there were still procedures put in 
place. 
Even outside of national security controls there were publication review 
processes at Bell Labs. The lab had a Book Review Board which reviewed all 
books that were set to be released under Bell’s affiliation. The review board used 
internal reviewers to ensure that the book was worthy of the Bell brand, and had 
technical integrity. There were competing interests though at times with internal 
and sometimes competing Bell products, which Narain Gehani former researcher 
(and eventual Research Vice President) at Bell Labs describes in his memoir.365 
Paper publications similarly also went through a publication review board, which 
Gehani notes was very liberal in approving papers since publishing was seen as 
validation for the work done within Bell Labs by the greater scientific community. 
The review board was used to screen for proprietor information or any 
information that could have given competitors a head start or competitive edge. 
Gehani notes that only a few papers in his time were flagged, and usually resolved 
after some negotiation about modifying key parts. The notion there are no 
precedents for handling research coming out of firms with proprietary interests 
in these studies is false. These models, though often even historically private 
either intentionally or through record obscurity, are important to learn from in 
thinking through new paradigms in information and knowledge sharing from 
private firms.
Based on several background interviews, research review in contemporary 
firms often goes through public relations/communications and/or legal instead 
of emphasizing other subject matter experts. However, getting an accurate 
assessment across firms is impossible since these processes change over time and 
as a firm grows (according to interviewees), the lack of transparency, and 
variance in the types of research being vetted. Large firms relevant to this 
dissertation are not transparent about the internal review process (if there is one 
established), and often former employees were uncertain about this process and 
what they could go on the record for—even when their interview was anonymous. 
Sometimes firms would tell me their process was so complex it would be too 
difficult to explain, which is a ridiculous assertion given much of the process 
when handling classified material is known at least in abstract. 
Many firms (mostly the startups) were too young and too small to devote 
resources to formalized internal processes and handled publications on an ad hoc 
basis. Medium to younger large firms may not have a process in place, and a few 
interviewees reflected that they did not institute publication review requirements 
until there was a high profile press event related to an academic publication. 
happens before the paper is allowed to be written, even once the knowledge contained is no longer viewed 
as sensitive it can never be released later—especially since the scholars will have likely moved on to 
something else or forgotten the keys to even their own meaningful ideas.
365 Gehani, Narain. Bell Labs : Life in the Crown Jewel. (1st ed. Summit, NJ: Silicon Press, 2003), 90. 
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Knowledge Sharing
“Knowledge Sharing” can imply several different activities that result in the 
transfer of private resources that then generate knowledge (e.g., device or data 
sharing for research purposes) or in sharing knowledge gained internally or 
through partnerships. For the purposes here, knowledge sharing means any 
activity that translates and makes knowledge learned within a firm or using a 
proprietary device/underlying data accessible to individuals outside of the firm 
itself. Knowledge sharing may be achieved through traditional publications, gray 
literature (e.g., reports, blogs), patents, peer-based exchanges through conference 
presentations or informal networks, or by sharing underlying resources like 
devices or data that enable knowledge generation by others (namely, 
researchers). Without knowledge sharing, society risks losing out on 
advancements made within firms unless the firm is able to fully capture and use 
these advancements within the firm. However, in most cases knowledge only kept 
within a firm languishes based on market whims and inefficiencies, thus missing 
an opportunity to be picked up by outsiders and utilized in other ways. 
Patents
A traditional way new industry knowledge has been shared was through the 
design of the patent system, which makes patent applications public generally 18 
months after filing. This design was intended to offer inventors (or inventing 
firms) the intellectual property rights to monetize their discovery, but made it 
public so that others could learn from the design and test it. This can lead to 
other tangential discoveries, but also serves as a way for those outside of the firm 
to learn about inventions and work coming from inside the firm. Patents are a 
form of knowledge sharing, but as the information economics of tech firms evolve 
so do the intellectual property regimes. Now tech companies make their profit off 
of the network effects of platforms and their data holdings—through better 
algorithmic offerings, data science insights, or data-as-a-product—which means 
core business assets cannot be protected under patents but rather trade secrets. 
Trade secrets depend upon maintaining secrecy, unlike patents which require a 
form of eventual public disclosure and documentation. Secrecy as a result within 
these companies may be on the rise, but the practices and strategies around 
maintaining secrecy are still emerging (and outlined in Section IV). This 
intellectual property shift is additionally impacting broader knowledge sharing 
and taking away an existing mechanism of disclosure and documentation.
One interviewee remarked after saying they wouldn’t feel comfortable asking 
permission to write an article using data collected during their research job: 
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“Mainly because the IP that I create is bigger, so I don't think I would even think 
about doing that.”
Blogs and other gray literature 
“Research366 blogs” have also become a popular way for firms—large and 
small, though smaller firms usually have general blogs that may feature research 
posts—to publicize the interesting findings coming from within the firm. Though 
blogs are often small scale insights, lack peer review, and may come with a heavy 
dose of promotional up-sell, they are still a low barrier way for researchers in 
firms to post about what they are doing. For instance, in the Basis illustrative 
case (see Chapter 5) blogs were a way for researchers at the startup to learn about 
new ways to detect heart arrhythmias from heart rate alone, and one particular 
post from another firm was reportedly widely circulated among engineers 
designing heart rate algorithms. Several Basis team members also remember 
publishing blogs as a form of sharing. Blogs were used to help identify firms to 
approach for interviews for this dissertation, and also at times are cited within 
this research as evidence of claims and findings within the firm (see Lioness in 
Chapter 5). 
Some in the academic community assume that if something is published in a 
blog it is not generalizable finding because it does not pass the bar of peer review. 
However, by sharing widely on a blog a finding or method for an audience outside 
of their firm it suggests that the topic is generalizable and relevant to people 
outside of the firm—the audience just may be other practitioners. The reason 
these individuals published a blog as their work teetered between practice and 
research boundaries or emerged as is because they did not have the time or 
resources to devote to an academic publication—not to mention the year or more 
timescale is not applicable with industry. As illustrated in the previous section, 
the boundaries between research and practice are fuzzy. 
In a less charitable light, blogs can be seen as thinly veiled PR and recruiting 
tactics. One interviewee described his perspective on the role blogs played.
“Another example would be in the recruiting environment. A lot of places like 
Uber and everything, whatever, they will start to have really active blogs where 
they publish reports and they publish open source tools. The main reason for that 
is to build their brand as a serious engineering team to attract good people who 
think it's a really vibrant environment.
[…]
366 These blogs are actually self labeled research blogs, this is not a categorization placed on them by 
this analysis.
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 So, yeah. [Name Redacted] did that. They have a whole team just trying to find 
fun little stories in consumer data so they can get [our] name out there, and 
they've done an amazing job of making [our startup] seem like it's a much bigger 
company than it is. 
   It's all about…trying to address little culturally interesting questions but with 
super simple approaches and correlations that are inferred as causation and all 
sorts of stuff, you know. But they try their best to try to be rigorous. But, like, the 
people who are doing them are recent undergraduates who are just kind of 
mucking around or who don't have a background in research and they're 
cranking out this story. It's like a news story, they're cranking it out in a little data 
story in two days.”
The quality of the blog certainly depends on the writer, the firm, and the time 
within company growth. Even if there is uneven quality, it should be noted that 
blogs are a mechanism that allows companies to distribute information from 
employees—at firms large and small. Even when the message has been carefully 
tailored to fit a public relations or marketing narrative, they are still one avenue 
to bring knowledge or insight into inter-firm workings into the public eye. One 
may just have to scour in order to find practical knowledge, or learn how to read 
in between the lines. 
Shades of Gray Knowledge sharing: Opportunities and Barriers from the Firm
Other reports, white papers, newsletters, and gray literature are also 
important aspects of knowledge sharing from firms. One Basis engineer made the 
following statement about how their team shared knowledge they were learning 
designing the underlying algorithms for the product:
“I don’t think we published externally because a lot of the—it was all trade 
secreted algorithm stuff—outside of like—I can send them to you, if you want—a 
couple, I’d say, “white papers,” because they’re not white papers, but scientific—
slash marketing. It made sense. It was like here’s the protocol we did. Here’s how 
many subjects. This is the—this is the data. These are the activities. It’d just show 
it. It was also—okay, so we did it in cahoots with another university, but we don’t 
talk how the algorithm works or whatever. Just this is how the data compares to 
truth, or ECG.”
This perspective tees up one of the most obvious barriers to sharing, which is 
fears of intellectual property disclosure. However it does show how highly 
innovative and functioning research and algorithms teams can share what they 
are doing in a transparent way. Also by sharing a limited amount of data, the 
team can validate—or more likely simply demonstrate—some of their work 
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publicly. Others with similar data (e.g., biosensing data) could then try and 
replicate with their own data and not require the Basis dataset, thus avoiding 
proprietary conflicts, privacy issues, and other barriers to data sharing. As also 
mentioned in the Basis case, publishing was beneficial to employees as they 
changed jobs following the acquisition since it made their contributions solidly 
public and able to be referenced on CVs. Additionally, understanding what 
knowledge and activities can be shared when interviewing at new jobs is a current 
challenge among many individuals as changes occur around secrecy practices 
within firms.
Many firms did not feel they conducted the right level of methodological rigor 
to publish, and accepted this as something that should be left to academics. 
“In terms of an aggregate pool level, similar to what we do in the newsletter. 
We've considered doing publications. Actual formal publication studies if we 
actually wanted to. We do probably survey level studies, like ourselves. We 
probably wouldn't have the nice, controlled, global standard studies. That would 
probably be working with researchers. We have sent abstracts to different 
conferences, just in terms of, ‘Hey this is an interesting finding that we've had. 
Yes, it is not a particularly well controlled population. No, we didn't do a 
stratified cluster, no, we didn't do any of that. This is basically pure volunteer 
self-selected study, but hey here's the information. Do with it what you will.’” -
James Wong, Lioness
However, these acknowledgements do not keep startups like Lioness from 
seeking to be in academic settings, whether it be in conference venues or as 
research partners.  
 “Not really [a problem], especially since our orientation is far ... I think we 
understand the research sector well enough that we are well oriented towards it. 
There's definitely not been no serious antipathy towards us and we belong or fit, 
even though we aren't researchers. I'll say that again. We essentially fit well. 
There have been horror stories in terms of other companies who come in and run 
roughshod over it and have been rejected quite hardily. 23andMe probably being 
one of the more famous examples, but no, we've had a lot of positive perception. 
Probably because we're so open about our limitations as well, since I think some 
companies don't recognize that they have any limitations.” -James Wong Lioness
In being open to the role industry can play, even small startups, there is ample 
room to reimagine the space for public-private partnerships.
Several practitioners expressed frustrations about their desire to publish but 
inability to once they got started for vague (corporate strategy) and sometimes 
indefinite reasons. This was particularly true for those with a PhD who now work 
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in industry in research-esque but applied positions.
Time was a large factor in why many interviewees reported they could not 
pursue publications.  For instance, one interviewee remarked: “We don't do that 
much internal research that can lead to publishable results, but there's a lot of 
opportunity to go that way but there's little obstacles in the way such as finding 
the time to do it.” Not only would writing up a paper take time, there is a long 
time horizon of getting peer reviewed feedback after going through any internal 
formalized or informal approvals. By the time a paper could get published outside 
of a firm, so much time would have passed that the writer would have already 
gone through one or two (or more) performance review cycles and some of the 
interest within the firm in the subject may have passed. This is in part why gray 
literature and informal mechanisms of knowledge sharing is so popular—even if 
it only gets out rough and unscientifically-vetted ideas. This mismatch on time 
horizons is a problem not just for research professionals within the firm, but a 
lost opportunity for academics and the public to learn about cutting edge 
research and innovation that might otherwise have gotten past secrecy and 
sensitivity concerns. In thinking through opportunities to improve knowledge 
sharing from the firm, coming up with alternative ways to publish in venues that 
are not only scene by academic researchers, but involving some expedited input 
or comment exchange. The academic model for publishing is challenging enough 
for individuals within academia, but the incentives to endure it are very small for 
those outside of the ivory tower. 
One of the engineers from Basis reflected on publishing both at Basis and at 
other companies.
“I think we have plans. We always have plans to write a bunch of white papers. 
What I go to is always talking about writing white papers and very excited about 
sharing interesting things they do, always low priority. Never just kind of 
happens. I think we wanted to do ... I don't remember much about Basis, but I 
know at previous and current companies it's always like a ... It seems like it's low 
priority, or not low priority. It's just like, maybe, it gets you more funding, but 
surely there's no ... I, as an engineer, who have worked on things want to do [and 
make public, but then then the] CEO maybe they think like, "I don't want them 
spending weeks on a paper that might make us look cool." I know there were at 
least a couple of plans to do it at my last company, but we still haven't seen 
anything.” 
One interviewee pointed out that there is a cultural difference between how 
academics view papers, and how a firm does. For an academic, at times, the 
paper is the end goal of a project, whereas for a firm the paper is a means to an 
end or a partial public benchmark.
“There's also a misunderstanding on what constitutes a finished work. And a 
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paper is a finished work for a scientist but for a company it's like saying "I have 
the rough draft of a script and then therefore I got a movie." And movies make a 
$100 million right? So my rough draft of a script should cost, maybe half of that 
so may $50 million. Rough draft of a script, you haven't found any actors, you 
haven't created any production value, you haven't shot the darn thing or edited it 
or created the production wheels or promoted it with millions and millions of 
dollars of advertisement and so forth and taken any risk. And so an academic will 
say "I invented this." We didn't really invent anything since nothing exists yet. 
You invented some thought and to make something exist changes the nature of 
that thought towards it's early conception to the product a billion times. And 
takes potentially, literally a billion dollars to do so.” 
Another comment from those in the private sector, particularly from smaller 
startups, is that having a private sector affiliation makes it harder to publish.
[After clarification they list their startup as their affiliation on published papers] 
“And that decreases are ability to publish. We probably have to go to lesser 
journals just 'cause true academics are suspicious of that and saying what I said 
before. But we'll just keep at it and I'll prove to the system that you can do good 
science as a company.”
The extent to which industry researchers feel comfortable sharing practices or 
ideas outside of the firm is highly subjective. This is even true in conversations. 
“I think depending on who you are, your privy to certain confidential information 
or not, and that might affect how much you believe in the sharing of information 
but it probably has some effect of who you are individually and what you believe 
in philosophically. Is it okay to have a coffee with someone and talk about some 
stuff that maybe you shouldn't? And do you believe in that?”
There are key differences in strategy for sharing any knowledge. Specifically, a 
smaller firm needs to the publicity and to appear successful in order to be 
acquired, invested in, or taken seriously. A larger firm has the resources to devote 
to documented and reasoned sharing, but has less of an immediate motivation to. 
For instance in reflecting on exchanges between practitioners at MeetUps, they 
remarked on this difference.
“I imagine there's an aspect of skill to that too, like you go to even now, you go to 
like MeetUps with people who are trying to start their own thing and man, they 
will share everything with you, but then you go to a company who has $10M of 
funding and they're probably not going to share much with you.”
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The auras of secrecy impacted firm sharing at conferences too, even when 
about researcher. One interviewee explained:
“And well, from a person who came from going to academic research conferences 
where a research presentation is very detailed, it's very, ‘here are our methods, 
here are our samples, here are our statistics,’ and I went to research 
presentations at [industry conference name redacted], and this is a retail kind of 
like, the future of innovation of retail conference. In the research track, and here's 
how they resented a research finding. 'Six percent of people will be using 
[Product Name] by 2012. Next slide. As you can see, [Product Name] is super 
cool.'
I was shocked. I was like, it removed so much credibility for me, and like, I 
understand oh you're trying to be secret, you don't want to tell, like, when I 
walked in thinking, 'Oh, good, they're going to present research,' like that is not 
what I expected in any way.“
 
There are always counter examples, usually subfield specific. Such as graphics, 
which fostered a subfield of a high amount of sharing.
 “There are then conferences like SIGGRAPH in L.A. for computer graphics, 
where you go there and like, they're telling you the exact algorithms that they've 
been doing developing to have more realistic animations and you know, that 
could be for all intents and purposes to a company like Nvidia, proprietary 
knowledge and they're just sharing everything.”
Interviewees and individuals encountered during the course of this 
dissertation research from larger firms repeatedly referenced the need to go 
through both legal and public relations/communications teams in order to get 
approval for any outside sharing. There was often a large amount of uncertainty 
about this process, and skepticism about being able to get anything approved 
without a struggle. Often pushing was something interviewees said they would 
do, but at the end of the day just did not have the time to take to completion.
“I, personally, have been sort of nudging the boundary and so far it's been 
received well. It's just a matter of having the bandwidth to go and do it on top of 
everything else I have to do.”
Often, the researchers or research-oriented positions do not benefit from the 
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trainings others receive in what they can say publicly about their work, or the 
company. This continues to have a chilling effect, and was expressed to me as a 
barrier to trying to figure out how to translate work outside of the firm and 
discussing their struggles working with these teams.
“It's just a little bit weird because it's uncontrolled. Sales people go through 
trainings. They know exactly what to say. Not that they have anything to worry 
about with me but it was a little more of a wild card, I guess. I don't think it was a 
fear of me betraying the company but it was more of there's a certain way of 
doing things and a certain way of discussing the company that I haven't gotten 
formal guidance in, I guess. Maybe that's it. I'm not sure.”
There are important existential questions to ask ourselves, as communication 
and legal teams become the arbiters of knowledge shared outside of the firm, and 
by proxy what research efforts are undertaken within the firm. Research that is 
never expected to see the light of day because of defensive and subjective review 
policies is unlikely to occur—especially if it is at the fringes of research-oriented 
employees’ primary responsibilities. Review and controls of knowledge sharing 
within the private sector is not this issue itself, given that it has been in corporate 
laboratories for decades. However uncertainty about these processes, and unclear 
rulings made by individuals who themselves are unlikely to have research 
training or research-based educational backgrounds provokes some important 
questions. Sharing data often steals the thunder, but being able to read and learn 
from those inside the firm who are experts in the data collected and how it is used 
is something that should be getting much more attention and emphasis. 
Internal Knowledge Sharing
Sometimes firms reported that research reports were written (within medium 
and large companies) and circulated around, but never shared outside of the firm 
due to issues around secrecy and wanting to protect the firm’s strategy.
 “Yes, I mean coming on board I was told research was taken seriously and you 
will have the ability to publish once we reveal what we’re doing, so, yes, I’ll be at 
CHI soon, but we cannot publish anything we are doing until kind of the big 
reveal. And then there still might be some limitations on depending on what it is, 
but I was told, and the understanding was, “yes absolutely we will send you 
conferences and we encourage publishing.’ We want that, but so far it’s been 
internal reports and collecting project data with the thought toward this is 
something we can publish once we can talk about what we are doing.”-
Anonymous interviewee at midsize firm
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There are other ways that information learned through research activities is 
shared within the firm. Informal networks through management were used to 
connect project leads from sometimes failed projects to others who could benefit 
from their experience.
“From a procedural level, what I've noticed happening, is that we have a project, 
or in my experience, we've had a project, I've done a research project on it and 
there are results, and then the product manager who's been networking a lot with 
HQ sees those results, and he or she is often times the one kind of like putting the 
thesis together and has come to me and been like, 'Hey [name redacted], I'm 
going to schedule a share out with you for x, y, and z teams over at core,' which 
has happened a couple of times, and that's on the procedural level. I think that 
other times I've noticed research we've done here would probably have value to 
some other team, then I either, again it's communicating through the project 
manager, and then creating the opportunity to let that team know that, 'Hey, 
come to us if you're interested and we might have some answers to questions 
you're working on.’”
However, often there are no reliable ways to share knowledge inside the firm, 
let alone outside.
“Cool, but I would say also, in general, something that we've talked about a bit is 
that [Name of Firm] doesn't have a really good way to share findings and make 
them searchable, like there's no data web of science, database that we can search 
that actually helps us find things that's like several hodgepodges in several 
different locations that may or may not be able to just like, there isn't really a 
good system for sharing work.”
This desire for knowledge is often reflected when management is seeking to 
learn what has failed within a firm. For instance, one interviewee when talking 
about publishing outside of the firm recalled a recent conversation about 
handling and capturing the results of research failures. “That kind of reminds me 
of a comment that someone asked today to one of our leaders like, 'Is there a post 
mortem somewhere, like if projects have died in the past, is there a way for us to 
know about what happened? Was it just not the right time? Was it a 
communication issue? Like, what was the cost of failure of that project?’”
Within small and physically isolated research organizations, knowing about 
failed projects and the appropriate point person to ask is more tacit and 
omnipresent. As firms have embraced the large, open “everyone innovate” model, 
it is harder for information to flow within firms relating to research projects. 
The frustration and lack of clear research communities within large firms was 
echoed by interviewees.
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“I realize that there's not really opportunities to socialize research either, so you 
know like there's academic conferences or whatever, or so many other 
communication and computation conferences that give people the opportunity to 
share those results…or journals, or what have you. It’s not even like, so much, like 
I wouldn't necessarily expect people at [name of firm] to publish research for the 
public or internally, but at [our annual corporate meeting/conference]…it would 
be an opportunity to be a stream for people to get together and learn about the 
different research that's been done, or some of the projects that have been done 
regardless of their outcomes just so that people can apply that to their work.” 
The clear research community enabled by physical proximity and team 
association was notably missing and emphasized from many industry 
researchers’ work.
Another challenge firms faced was difficulty fully capturing the capacity of 
acquisitions or teams as they change over time. For instance, Intel reportedly has 
been unable to make use of the Basis research team’s data—assets they paid for in 
the acquisition.
Interviewee: If anyone on the R&D team had access to it, anyone outside of the 
R&D team they had to go through either us or the backend software team to get 
that. And usually what would happen is like even anyone outside of the R&D 
team, if they got their hands on that data, they wouldn't have the tools to do really 
anything with it. Parsing tools, and plotting tools, and any other utilities that you 
would need. Because we all developed those on our own so it's like if they even 
have the data, it'd be really hard for them to do .
   That is a pretty consistent problem I'm seeing right now too, you give people 
across industries or even out of industry your data, they can't do anything with it 
up until two or three months after that just because they don't have the tools 
necessary to do anything. And that even being longer between the industry itself 
and academia I think. That process is significantly slower. 
Elaine:   And why is it? Is it just the nature of the data, the format it's in, and the 
combination of different data types in terms of ….
Interviewee:   Yeah like data types, data formats, understanding how the data was 
collected. If you didn't collect the data yourself it's like there are going to be 
certain caveats that you don't know about. And just, yeah data parsing and 
aggregation and all that takes a little bit of time. 
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This raises important issues not only in the issues of knowledge transfer 
within firms—in this case on how to use data acquired through an acquisition—
but broader themes relevant to data sharing between entities. 
Outsourcing Publishing to Academics
Throughout the interviews, practitioners repeatedly stated that partnering 
with academics for the publication of papers was an intended benefit or positive 
externality for the firm. From the perspective of startups, they may not have the 
expertise or time/resources to conduct research at the level of academic rigor. 
Startups also sometimes lacked the knowledge of how to get a paper successfully 
through the peer-review process, or lacked knowledge on where to publish. 
Larger firms had similar challenges, but usually had more resources and 
research-capable staff—these staff were often just overworked. Much like access 
to ethical review, partnering with academics offered not only additional 
intellectual and analytical power, but also the possibility to publish. 
The outsourcing of different aspects of research is illustrated in all three of the 
illustrative cases. The exact motivations to partners with academics, and the 
method of curating a relationship (e.g., arranging data sharing and device 
donations) is slightly different in each case, but represent the evolving incentives 
to broker these connections.
Time continues to be a constraint—even when the firm and practitioners are 
willing to engage in academic partnerships and knowledge-sharing activities.
“It really will [come down] to a matter of resources because my job title involves 
demos and training and workshops. Anything on the side, whether it's working 
on a publication or partnering with somebody is sort of like passion project which 
is entirely welcome but should not detract from the primary objective of my 
position. If that makes sense.”
There was a lot of uncertainty and angst expressed when trying to handle and 
structure partnerships with academics. These partnerships provided intellectual 
power, but many interviewees expressed fears that they would publish negative 
results based on the device or data—in addition to predicted fears about 
intellectual property rights and data privacy. For instance on interviewee 
described the way they approached a recent partnerships of exchanging data for 
particular research.
“And I have view the relationship with academics right now is largely external 
R&D, You know, it's, it's an extra set of hands. I'm the one, I think the larger risk 
outside of publishing negative results is, is just kind of IP ownership and to own 
the ideas, uh, where the academics themselves we've worked with are very 
reasonable and rational and um, that hasn't been an issue. It's more the 
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university level. Like there's this kind of standard desire to ensure that anything 
your tenured professors work on is owned by the university. And so we've had to 
negotiate on the IP side a little bit just to ensure that, hey, no, actually this data 
and our brainstorms about what can be done with this data. Just because we're, 
we're discussing the world of possibilities doesn't mean that we don't own the 
right to develop these algorithms and house and own those algorithms.”
Several interviewees sheepishly admitted they instituted some type of prior 
review when working with academics. On quick judgment, this makes an 
impression that firms are controlling of the message put out and could impede 
scientific objectivity by interfering. However, it is rational firms want to ensure 
that data published does not have any privacy or IP sensitivities, and that 
findings are accurate. If an academic made a mistake in analysis—which happens
—it could ruin the chances for a small firm, or cause a large public headache for 
large one. Both large and small firms risk financial and regulatory blowback if a 
mistake is made. Conversely, an academic should value their integrity but in 
reality only needs to file a correction if such an error is discovered.
There is no easy answer for handling publication reviews, which is why a team 
member ideally from the firm who donated the sensor/product or data should be 
part of the study. Given these factors, there is a need to rethink the options 
available (and known) to firms on how to work with academics and structure 
these relationships and review requirements. Upon pressing, many individuals 
who set prior publication review in place felt that was the only way to ensure 
correct information was being published, and to monitor any potential risk to the 
firm. Many who were executing these contracts had no prior experience working 
with academics or structuring such agreements—the same goes for academics 
who are most often not attorneys and may have never had a partnership with 
industry before. 
Academic Data Sharing
Data itself is not knowledge, but may be shared with others in the pursuit of 
new knowledge. It should be established there are not many established 
guidelines and tools available to help with industry data sharing. Universities are 
often ill equipped (see quote above on wanting to sign all IP from a partnership to 
the institutional academic), and there are not many models for privacy-
preserving data sharing and risk-minimizing strategies for the firm. When data 
are on a smaller scale, and with a subject well known to the firm, these 
negotiations may be easier and done more casually. 
Conclusion 
Knowledge sharing is heavily influenced by larger external forces shaping how 
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firms seek competitive advantage in the age of information-intensive innovation, 
and where firms place perceived risks. Barriers to share include IP and strategy 
secrecy concerns, challenges over sharing data to validate research or partnering 
with academics, unclear approval processes to proceed with publications, and 
ambiguous benefit to firms. Time is predictably a huge factor as well, both in time 
to write a paper (stemming for work already being done), time to get internal 
approval, time to go through the long time horizon of academic publishing, and 
time to foster relationships with external partners. 
There are times when knowledge sharing helps promote a firm, valuation, or 
demonstrate expertise. Some firms may see the value of visibility, demonstration 
of technical competency, and employee development but may not have the 
resources to promote it. Often, however, there are challenges in monetizing the 
value of the long-term investment and value to individual employees. 
As IP and guarding corporate secrets have grown as challenges, PR /Comms/
Legal teams have become increasing gatekeepers of knowledge or knowledge-
enabling data. Secrecy practices control how information is released it ends up 
being about knowledge sharing, and the impacts of these decisions need to be 
carefully considered.
Academics continued to be important external partners in helping firms 
transition knowledge outside of the firm, but these collaborations and models are 
haphazard and vary greatly between firms. By studying how these changes were 
manifesting in firms, it is possible to begin crafting cohesive innovation strategies 
that leverage the positive potential and aim to minimize negative outcomes. 
Without knowledge sharing mechanisms that fit information-intensive 
innovation models, society and other firms will fail to benefit from findings of 
internal research activities. 
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Section III: Research Ethics in the Wild
In the contemporary information economy, questions and tensions around 
technology ethics abound. It is consequently unsurprising that firms performing 
information-intensive inquiries grapple internally with how to deal with 
questions of research ethics and user privacy—particularly because they were 
often trained PhD researchers themselves and accepted this as part of their 
professional responsibilities. Additionally interesting, this research reveals the 
growing reliance private firms have on external academic research partners to 
provide access to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) within universities and 
research hospitals. Access to these accepted forms of ethical reviews were seen as 
a resource external research partnerships could provide to help cover activities 
within the firm which was an added incentive to find such partners. In the 
absence of external partners, many interviewees discussed the limited ways their 
firms attempted to deal (or ignore) research ethics, and how they took extra 
responsibilities upon themselves to incorporate ethics into their practice.
Asking research participants about their views and practices instituting 
“ethics” in their daily research, design, or professional practice was the most 
sensitive question topics posed during this dissertation study. Topics related to 
“technology ethics” and “research ethics” within companies has become a topic of 
heated debate among technologists, academics, and the public alike. With no 
clear rules or lines of acceptability, interviewees were often reluctant to discuss 
any of their firm’s or their own practices. Many participants were also not sure 
about formal policies and procedures, even on studies they may have assisted 
with. 
This portion of the study was not intended to be comprehensive in terms of 
understanding how each firm conducted ethical review, but rather aimed to 
simply understand and document how interviewees viewed their ethics on the 
ground within their roles. Some were more willing than others to discuss their 
personal and company’s approach to ethics, but several key themes emerging 
including cultures of questioning, duty stemming from academic training prior to 
working in industry, reliance on university partnerships, creation of ad hoc rules, 
and novel approaches legal agreements and consent forms to find ways to enable 
activities in thoughtful manners. By understanding some of the ways ethics is 
instituted in practice or perceived as a barrier in research, more comprehensive 
recommendations can be made.
Brief Industry Research Ethics Background
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Technology ethics usually encompasses more broad moral issues and 
questions around technology development and application. By contrast, research 
ethics focuses specifically on the context of moral and ethical issues around 
research and development. Many research ethics issues involve the discussion 
around the use of human subjects, including the implications of human subjects 
within research conducted inside tech firms or on data garnered from users. 
For much of human history the practice of medicine was experimental—
healers and doctors did whatever they could to save the patient and were 
governed loosely under the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm. However as science 
and medicine progressed, the use of humans as research subjects introduced 
horrifying instances of harm where elements of voluntariness, informedness, and 
autonomy forced the creation and development of research ethics. There are 
several early 20th century frameworks for research ethics, the Nuremberg Code in 
1947 generated from the atrocities of the Nazi clinical trials is one of the most 
internationally accepted research ethics policy frameworks.367 Within the United 
States, policy discussions coalesced over time as several public research harms 
made the press (e.g., Tuskegee syphilis experiments, Willowbrook State School 
hepatitis experiment, Brooklyn’s Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital cancer cell 
experiment) and the NIH clinical hospital began grappling with testing on 
healthy participants (often called at the time “normals”) who did not stand to 
directly benefit from research interventions. The US government was also 
beginning to fund extramural (non-governmental) research, which implied a new 
liability dynamic and research context where the government could no longer 
dictate implementation processes (including ethics).368 This public and 
government push to grapple with ethics resulted in the Belmont Report (1979) 
which identified three core principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and 
justice.369 These principles and actionable tenets such as informed consent and 
balancing of risks and benefits were later codified in in 1974 as Title 45 section 46 
of the Code of Federal Regulation370 (45 CFR 46; usually known as the “Common 
Rule”). It is through this law, as well as additional policies like Federal-Wide 
Assurance Contract that makes all research at universities—not just studies 
funded by the US Government—subject to ethical review guidelines including the 
use of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).
367 The Nuremberg Code (1947). US Government Printing Office (Washington DC: 1949). https://
history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf.
368 A detailed history of this debate and the foundations of IRBs as an institutionalization of ethics can 
be found in Rebecca Stark’s book. 
Stark, Laura Jeanine Morris. Behind Closed Doors:IRBs and the Making of Ethical Research. 
Morality and Society Series. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012.
369 The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1979). https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-
and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-report/index.html.
370 This law has been updated and amended several times over the decades.
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These research ethics guidelines have known limitations in application and 
context. The guidelines, though intended to be extensible and flexible, were not 
initially designed to apply to all areas of research. For instance, the initial rules 
and guidelines were developed with medical or psychological experiments in 
mind—not social science studies.371 Additionally, at the time these policies were 
developed, private sector research involving human subjects was limited to 
pharmaceutical and medical studies and thus regulated under the FDA 
guidelines.372 (See history Chapter 4; specifically on the discussion of limited 
social science research within large labs like Bell Labs) 
In 2014 private industry as a site of research hit a public flashpoint with the 
publication of a study on emotion contagion within social networks.373 An 
experiment was run on Facebook’s newsfeed, and the analysis was conducted by 
university research partners, leaving open a question of who was responsible for 
running an ethical review. A lengthy debate  ensued in the public media and 
within academic circles about the new opportunities “big data” (or what would 
now be called more broadly data science) offered through these partnerships, and 
the ways in which human subjects research ethics frameworks were unable to 
extend for this new research reality and context.374 Other digital manipulations 
371 See, for instance: 
Bledsoe, Caroline H., Bruce Sherin, Adam G. Galinsky, Nathalia M. Headley, Carol A. Heimer, Erik 
Kjeldgaard, James Lindgren, et al. "Regulating Creativity: Research and Survival in the Irb Iron Cage." 
Northwestern University Law Review 101, no. 2 (2007). https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?
handle=hein.journals/illlr101&div=24&id=&page=.
Schrag, Zachary M. "How Talking Became Human Subjects Research: The Federal Regulation of the 
Social Sciences, 1965-1991." Cambridge University Press 21, no. 1 (2009). https://www.cambridge.org/
core/journals/journal-of-policy-history/article/how-talking-became-human-subjects-research-the-
federal-regulation-of-the-social-sciences-19651991/097169CC72ACEF36DC8B5BD80859C615.
Zachary Schrag in “How Talking Became Human Subjects Research: The Federal Regulation of the 
Social Sciences, 1965-1991” (2009) details the policy and regulatory tussle that occurred to extend the 
coverage of IRBs, and the ways in which these policies were not designed for social science research. He 
states: “At best, they offered a few adaptations or exceptions to the regulations developed for medical 
experimentation, but a basketball court with some holes in the  floor is not a golf course. From the first 
version of the policies, the social sciences were included, but only in the marginal position they still 
occupy today.”
372 Vitak, Jessica, Nicholas Proferes, Katie Shilton, and Zahra Ashktorab. "Ethics Regulation in Social 
Computing Research: Examining the Role of Institutional Review Boards." Journal of Empirical Research 
on Human Research Ethics 12, no. 5 (2017). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/
10.1177/1556264617725200.
373 A full discussion of this event and the nuances of the study and public fallout are beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, but some selected discussions are cited below.
Kramer, Adam D., Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock. "Emotional Contagion through Social 
Networks." PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  
(2014). https://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.
374 See for instance:
Metcalf, Jacob, and Kate Crawford. "Where Are Human Subjects in Big Data Research? The Emerging 
Ethics Divide." Big Data and Society  (2016). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/
10.1177/2053951716650211.
173
(not just observational studies) were divulged at companies like OKCupid, and 
questions were raised about the ethics of these practices even when the results 
are not published.375 Research conducted in the dark, or research that is simply 
unlabeled but looks and feels like research, is not by default ethical. This moment 
raised important questions about what classified as human subject research 
within industry (see definitions in previous section), how research ethics could be 
brought into the private sector, and whose responsibility it was to monitor and 
regulate these activities. Unlike the US government that had grant making 
authority to require all universities to accept the operationalized research ethics 
policies, the Federal Trade Commission and other privacy and data regulators are 
the only entities left to evaluate ethical boundaries under consumer protection 
authorities.
In the absence of clear answers to these challenges, this section sets to seek 
to understand how ethics are reviewed in practice by practitioners and firms to 
not only understand the research ecosystem but also what possible remedies and 
recommendations might be considered to shape the system. 
Ethics in Practice
Grimmelmann, James. "The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users." Colorado 
Technology Law Journal 13 (2015): 219. https://james.grimmelmann.net/files/articles/social-media-
experiments.pdf.
Editorial Board. "Editorial Expression of Concern: Experimental Evidence of Massivescale Emotional 
Contagion through Social Networks." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 29 (2014): 111. 
https://europepmc.org/articles/pmc4115552.
Flick, Catherine. "Informed Consent and the Facebook Emotional Manipulation Study." Research 
Ethics 12, no. 1 (2016). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1747016115599568.
Kleinsman, John., and Sue Buckley. "Facebook Study: A Little Bit Unethical but Worth It?". Journal 
of Bioethical Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2015): 179-82. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s11673-015-9621-0.
boyd, danah. "Untangling Research and Practice: What Facebook's "Emotional Contagion" Study 
Teaches Us." Research Ethics 12, no. 1 (2016). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/
10.1177/1747016115583379.
Panger, Galen. "Reassessing the Facebook Experiment: Critical Thinking About the Validity of Big 
Data Research." Information, Communication & Society 19, no. Issue 8 (2015): 1108-26. https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1093525.
375 The original OKCupid blogpost has since been deleted (original URL is https://
theblog.okcupid.com/we-experiment-on-human-beings-5dd9fe280cd5?gi=ec8ced4aead) and 
unfortunately it does not appear to be archived at the Wayback Machine. A copy of the blog appears to be 
found here (https://hackerfall.com/story/we-experiment-on-human-beings) and is covered in many news 
stories.
See also: https://slate.com/technology/2014/07/facebook-okcupid-experiments-what-other-
companies-are-conducting-secret-psychology-studies.html
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This research revealed that there were two primary ways ethics were put into 
practice: first, was through the individual within firms based on their training or 
opening up questions about practices and outcomes. Because startups are usually 
very small, the individuals within startups had more influence over firm practices 
and outcomes than an individual within a larger firm, and it was usually the 
individual who was able to shape the startups culture around ethics. Second, 
there were some organizational strategies that emerged in instituting research 
ethics, including academic partnerships, private IRBs, and some references to 
internal processes. 
Part I: Individual Actors
Cultures of questioning
One thing my interviewees felt is that just because there were not formal 
reviews at all firms where they worked, they didn’t feel they were necessarily 
lacking the ability to question practices of their teams, other teams, or practices 
within the company. Formalized organizational structures were not required to 
promote these cultures of questioning. One interviewee, who had recently 
completed a PhD and moved into industry reflected: “I think within our group 
we’re pretty close knit … we’ve had this back and forth of ‘hey this doesn’t seem 
ok’ and then talk about it as a group and talk about what makes ethical sense 
here.”
This interviewee went on to reflect on the challenges as the company grew and 
they were exposed to research or research-like activities outside of their control 
or research unit. “Where it gets fuzzier is when other groups with product and UX 
and where it’s not within our control and domain of experience, and we are 
brought in as consults on study design. There hasn’t been something where I felt 
completely “OMG this!” And even if I was just consulting I would take it to 
whoever in research and head of their group or it’s a casual company where you 
can just ping someone on Slack and I would feel pretty comfortable talking to 
some and say “this is not alright” in the nicest way possible. But at the same time 
there’s a lack of control because I can only do so much, and as the company grows 
it’s its own entity. In a university if there was another researchers group you 
disagreed with, and you were brought in part time and saw it, how would you 
handle it? You would hopefully, if you felt strongly about it, flag it and voice it. 
But at the end of the day it’s their group and their decision, and mentally I do 
treat it differently, too. I hold myself and our group to different standards.” 
This reflection points out that cultures of questioning are hard to scale in a 
growing organization, and difficult to replicate. Cultures of questioning are 
certainly better than no questioning and blind execution of tasks that invariably 
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have moral and tangible consequences for others eventually, but they are 
impossible to audit or examine objectively for shifts over time.
Lioness: an example of a broader ethical discussion and dedication to user 
wellness
The ways in which Lioness thought about how to offer an explicit “opt in” to 
any research that tied to deeper fundamental questions, on top of the statements 
within their privacy policy are discussed within the illustrative case in Chapter 5. 
It was interesting to reflect with James on how the company carefully weighed 
the less tangible harms that could occur not necessarily in formal research but in 
their internal product and algorithmic development. Separate from “research 
ethics” discussions, this conversation illustrates when questions of ethics and 
user well-being are brought into the conversation, even within very small firms 
(startups) and are an important part of understanding how ethics may be 
executed on the ground. This is a detailed example of how individuals acting 
within small firms grapple with larger issues, and illustrates some of the positive 
discussions that are often overshadowed by poor decisions and outcomes made 
by firms.
“In terms of consumer behavior and whatnot, there's far more consistency, 
especially in the aggregate and in our particular case when we're trying to give 
insights that are similar in the sense of consumer consistency or user consistency, 
correlational tends to work fine and doesn't suddenly change or have super bad 
consequences generally speaking. There are some, where there are areas where 
there might actually be super bad consequences, at least psychologically if you 
say the wrong thing. We've been actually pretty careful with some of those areas.”
The acknowledgement that there is low risk, however depending how the 
product delivers readings and analysis could be harmful the psychological and 
emotional wellness of the user, given the sensitivity of the data.
“Anyway, the time's off. The person goes, "Your time is off." It's kind of annoying 
but it's not deeply traumatic or problematic in any sort of way. On the other 
hand, we've been working on an orgasm predictor for a long time because it's 
basically something that we've gotten requested quite a bit. For some women, 
they actually are not sure, "Is this an orgasm? Is this not an orgasm? How do you 
even know in terms of subjective experience and everything, especially with this? 
Oh, there's actually a physiological way of telling? I'd like to know." If you don't 
do it accurately in terms of either false positive or false negative, that could 
actually be an issue. That we're being pretty careful of, both in terms of level of 
accuracy we're comfortable with having it roll out with. It's going to be hard to 
find the true bounds of it. In terms of pretty damn accurate, just in terms of how 
we would see it, but also with the right caveats and the right language around it, 
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helping people understand. No matter what, it's going to fail somewhere and it's 
going to be wrong somewhere. The part of the thing is making sure it's wrong less 
of the time first, but also just the language around it helps people understand and 
put it into context what this is.” — James Wang, Lioness CTO
This nuanced discussion of potential harms and actions that could be 
detrimental to the wellness of users would not traditionally be cast as research 
ethics. However this culture of questioning should be recognized as necessary 
and important conversations to have within firms and teams—not to mention 
possibly outside stakeholders and users.
Training as an Academic
The importance of research training within academia as a professional guide 
for PhDs (or Master’s with research experience)376 was often reflected within 
cultures of questioning through their perceived duty or obligation to perform 
checks on study design and practices—whether they involved data analysis or 
actual testing on users.
IRBs or some form of accepted ethical review is seen as a barrier to getting 
their internal private sector research published. Many expressed a challenge 
trying to find a way to satisfy this requirement in order to publish or carry out the 
work in a systematic way like they wanted to based on their research training.
Many interviewees who had conducted research during their training knew 
the shortcomings of IRBs, and that seeking an IRB-style review may not help 
them think through their dilemmas. 
“My role recently on the academic side the cloud has changed so much and that 
IRBs don’t understand storage and the implications of that. It’s true on the 
academic side, and also true on the industry side.” -Anonymous Interviewee
Regardless, the training of individuals within industry was an important 
component of when ethical review and ethical discussions took place in firms, 
particularly smaller ones.
Part II: Organizational Strategies for Grappling with Ethics
There are three primary themes that emerged as organizational strategies for 
grappling with ethical issues and instantiating processes and approaches for 
376 This is not meant to exclude those with Bachelor’s training and exposure to research, but those 
who reflected on their perceived professional duties and knowledge about ethical review processes overall 
had PhDs or Master’s degrees.
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employees and projects: 1) Using academic and medical research partnerships as 
a way to access traditional IRB infrastructure; 2) Hiring Private IRBs to review 
internal projects and practices; and 3) An acknowledgement large firms 
sometimes have internal documents, but these documents like other research-
related practices are kept secret.  
Access to Academic IRBs and Outsourcing Ethics through University 
(or Medical) Partnerships
For many, partnering with a university or research hospital was seen as a way 
to assist with research, publications, and most relevant to this section: a way of 
accessing validated ethical review processes. 
Many interviewees, all of whom had academic research training (mostly PhDs) 
prior to working within industry saw university partnerships as a way to access 
ethical review so they could conduct their research. Once again, their training 
carried over into their professional lives in industry.
“We don't do that much internal research that can lead to publishable results but 
there's a lot of opportunity to go that way. But there's little obstacles in the way, 
such as finding the time to do it, having it be worthwhile for the company, and 
also little academic loopholes like getting on an IRB, for example. …I did human 
research for my PhD so to me IRB's were the end all be all and I talked about this 
with some of my coworkers where I was like, "Hey, if you're in industry, how do 
you stay involved academically?" And people are like, "Well, you basically have to 
find a way into the university either to become like a visiting scholar or partner 
up with an academic who can sort of bring you in as part-time staff so at least 
you're counted as being part of the institution. And then that way you can get 
listed on the IRB and then you have clearance after that." - Anonymous 
Interviewee
   Another remarked on using their personal network to form collaborations 
that also allowed for IRB access.
“I came into this with a lot of friends. Those are my friends in different places 
doing cool stuff and I'd say over a beer how can we get together. Well we can't 
because we don't have your capability and you don't have ours and the IRB is in 
between.”
Numerous firms told me the way they dealt with ethical questions and reviews 
was to “outsource” this to their academic partnerships. A few interviewees 
sheepishly admitted that they simply assumed the IRBs had done an ethics 
review on the research given the requirements of their academic partners, but 
that they were not involved with the process. Others were more involved in the 
review process, and many saw this opportunity to use the existing ethics 
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infrastructure as an asset and incentive to work with academic/medical 
researchers. 
This illustrates how IRBs are able to extend their mandated coverage to new 
contexts, specifically, private industry. However, it also points on additional 
pressures placed on an already overextended infrastructure, and the ways in 
which this ethical handoff may not result in improved ethical outcomes by actors 
within private industry, but rather a mechanism to cover private industry’s legal 
and public relations behind.
Buying Ethical Review: Hiring Private IRBs
Some firms said they used private IRBs for studies run internally, but nobody 
could offer me any details about those experiences either because they didn’t 
execute them or maybe simply forgot. It is possible that interviewees also felt 
uncomfortable during these questions and felt compelled to provide me with 
some answer out of guilt and a desire to protect their own (or their firm’s) 
reputation. Research notes often reflected interviewees were uncomfortable 
during these questions, likely because there are few accepted practices that give 
cover for activities done within the firm, and individuals know this is an issue 
that is often criticized by academics.
Regardless of the veracity of the answers, several interviewees brought up 
private IRBs as either resources used or alternatives they thought to explore. For 
instance, one interviewee discussed their hesitation to use one because they felt it 
was an insufficient mechanism to achieve better ethical  ends in their work.
“The other alternative is to go for private IRB companies, which apparently exist. 
I didn't know that. Basically, it's just this outside company that you send in a 
proposal and you give them some exorbitant amount of money, like $2,000 or 
something, and they approve it. Then, that way you can include that disclaimer 
when you submit for publication that our protocols have been approved by an 
IRB sort of deal. I have colleagues who used to work in government and have 
published papers that have gone to independent IRB companies before just to 
check that box off, you know? How rigorous those companies are, I have no 
absolutely no idea.” - Anonymous Interviewee
There is not a lot of existing scholarship on private IRBs, how they function 
under self-regulation, and the ways in which it is a productive means to 
promoting better ethical outcomes. This is an important topic for future research.
Ethics Protocols in Secret
Small startups, for the reasons discussed above, operate at an individual level 
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but it was near impossible to get any large firms on the record. The only folks 
interviewed from large firms were under strict agreements with me on anonymity 
for both them and their company, or were strictly background conversations to 
inform my work. From what I know, there are some large firms that are 
proactively creating human subject review guidelines, and IRB-like structures for 
any research or market research style internal activity. These documents are 
often labeled as confidential or designated as “not for public release.” There are 
little to no incentives for firms to publish and share these practices, and thus 
placing themselves under scrutiny for voluntary activities (given there is no legal 
requirement for them to do these reviews). What is important to distinguish is 
that these protocols are not published because of fears of being poached on an 
idea or new pending innovation, but rather for concerns about public criticism 
and potential liability by exposing practices. 
Conclusion
This section sought to understand the spectrum of ethics practices and how 
ethical questions are considered by interviewees. There were also plenty of 
interviewees who had no idea what the practices of ethical review were (if any) 
during product development and testing. Usually these cases were more in the 
gray fringes of what could be considered research versus product development, 
and those who had formal research training almost always responded with what 
reviews were practiced or not. Individuals often took research ethics practices 
upon themselves, and attempted to make do given constrained resources and lack 
of accepted best practices for industry. The snapshots from the viewpoints of 
interviewees establish some of the barriers to research, challenges of institutions’ 
ethical research practices within firms, the role of the individual professional and 
their academic training, and the opportunities afforded by university/research 
hospital partnerships. The extra incentive to leverage academic research 
institutions for their ethics review infrastructure was a novel finding, and helps to 
understand how new models for research and research collaboration are evolving 
around information-intensive innovation.
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Section IV: Information-intensive innovation 
secrecy out of open innovation
One of the greatest ironies of Silicon Valley (and tech companies more 
broadly) is that the very firms that promise to connect the world and instrument 
our entire personal lives is that the industry seemingly thrives on paranoia and 
secrecy. While the average persons’ life is becoming more transparent and 
permeable to private sector data collectors, the actions of the curating companies 
have become opaque to not only public scrutiny, but peer and expert gaze. 
Chapter 2 illustrated how the Silicon Valley model of innovation via Saxenain 
and Chesbrough’s work created fluid information flows between firms that often 
had implications for parts of research and practice. As evidenced in the historical 
chapter and part of the appendix, not all aspects of research in tech firms was 
open. However, this dissertation research uncovered new barriers to general 
information flows—specifically concerns around leaking as well as the 
proliferation of NDAs—and the impact these legal and organizational structures 
are having on research conversations.
This section first explores the uncertainty and blurry boundaries over 
employee’s mental models of what should be kept secret, and then examines the 
ways in which operational information security are in tension with other cultural 
norms like open office plans and flat organizational models. Then this section 
examines NDAs, and the impact of employee NDAs and visitor NDAs are having 
upon the research landscape, and how general perceptions are causing a broader 
chilling effect. These emerging secrecy practices threaten to counteract other 
strategies to collaborate with external researchers, contribute dialog and findings 
to the larger research discourse, and creating institutional and legal barriers to 
adapting research demands.
Which part is the secret? Employee mental models and work arounds
Not all engineers and programmers I spoke to felt they could not share 
information. One engineer who worked with wearable data made it clear he did 
not feel stymied from discussing the results of their internal R&D team broadly. 
“Not really. When we'd talk about algorithms, it's not like the person hearing 
about the conversation is really gonna go out to a computer and go do something 
about it. It's more about the data integrity itself, and if they don't have access to 
that similar data, it's going to be hard to reproduce those results anyway. So it 
was more about keeping the data confidential.” Secrecy practices are often based 
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in employees mental models, and the emphasis on what should be kept secret (let 
alone how) varied between employees and especially between firms.
Individuals executing research or possible research-related investigations 
within data science and user studies talked about how they got around not being 
exactly sure what parts of their job they could discuss. When attending MeetUps
—a platform for connecting individuals on similar interests in person, including 
particular coding languages and tools—several individuals felt they could talk 
strictly about methods and skills without worry. Employees I spoke with felt like 
this did enough to satiate their need to seek outside professional development 
and exchange ideas. However, this type of communication from an outsiders’ 
perspective only serves to improve the underlying methodologies and strategies 
used to solve problems, not discussing the possible findings, applications, and the 
impact implications of such algorithms and platforms. This limitation on 
knowledge sharing, stemming primarily from uncertainty on how to 
communicate with peers, ultimately impacts the professional development (and 
thus suggests impact on corporate efficiency and quality) as well as society as a 
whole by taking entire subjects off the discussion table. 
The pressures of secrecy impacts employees in other ways. One user 
experience researcher admitted to me that she was having trouble applying for 
other jobs, because she did not know what she could claim credit for or boast 
about since none of her projects were ever made public by the company. This was 
not a point she could seek guidance on from her managers because they did not 
know she was applying for other jobs. She also worried that if she did go into 
another company and say too much, the other company would view her as a 
“snitch” and think she would not keep their practices and projects on close 
enough hold. This was a struggle she both expressed frustration with and 
helplessness because it was not an issue widely discussed.
The ways in which employees viewed which part of their jobs were secret, 
and how they could interact with others and exchange knowledge or practices 
varied. However the uncertainty, caution, and very specific mental models (based 
on their interpretation of corporate policies) on how to conduct themselves were 
common themes.
Operational Information Security Tensions
There is clear tension within many firms (e.g., Apple may be an exception) 
that there was a desire to appear open, transparent, and with a flat, peer or merit 
based management structure. Many offices are open floorpans, where employee 
desks are open for all other employees and visitors to see. Open floorpans also 
relate to the open and omnipresent innovation strategy that seems to dominate 
contemporary tech companies. Every employee can be an innovator, so there is 
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no need to invest in large insulated teams with set aside resources. Startups also 
often use shared spaces to operate, like the popular WeWork locations that 
include hot desks, open desks, and shared conference rooms (not to mention 
amenities). Understanding the shared and communal culture of these spaces and 
the differing impact on innovation culture—certainly there are plenty of good 
ideas spread this way—is out of scope of this work. However, these open spaces 
compete with, and perhaps fuel the confusion over, what exactly should be kept 
secret within firms.
From an operational security perspective, these open practices run directly 
counter to any information and physical controls that are designed to keep 
secrets and compartmentalize knowledge as protection. Recent historical 
examples (explored in previous section) suggest that in order to truly run agile 
and clandestine innovation operations, tight physical security and information 
security is necessary. The information controls in current technology companies 
are scattered and unclear, unlike national security information controls which 
clearly label all classified information and compartmentalize both the physical 
processes as well as making it clear who can know what. Guests are frequently 
allowed within open floorpans so long as they are escorted by an employee, and 
at times academic or outside partner engagements are held within the facilities as 
well—adjacent to places of work.
There is also an unclear hierarchy for approval to speak to outsiders or 
understand what information should be kept secret. When I asked an interviewee 
how he would go about receiving approval to be on the record for our 
conversation, if he had wanted to, he replied:
“Basically I would email a coworker (or slack a coworker) who is in change of IP 
and patents who is in charge of this stuff and here’s what’s going on I’m doing 
this interview for a dissertation, what would you be OK with or not. And this is, 
yeah, so not a formal route but it would be …yeah.”
Other interviewees had no idea who they would talk to to figure out what on 
their project needed to be kept secret, or how they could best engage with 
outsiders. They usually just wanted to speak off the record, and felt they were not 
supposed to talk to anyone.
Perhaps the confusion over what should be kept secret in these employees’ 
work lives comes from a certain amount of denial among those in the industry 
that practices are not as open, even within particular regions like Silicon Valley, 
as they once were. The resulting employee paranoia from all the NDAs, private 
investigators (referenced below), and chastising at all hands briefings is not an 
effective or rational information management strategy. This chaotic and 
threatening culture is difficult for even well intentioned employees to 
meaningfully enforce. The tacit “keep everything secret” that results from unclear 
protocols and missions dilutes the focus of those entrusted with real secrets.
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These findings were also contradictory to other studies run focused on 
particular types of information sharing between industry partners. Sedenberg 
and Dempsey377 illustrate there is a high degree of sharing within highly vetted, 
exclusive trust-based sharing groups that are based on individual membership 
not their employing organizations. Even though the information exchanged in 
these groups was highly sensitive from a cybersecurity perspective—which has 
investment and public relations consequences for firms—these sub-groups had a 
concrete understanding of what they could share to receive feedback and help, 
and these information sharing networks often worked together among competing 
firms. This dissertation did not find evidence of established networks where 
individuals felt they could share and learn from others, perhaps because the types 
of roles and information were so highly varied, finding clear missions and 
purpose are impossible. Given the nature of some of their jobs, perhaps methods-
based meet ups are sufficient. However in an age where there are questions on 
algorithm’s design impacts and ethics, this aura of secrecy seems only to be 
fueling a cultural gap by limiting the dissenting and constructive voices that could 
otherwise be included in the conversations.
NDAs For Everyone
NDAs for employees has grown the scope and intensity of contracts signed by 
employees, creating significant monetary and career consequences if a leak 
occurs. The use of NDAs are no longer limited to exiting a role, particularly 
privileged roles as advisors or team members on special projects, or used during 
business negotiations where sensitive and vulnerable information needs to be 
exchanged. In mid-sized and larger firms, NDAs are present on iPads-style 
touchscreens at each entry, and some firms require employees to be under 
multiple NDAs378 for their own job. Visitor NDAs  (or NDA-like agreements) are 
required to enter regardless of the level of access or purpose of the meeting, has 
become a new chilling factor that extends beyond the firm and theoretically locks 
any academic (as well as activists or journalists) who signs into language that 
may prevent them writing about a firm in general after attending a meeting, 
happy hour, or giving a talk on a premise. NDAs are poorly understood by many 
people, and have a vague holding power for many years. Language in many NDAs 
is vague on what counts as proprietary or sensitive information, and how this 
classification of information will be signaled to the signee. This proliferation of 
377 Sedenberg, Elaine, and James X. Dempsey. "Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Governance 
Structures: An Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Trade-Offs." Chap. 1 In Rewired: Cybersecurity 
Governance, edited by Ryan Ellis and Vivek Mohan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
378 MacInnis, Matt. "How I Survived and Thrived in Apple's Legendary Environment of Super-
Secrecy." recode, 2017.
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NDAs counters the limited use and trust-base relationships of tech firms of the 
past, and based on this research are having a much greater chilling effect on 
intellectual and social discourse around technology.
 It is unfortunately out of scope of this dissertation study but the impact these 
practices have on journalists covering tech and corporate leakers should be 
considered. Journalists are sometimes bound to the same rigid NDAs, and the the 
culture to prosecute leakers to the press about internal practices creates a culture 
of employee fear that feeds back and impacts conversations that relate to R&D 
and innovation.
Employee NDAs
Employee NDAs were a behemoth and referenced repeatedly during this 
research, particularly by individuals who were cautious about what they could 
and could not say. One acquaintance, upon talking about her recent NDA 
experience at a large and prominent tech firm in the Bay Area, nervously joked 
she did not even want to tell me about how long or how many NDAs she had 
signed, because it was probably against a clause in the contract. She expressed 
frustration about how she had tried to use her graduate training and prior 
exposure to tech law to read through the contract, but failed to fully understand 
what she was signing. All she knew was that a lot of money was on the line and 
the language was “scary,” and that she better not say anything to anyone and risk 
her hiring bonus.
It was frequent for employees to not be sure about exactly what they had 
signed, or even how to go back and reference particular clauses. But the NDA was 
repeatedly alluded to with respect and deference—illustrating how seriously 
employees took the document. 
Visitor NDAs—Reflection on my own experiences 
I am not completely certain379 how many NDAs I have signed throughout the 
course of this research, or in my lifetime. I have no ability to audit these 
contracts, no concept of how long they may be in effect, or what type of content 
they may cover. 
When signing into companies for social and professional visits, the NDA was 
usually presented on a screen as if it was a TOS (Terms of Service) you would 
agree to after downloading software or a new app—except with the NDA you 
usually have to digitally sign with your finger. Typically about a page long for 
visitors, there was often no way to send a copy to yourself and I frequently 
befuddled the front desk staff by asking for a copy—which I made a practice of 
doing after a time. One time I was told the printer was broken, was given a copy 
“identical” blank copy, other times I was asked to follow up with my host for a 
379 I do however have a good idea, and know for a fact which companies I have not signed one for. For 
the last two years I have attempted to collect copies of all NDAs I was forced to sign. This uncertainty 
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digital copy—one she admitted sheepishly she’d have to figure out the process for 
obtaining a copy. Once the NDA was signed, I was given a temporary badge. In 
each of these cases, it would have been easy to enter my email address and have a 
copy sent to me automatically—one company does this with financial receipts on 
their platform service but that wasn’t not an option for the NDA.
Signing an NDA for routine meetings—though perhaps overly cautious and 
obsessively thorough—is not entirely shocking. However, the NDA signing at 
most large companies and their subsidiaries (i.e. Facebook, Amazon, Google, 
Twitter) are automatically triggered regardless of visit purpose and levels of 
access. In some cases, the agreement is not a full NDA but a shorter code of 
conduct agreement. It is impossible to know since I did not request (and often 
having to insist) to have a copy printed for me, and the policies change over time.
Once at Twitch (owned by Amazon), I had to sign an NDA to visit a friend for 
an afterwork happy hour social at the company bar/cafeteria next door to the 
front desk. In 2017 I attended an event that was only co-sponsored by Facebook 
and was also required to sign yet another Facebook NDA—I’ve signed several 
iterations at many tech firms due to friends working at these companies and 
before I realized exactly what I was signing. Ironically, the event was about 
privacy and ethics, and one invitee asked to negotiate on the spot a particular 
clause—jeopardizing their ability to even participate in the invite only event. 
Another time, I was an invited speaker at Square (a company led by Twitter CEO 
Jack Dorsey) to discuss my own research and was asked to sign an NDA before I 
could enter and give a talk about my own developing research ideas to employees. 
This experience is not uncommon for academics or startups (particularly the 
academic oriented ones) who go to share their work and ideas within companies.
One startup CEO who holds a PhD and bridges the academic and startup 
worlds talked about the challenges working with big companies: “I’m learning 
about the business world and applied science and so forth all and these are part 
of our origin story to your point because I'm here, I'm finding out that here's a 
company inviting me as an academic to give an academic talk. And when I do I 
have to sign certain documents and that's part of the friction that you're talking 
talking about which scare me. And I try to establish good will while I'm there and 
hopefully that will help 'cause this is a company that is based on good will, but it's 
scary and then the process of talking to my colleagues while I'm contemplating 
this is a weird one for me existentially because I'm worried they're thinking I'm 
selling out 'cause I'm going to the big bad corporate world and they're wondering 
if I'm going to get the money because their grants are drying up.”
The anxiety around simultaneously learning how to navigate corporate 
entities—and their opaque processes—to protect your own interests is difficult 
and adds uncertainty to these ventures for both academics and small companies 
alike. This uneasiness is further fed since many academics feel sheepish, 
admitting to others that they are pursuing these connections in the first place, 
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harkening back to historical moments where academic researchers valued “pure” 
science research over industrial research. (See history section Chapter 4) Signing 
an NDA to go present your own work not only has the appearance of 
disingenuous discourse and one-sided protections for the firm that has the large 
legal team, but also may prevent certain individuals with personal stances on 
signing (or who lack the stomach to negotiate on the spot) to avoid these 
exchanges altogether. 
Certainly not all companies employ the blanket visitor NDA strategy. Many 
sites I visited who were not necessarily “tech” giants but were otherwise large 
companies did not require an NDA, possibly because there was no internal threat 
model to desire one. The unpredictable nature of when an NDA might present 
itself is in and of itself part of the problem. 
The Powerful Perception of NDAs
As is common with many policies or laws, sometimes the perception of the 
breadth and power of it is more powerful than the actual legal grounding. This 
perception and often expanding pervasiveness should not be underplayed as it 
holds very real consequences for how average people conduct themselves. The 
average person is not going to know the intricacies of what clauses will hold up in 
court, nor does the average organization or individual, including professionals 
like journalists, want to fight a public and expensive legal battle to win the right 
to repeat information or say something. This uneven playing field enables 
prominent tech companies to place a document before all visitors and employees 
whose power arguably lies more in the posturing than the actual strength (at least 
in many fringe cases). It also has allowed the NDA to take on a mythical level of 
might and prowess. 
Throughout the course of this work, NDAs were catch all legal documents. It 
was common for interviewees to say things like: “I’m sure there’s something in 
my NDA about how or what I can say, but I don’t recall what that is.” NDAs 
operate like ephemeral oaths of silence, that instead of rooting their power in the 
documented language are often inaccessible to the signee and held only within 
the signee’s mind. 
“Again, I’d have to refer back to the NDA to know exactly how things are 
formulated but basically the sense is absolutely nothing. Completely zipped. You 
are not supposed to talk to partners, spouses, family, um, yeah. Completely tight 
lipped about it.”-Anonymous interviewee 
It has also been reported that journalists who visit tech companies and refuse 
an NDA, if they are allowed in at all, are asked to wear a large red badge 
announcing to everyone they have not signed an NDA. This is unlikely to change 
any information that was disclosed to a journalist, because what rationale firm 
would disclose sensitive information they don’t want reported on to a journalist, 
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but rather serves as mechanism to increase social pressure on visiting 
individuals. 
Frequently when I have signed NDAs, it has been with my host and the 
receptionist staring intently at me. At times, I’ve had other visitors waiting to use 
the iPad next. This situational context makes understanding the clauses I’m 
agreeing to very difficult, even with familiarity into contracts and legal language, 
and resonates with discussions about privacy policies as unintelligible and 
unreasonable legal agreements for consumers to click through out of habit. 
Though NDAs and privacy policies differ in the situation and type of agreement, 
there are many parallels between the contexts of signing and broad future 
implications to users and average employees or visitors.
NDAs equipped with broad language and presented on small screens during a 
sign in procedure make it easy to seem like the contract “covers everything” and 
has a clear chilling effect on visitors and employees. In reality, it is relatively hard 
to prove in many cases that a disclosure and thus contract breach has occurred. 
However, in cases where journalists (or even an academic) writes about a 
company, the difficult burden of proof falls on the writer to prove information 
they learned did not come from a visit or “meeting” at a company during which 
the NDA was signed. 
NDAs also frequently have vague termination dates, amounting to “when the 
information is publicly known” so that theoretically signing an NDA with a large 
tech firm means anything written after that time could be scrutinized and subject 
to legal action. Overall, there was great confusion about the staying power of 
NDAs. For instance at a dinner party, several technology NGO employees 
discussed a recent meeting and how they thought the NDA only covered that 
particular meeting and they had resolved not to sign any more (this is not the 
case). As discussed in Appendix D, the actual power of these contracts is disputed 
but hardly anyone wants to risk a lawsuit. Journalists rarely want a costly and 
public legal fight, and most academics and employees have no idea what their 
rights are or want to threaten their reputations and careers. 
NDAs have a broad and hard to define chilling effect on employees and 
visitors to tech firms who use them as part of the “Welcome Mat” badge 
procedures. There are entire companies dedicated to facilitating the NDA service 
for companies380. They are also a legal mechanism that once triggered is virtually 
impossible to undo. Given the broad language of many NDAs found at visitor 
check ins, it potentially could stymie discourse about particular companies well 
into the future as people’s careers evolve and technology changes. Even if it could 
be argued that information in question was learned outside of the company, or 
that information learned in future “meetings” was not even created at the time of 
the NDA, the chilling effect remains. 
380 See for example: Envoy (https://envoy.com/features/nda/) Easy NDA (https://
www.easynda.com/) and The Receptionist. https://thereceptionist.com/
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NDAs are also negotiated by the individual, not the individual’s professional 
institution (e.g., university). This lessens the negotiating power and ability to 
fully understand the contract. Other agreements signed by academics, like data 
sharing agreements, are usually negotiated and handled by offices within 
universities. 
Startups are often an exception to this trend, because they are not yet saddled 
with a legal team or have the capacity to implement protocols that are not 
absolutely necessary. That is in part why most of the identified cases and 
interviewees are from startups. 
Contexts from the past, exposure to leakers, and consequential 
corporate retaliation 
The press around technology firms has evolved to become more participatory 
in critiques of the influence of technology on society, and larger social 
movements—#MeToo, issues gender and racial equality, national political 
division, free speech in the digital era, etc.— reach into the previously hip and 
exempt heroes of modern tech.381 These issues make tech firms of high interest to 
investigative journalists, academics, activists, and users worldwide. Companies 
now seek to prevent their latest strategy or product release from being leaked to 
the press—a sometimes counterintuitive strategy to the desire to build press and 
hype—so they can control the narrative and maintain a competitive advantage 
among competitors. But companies also must seek to cultivate their public image 
and reputation. This section grapples with the chilling effects and efforts made by 
companies to prevent information leaks to the press and other sources. 
“Every Friday we have a company wide meeting and that’s a time that if 
there’s something happened in terms of a potential leak they touch base and say 
‘hey remember this’ or ‘be careful of what you say’” -Anonymous interviewee
Many people I interviewed or spoke to in general had had personal experience 
with colleagues or friends getting in trouble for talking about what they do. This 
lore was found across companies and from individuals in my different positions. 
For example, one anonymous interviewee summed up their personal experience 
once we had established a rapport discussing other topics:  
“I had a colleague who was representing a company at a conference and a 
podcaster came up to him for some related field like AI or something like that 
and said, "Hey, can we talk about this kind of work you do for podcast?" Which 
381 Though in 2019 it may seem like a distant memory, at one time large technology companies were 
seen as innovators and “cool” companies, not problematic behemoths. 
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he did. But, it talked about technology and the kind of stuff that they do and the 
different applications for it. At the very end, the podcaster asked, "Hey, what are 
your opinions on the ethics of what it is that you're doing?"
   And my colleague had his own thoughts on it and they talked about it for a good 
10 minutes. Just sort of like a pie in the sky sort of discussion that really didn't 
mean much but because he was affiliated with the company in the podcast, it was 
not taken over very well because it's not the company's job to comment on the 
ethics of the research that people use our software for. It ended up being a little 
bit of a kerfuffle. Well, okay, these interactions have to be approved beforehand 
and hence my edginess about sharing the company name.” -Anonymous 
interviewee about their anonymity
Employees were aware of the many ways their company would be able to 
surveil their activities and that these leaks (even small ones) are no longer 
ignored but actively chased. Stories in the press also contributed to the growing 
paranoia about leaking something—even accidentally. For instance, a story in The 
Guardian from March 2018 titled “‘They’ll Squash You Like a Bug’: how Silicon 
Valley keeps a lid on leakers” details the technical measures by large technology 
firms to detect and find employees who leak material to the press.382 The 
secondary headline sums up the relevance to this chapter succinctly by stating 
“working for a tech company may sound like all fun and ping-pong, but behind 
the facade is a ruthless code of secrecy — and retribution for those who break it.” 
Career experience also may have been a factor in level of comfort with 
discussing work practices. Despite the fact those who had personal exposure to a 
colleague or friend who had been punished were more skittish and less likely to 
talk on the record, the opposite was true for general experience. I found that 
industry veterans had their own clear mental models of what would be 
appropriate to discuss and what wouldn’t be—whereas younger professionals did 
not have this internal guiding compass. This intuitive point is made significant 
when considering how young many startups and leading companies are. When 
the cutting edge is forged by a generation made paranoid about leakers and 
corporate retribution, knowledge transfer and an open society suffers. 
Conclusion
Saxenian begins Regional Advantage describing the Massachusetts Route 128 
and the ways in which it fell behind the innovative pace of Silicon Valley. 
“Practices of secrecy and corporate loyalty govern relations between firms and 
382 Solon, Olivia. "'They'll Squash You Like a Bug': How Silicon Valley Keeps a Lid on Leakers." The 
Gaurdian, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/16/silicon-valley-internal-work-
spying-surveillance-leakers.
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their customers, suppliers, and competitors, reinforcing a regional culture that 
encourages stability and self-reliance.”383 This contrasted with the dynamic and 
networked firms, where information flowed freely and firms fostered mutual 
trust despite fierce competitions. This section detailed the ways in which 
practices of secrecy and a new demand for corporate loyalty by employees has 
impacted employee activities and discourse around research, and suggests 
broader cultural impact. This section only begins to scratch the surface on larger 
phenomena, however. Reporting and writing like the coverage of “Bad Blood: 
Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup”384 detail how secrecy enabled 
massive fraud to persist even with the media spotlight. The practices of secrecy 
within technology firms are impacting not only research discourse and knowledge 
sharing, but information-intensive innovation strategies and issues of broader 
public interest. 
383 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
384 Carreyrou, John. Bad Blood : Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2018.
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Chapter 7:
Conclusions
This dissertation study suggests that the role of the private firm within the 
R&D ecosystem is fundamentally changing, and challenging traditional data 
infrastructures and sites of research. This study establishes the key aspects and 
driving forces of change within Silicon Valley and contemporary tech firms’ 
approach to research and development, via a focus and emphasis on information-
intensive innovation for competitive advantage. 
The success of many of these firms turns on the use of algorithms and design 
to respond to and shape human behavior, thus they demand the ability to 
leverage fundamental research in entirely new ways through internal practices, 
outside partnerships, and data sharing. These emerging practices have occurred 
both within traditional academic contexts as well as by forming new internal 
modalities that account for evolving concepts of research within the private firm. 
In addition to challenging prior theories of research and innovation, these shifts 
present new challenges to individual privacy, research ethics, and are generating 
new questions about the management of these issues through corporate 
governance and risk management practices. This shift toward information-
intensive innovation and the affordances this allows has fundamentally altered 
the role of the private firm within the research ecosystem in a way that demands 
new policy considerations and strategy adjustments.
Policy Considerations
This analysis on how firms are managing and adapting to information-
intensive innovation challenges the foundational models of research and 
innovation, builds off of practices from early Silicon Valley tech firms, and 
presents new opportunities for research moving forward. This dissertation 
research shows that many firms are outsourcing different aspects of their 
research to academic research partners: relying on external expertise, specialized 
equipment, academic publishing, and university/institution research ethics 
infrastructure to supplement in-house efforts. This research reconsiders the 
definitional boundaries of what activities are considered “formal research” from 
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the perspective of interviewees, and in light of the changing embedded 
definitional assumptions derived from the linear innovation model. Recasting a 
broader scope of what could be considered research and contribute to the larger 
R&D ecosystem is important not only to thinking critically about what activities 
should (and could) be shared for public interests, but also in considering how 
traditional sites of research within industry are expanding. These changes 
accommodate the pressures of information-intensive innovation and the quest 
for more fundamental questions about our human nature.
Large tech firms often demand more of the public attention and scrutiny for 
their research and data sharing practices. However, this dissertation research 
shows small startups are also important actors within the information-intensive 
innovation ecosystem. Though large firms have more financial and infrastructure 
resources (as well as larger datasets), acknowledging the contributions and 
collaborations of smaller firms will be important to fully understanding emerging 
practices. Policies and programs should consider the diverse size of firms, and the 
different incentives and capacities both large and small firms have to collaborate 
and contribute to the knowledge ecosystem. 
Similarly, in considering small companies (e.g., startups): there are policy 
opportunities to incentivize later data sharing as the firm grows but including it 
as a stipulation in Small Business Administration (SBA) grants in the US, for 
example. Additionally, socially good motivated VCs could require some allocation 
of future resources if the startup becomes successful to participate in these social 
good and research data sharing initiatives. It is out of the scope of this 
dissertation to dive into the details or limitations of such approaches, but the 
ways in which early funders or partners can “bake in” obligations for data sharing 
and research partnerships should be considered. Often attention is placed only 
on large companies with public shareholders and large legal surface areas, but 
creating cultures of social good and attention to sources for potential research 
partnerships from the beginning should be a strategy considered as well.
Many science and technology policies claim to encourage these types of 
industry/academic collaborations, but have not provided suggested practices and 
mechanisms that could be more readily adapted by firms—particularly startups. 
There is a need for established processes that create legal and technical 
infrastructure that more easily allows for data sharing and information-intensive 
research collaborations. Creating these tools and infrastructures will be vital to 
incentivizing firms to participate in these fundamental research activities and 
fostering these activities in a way that protects users but leverages research 
potential. Many of the firms interviewed struggled to determine how to 
collaborate and share data, and felt they each had to assume the burden of 
individual risk and creative ingenuity to make these aspirations fruitful. 
Further, private data may be able to expand the reach and breadth of public 
infrastructure in an evolving, digitally-mediated society and with the proper 
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considerations and new infrastructure help bridge to public interest applications, 
like research. In 2018, France announced plans to explore policies that require 
private sector sharing of data for use by governments, and ideally others,385 in 
order to capitalize on the public benefit of privately-owned data. There are 
similar proposals in the UK, and cities like New York City are working on 
mandating data sharing in particular sectors like ride sharing.386 However, 
mandating information sharing from the private sector is fraught in many sectors 
and often does not have the intended effects.387 Creating incentives and policies 
that offer various forms of liability protection or external infrastructure/tools 
could help foster a healthier and more efficient public/private data sharing and 
research ecosystem. Grants from governments or foundations could also help 
incentivize public/private research partnerships, particularly for smaller firms 
that lack resources to devote time to create these mechanisms from scratch. 
However, if such grants were created the barrier to apply should kept at a 
minimum, since startups often lack grant writing expertise and are time/resource 
strapped. 
The emerging secrecy practices and the proliferation of NDAs requires further 
study, but is growing in opposition to many of the other strategies for 
information-intensive innovation. This unresolved (and often unrecognized) 
tension needs to be addressed by firms, and considered by scholars more broadly 
as it relates to the larger ecosystem. Secrecy practices are having unintended 
effects. The strategy of making everyone within a company a key innovator has 
resulted in everyone feeling uncertain, and fosters an environment where 
everyone feels the need to stay quiet to protect their jobs and bonuses. This has 
had a damaging impact on the innovation culture under the facade of openness 
and egalitarian opportunity. NDA procedures, particularly for academic guests 
(as within the bounds of this dissertation study), should be reconsidered to foster 
a healthy and mutually beneficial relationship. The pervasiveness of visitor NDAs 
likely offers little protection to the firm unless it is an NDA put in place for a 
particular targeted partnership and exchange of ideas/information. Instead, 
visitor NDAs create an adversarial relationship and presents a chilling factor for 
engagement (e.g., some people will not visit or work with private companies even 
385 Villani, Cedric. For a Meaningful Artificial Intelligence: Towards a French and European Strategy. 
AI For Humanity (2018). https://www.aiforhumanity.fr/pdfs/MissionVillani_Report_ENG-VF.pdf.
Wallace, Nick. "Countries Can Learn from France’s Plan for Public Interest Data and Ai." Center for 
Data Innovation, 2018. https://www.datainnovation.org/2018/08/countries-can-learn-from-frances-
plan-for-public-interest-data-and-ai/.
386 Marshall, Aarian. "NYC Now Knows More Than Ever About Your Uber and Lyft Trips." Wired, 
2019. https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-uber-lyft-ride-hail-data/.
387 See, for instance the discussion of the downsides to mandated information sharing in: Sedenberg, 
Elaine, and James X. Dempsey. "Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Governance Structures: An 
Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Trade-Offs." Chap. 1 In Rewired: Cybersecurity Governance, edited by 
Ryan Ellis and Vivek Mohan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
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on non-sensitive matters) as well as public/academic discourse. Rolling back 
ubiquitous NDA usage for academic engagement and limiting NDAs only to cases 
where sensitive information is being shared or exchanged would improve 
collaborations and early research discussions, without introducing meaningful 
risk to the private firm.
Limitations and Future Work
The findings of this dissertation are not meant to be representative of the 
experiences and processes of all firms and stakeholders in R&D or made 
generalizable to the point that all granularity from this study are abstracted and 
pixelated to the point of futility. The findings generated by this research is 
unlikely to be fully encompassing of all geographic localities throughout large 
spans of time. Mechanisms and theory developed should, however, contain the 
relevant details to contextualize findings that are dependent upon location and 
specific time constraints. The descriptions and analysis are meant to provide 
empirical evidence for contemporary and future discussions within the broader 
scope of this research, and inform a theories of practice described. 
This dissertation is not intended to be my final professional contribution to 
the field, but rather a body of research I continue to build upon throughout my 
post-graduate work experience embedded in industry and future research 
opportunities. The inquiry included within this dissertation is merely a start for a 
lifelong pursuit of these foundational research questions.
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Appendix A:
Essential background on existing public data 
infrastructures: new pressures and limitations
The rise of private sector data holdings is notable because it corresponds with 
important changes and evolutions in who holds valuable population (or large 
scale) data based on government changes, as well as social ones. We previously 
relied on government systems and information to conduct our lives and access 
data to make policy decisions or guide research. Governments, though obviously 
at the whim of politics and subject to competing ideologies, are institutions that 
are there to serve and protect citizens. Governments are often intended to be 
stable and consistent, which translates to the information systems that have been 
expanded over time to provide input to policymaking decisions and provide 
outside parties, including researchers, with data and information with consistent 
and reliable standards. 
These information systems were created through a patchwork of public 
infrastructure and services, stemming from local municipalities, federal 
programs, and a complicated web of global services through international 
arrangements. 
Canonical US data sources388 came from agencies like the Census Bureau,389 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Center for 
Health Statistics,390 US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic 
Analysis,391 Bureau of Labor Statistics,392 Health and Human Services,393 Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI)394 and numerous sources of scientific data from 
federal science agencies.395 These data have also been made more interoperable 
and accessible through centralized portals such as Data.gov. These information 
systems are vital parts of public infrastructure, used by researchers, citizens, 
388 This dissertation has a focus on US firms and policy, but obviously other countries and NGOs have 
data sources that are central to many areas of research.
389 E.g., the Decennial US Census, also known as the Population and Housing Census; American 
Community Survey; American FactFinder; etc.
390 E.g., Youth Risk Behavior Survey, National Death Index, National Vital Statistics System, CDC 
WONDER, etc.
391 I.e., GDPs for states and cities, state and local income levels
392 I.e., labor market activity data etc.
393 E.g., HealthData.gov which includes data about Medicaid/Medicare, etc.
394 i.e., Uniform Crime Reports
395 e.g., EPA, NASA, NOAA etc.
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private companies, policymakers, and journalists alike. 
These longstanding resources will continue, but are being tested due to 
political and functional limitations. Private firm data obtained through individual 
data sharing agreements are superseding traditional and publicly available 
economic data in new economics research because of the increased granularity 
and scope available from these private data as opposed to public systems.396 
Fluctuations in investments for these resources question some data source 
continuity and restrict efforts to make these data more accessible and 
interoperable.397 The 2020 Census is under scrutiny due to concerns over adding 
a citizenship question that may decrease response rates and thus impact data 
quality.398 The US Census, around since 1790,399 has had lost years in the past 
396 Einav, Liran, and Jonathan Levin. "Economics in the Age of Big Data." Science, 2014.
397 See for instance:
Gunter, Chase. "How Government Data Is at Risk." FCW The Business of Federal Technology  (2018). 
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/02/27/open-data-policy-gunter.aspx.
"Global Report." 2017, https://opendatabarometer.org/4thedition/report/.
398 Sometimes changes are also made to federal data that impact the ability to parse questions. 
Federal data is not without risk to changes that impact researchers. For instance, the 2000 Census was 
the last one to contain the longform sample that collected additional socioeconomic information. Between 
2005-2009 the first series of the American Community Survey was released after years of testing to 
provide a shorter time horizon on socio-economic data about neighborhoods and is conducted on a rolling 
basis. This change coincided with an economic recession, and complicated analyses on changing 
neighborhoods and gentrification during this time. Even though there were ways to account for these 
changes, one researcher remarked in a talk that having Craigslist data would have given better data about 
changes in rent prices in the Bay Area, and alleviated problems associated with this change during a key 
economic shift in the US. As public government data infrastructures face pressures and political forces, 
privately collected datasets offer and opportunity to supplement these official records—such as the 
theoretical access to Craigslist data over time. These social and technological changes present important 
questions about the role private data plays as they become a part of new public services (e.g., new 
messaging systems, transportation) and their underlying data is not part of the public access 
infrastructure. 
Florida, Richard. "The Gentrification Puzzle." 2013. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/11/why-
some-places-gentrify-more-others/7588/.
Bousquet, Chris. "Where Is Gentrification Happening in Your City?" Data-Smart City Solutions, 
2017. https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/where-is-gentrification-happening-in-your-
city-1055.
Spielman, Seth E., and Alex Singleton. "Studying Neighborhoods Using Uncertain Data from the 
American Community Survey: A Contextual Approach." Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 105, no. 5 (2015). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/00045608.2015.1052335.
399 See for instance: 
Hansen, Mark. "To Reduce Privacy Risks, the Census Plans to Report Less Accurate Data." The New 
York Times, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/upshot/to-reduce-privacy-risks-the-census-
plans-to-report-less-accurate-data.html.
Wang, Lo Hansi. "Rhode Island Gets a Sneak Peek at New Census Questions." Morning Edition 
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due to collection issues and accidental destruction of records,400 and other 
countries like Canada have had similar challenges when the 2011 census was 
deemed virtually useless after completion was made voluntary and response rates 
dropped significantly401.
Other social changes pressure the traditional data collection systems by 
directing previous public or publicly-mediated services wholly to the private 
sector. Online communication on private (let alone encrypted) apps like 
WhatsApp are mediated by private companies instead of mail routes or 
telecommunications infrastructure.402 Infrastructure like public transportation is 
being augmented by platform enabled gig-based economy in the case of Uber and 
Lyft, which in turn collect valuable data on traffic and commute patterns—not to 
mention employment patterns. Recently New York City has established 
requirements to share these data with the city in order to operate.403 In another 
case, a non-governmental organization (NGO) used Zillow data to project the 
impact of rising sea levels on real estate.404 
Similarly, there are many cases where private sector or crowdsourced data 
collection (sometimes through the use of private sector devices) are augmenting 
existing systems and increasing data and data granularity. Recent air quality 
issues from existing pollution and episodic crises have increased the use of a 
crowdsourced network of private air quality sensors developed by the company 
Purple Air.405 Even though the EPA has air quality sensors deployed, there was a 
400 "Why Can't I Find 1890 Census Records?" Genealogy FAQs, 2019, https://www.census.gov/
history/www/faqs/genealogy_faqs/why_cant_i_find_1890_census_records.html.
"1820 Overview." 2019, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/
1820.html.
401 Marshall, Aarian. "The Tragedy of Canada's Census." Citylab, 2015. https://www.citylab.com/
equity/2015/02/the-tragedy-of-canadas-census/385846/.
402 See for instance, the data collected by the US Postal Service or retired FCC information systems to 
track usage. Then compare to the challenges researchers and humanitarian organizations face in 
understanding crises as they unfold using private apps like WhatsApp where usage and histories are 
invisible. 
"Wcb Archived Data and Statistical Reports." nd, accessed April, 2019, https://www.fcc.gov/oea-
archived-data-and-statistical-reports.
"Postal Facts: A Decade of Facts & Figures." 2018, accessed April, 2019, https://facts.usps.com/table-
facts/.
Bohn, Lauren. "Syrian History Is Unfolding on Whatsapp." Backchannel, 2017. https://
www.wired.com/2017/02/syrian-history-is-unfolding-on-whatsapp/.
403 Marshall, Aarian. "Nyc Now Knows More Than Ever About Your Uber and Lyft Trips." Wired, 
2019. https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-uber-lyft-ride-hail-data/.
404 Allen, Greg. "Zillow Data Used to Project Impact of Sea Level Rise on Real Estate." NPR, 2018. 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/620939197/zillow-data-used-to-project-impact-of-sea-level-rise-on-
real-estate.
405 Cowan, Jill. "California Today: Silicon Valley’s Hot Holiday Gift." The New York Times, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/us/california-today-air-pollution-monitors.html.
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need for more granular data in neighborhoods far from a sensor station, and 
during recent wildfires the EPA website crashed making it difficult for citizens to 
assess the safety of their air. Whether for lack of investment, maintenance, or just 
a continued limitation of resources, the private sector augmentation offered an 
easy and somewhat affordable solution to citizens. Even though the EPA data 
may be available later to researchers, even more granular data—including 
information potentially about users who wanted better air quality data—remains 
in control of a private company and under unclear access to researchers or even 
policymakers.
There will always be reasons why government data is reliable and vital to the 
research ecosystem. Federal data are—in most cases except for some of the 
examples described above—assured to continue, enabling long-term and 
consistent study of a topic over time. Access to the data are also kept consistent, 
and changes would be likely to occur only if special access had already been 
granted to sensitive data or was already difficult to access (e.g., only data 
available through public record requests). Federal data also pays particular 
attention to equal representation in the data throughout the population, and 
spends resources to fill in gaps to ensure that the data take into account rural, 
homeless, and high non-response populations. These considerations are often not 
present in private sector data because these information systems were not 
explicitly designed for research, record keeping, or policymaking uses. 
Private data may be able to expand the reach and breadth of public 
infrastructure in an evolving, digitally-mediated society and with the proper 
considerations and new infrastructure help bridge to public interest applications, 
like research. In 2018, France announced plans to explore policies that require 
private sector sharing of data for use by governments, and ideally others,406 in 
order to capitalize on the public benefit of privately-owned data. There are 
similar proposals in the UK, and cities like New York City are working on 
mandating data sharing in particular sectors like ride sharing.407
406 Villani, Cedric. For a Meaningful Artificial Intelligence: Towards a French and European Strategy. 
AI For Humanity (2018). https://www.aiforhumanity.fr/pdfs/MissionVillani_Report_ENG-VF.pdf.
Wallace, Nick. "Countries Can Learn from France’s Plan for Public Interest Data and Ai." Center for 
Data Innovation, 2018. https://www.datainnovation.org/2018/08/countries-can-learn-from-frances-
plan-for-public-interest-data-and-ai/.
407 Marshall, Aarian. "Nyc Now Knows More Than Ever About Your Uber and Lyft Trips." Wired, 
2019. https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-uber-lyft-ride-hail-data/.
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Appendix B: 
Methodological Reflection: Secrecy practices 
impact on this research
In pursuing my research and recruiting interviewees, I received many non-
responses, some would agree to chat with me then suddenly change their minds, 
and almost all wanted to be anonymous. Encountering individuals who are 
uninterested in your research or unwilling to participate is not exceptional, but 
the patterns and frequency of these non-responses—coupled with numerous off 
the record or anonymous interviews with individualized boundaries—presented 
an insightful alternative view by examining contemporary tech culture’s opaque 
access. The barriers to achieving on the record conversations, skittishness around 
particular subjects, and secrecy lore propagated throughout this research 
provided an unplanned opportunity for reflections. The evolution of legal 
mechanisms within tech companies (like NDAs), information based innovation 
strategies, and uncertainty around intellectual property protections emerged as 
key external (and sometimes internal) forces impacting the flow of knowledge 
and data/information exchanges studied within this dissertation. 
Foundations of this reflection: “Why isn’t this experience part of 
your study?”
In the fall of 2017, I was increasingly discouraged about my dissertation data 
gathering. At the 2017 Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) conference, I 
was talking out my early findings and the parts I was struggling with—namely 
that many people ignored my emails or had very strange response patterns. A 
senior faculty member, after sympathizing, made a constructive and now 
embarrassingly obvious suggestion: examine the lack of access and interview 
struggle as part of the story, and use this as an opportunity to understand the 
internal and external factors influencing the underlying foundation of my 
research questions. 
With that moment of clarity, along with several key informants, this reflection 
took shape to use access (or lack thereof) as a way to uncover key trends that 
impact the private sector driven research and information sharing ecosystem. My 
experiences and interviews, which had to operate within the system of study, 
became a tool for probing the cultural and legal forces that shaped internal 
research and information sharing activities. The pattern and consistency of this 
challenge in finding individuals willing to talk to me—a barrier anecdotally unmet 
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by colleagues conducting similar style research on different topics and in a 
previous study seeking high ranking cybersecurity experts in the private sector408
—hinted that this might indicate it’s a larger social symptom resulting from legal, 
cultural, and a myriad of other mixed pressures. Also of note, AnnaLee 
Saxenian’s book “Regional Advantage” published in 1994 includes a list of 
interviewees by name with their affiliation at the end.409 Even in my wildest 
research design dreams, this level of transparency and attribution would not 
occur today on any subject of occupational substance. Additionally, a gray zone of 
off the record, background, and anonymous conversations informed this 
research.
Non-response patterns
There are two primary reasons many of my emails to startups went 
unanswered. It is likely many startup companies’ general contact email account 
goes unanswered, or that the website remained as vestiges of a startup that had 
since disbanded. The general contact email inference was corroborated by other 
startups who participated in interviews and guessed that in many cases the 
‘info@<company name>.com’ email found on the majority of startup webpages 
was unassigned and/or blatantly ignored. In the case of disbanded startups, it’s 
common for founders of very small startups to leave up the website until the 
expiration of the domain name—even after funding has dried up and the team 
has gone on to other employment. Without a press release, it is hard to 
distinguish these non-active startups when going through an incubator’s recent 
members. 
For individual contact emails that remained unanswered, contact information 
was almost always obtained through in person networking at topically related 
events or via introductions by another interviewee. In these cases, a non-
response could be from several different reasons including: 
1) The individual was too busy to respond and forgot; 
2) Did not think responding was worth their time, or felt uncertain about their 
desire or freedom to talk to me; 
3) Interviewees felt unqualified to talk to me or felt they did not have anything 
valuable to contribute to my research. This was a common response challenge in 
408 This is the study referenced below provided insight and lessons in the structure of this study. 
Compared to the security industry where people are just as busy, but much more willing to chat. Some of 
that is just the security industry is primed for communication and sharing; donating to the public good. 
Whereas that is not the case with research oddly enough.
Sedenberg, Elaine, and James X. Dempsey. "Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Governance 
Structures: An Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Trade-Offs." Chap. 1 In Rewired: Cybersecurity 
Governance, edited by Ryan Ellis and Vivek Mohan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
409 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 211.
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my past studies of industry because interviewees assumed their daily working 
knowledge was mundane and uninteresting to others410;
4) My positionality as a female graduate student was not enough to establish 
credibility with a short introduction email or they did not value—or likely 
understand—this type of qualitative research; (See comments in Chapter 3)
5) Given I never received a response to the effect of “I am sorry I am unable or 
unwilling to talk with you” ignoring the email could be either conflict avoiding or 
simply path of least effort. 
Depending upon my connection to the potential interviewee—I was not within 
my ethical parameters as dictated by the Berkeley IRB to follow up with 
individuals I did not know—I would only follow up as I felt was appropriate and 
professional. It is likely that pestering could have increased response rates, but 
that had the potential to burden the interviewee.
Individuals often to agreed411 or offered to talk with me after an email 
introduction or in person meeting where they volunteered their contact 
information. However, some of these contacts never responded to my follow up 
emails. It is impossible to ascertain whether this was related to perfunctory 
reasons described above, a realization that they were—or could be—limited in 
their ability to grant an interview which made them uncomfortable to participate, 
or new restrictions invisible to the public like a pending acquisition or media ban 
within the company. This specific agreement and following non response 
happened to me nine times.
There were several (three) people who agreed to be interviewed, and would 
send dates/times they were free to talk and then suddenly stop responding or not 
call at the time. Follow up emails then went unanswered. The pattern of cat and 
mouse was bizarre, and appeared to be the research equivalent of “ghosting412.” 
In one case, for instance, someone agreed in person to be interviewed and gave 
me their email. I followed up shortly thereafter, and received no response. A 
month later I replied again, also received no response. Then, almost 6 months 
later, the person reached out saying they were sorry they got behind on emails 
and had time to talk on Friday (two days later). I replied within hours, saying any 
time on Friday would work and provided additional information. I never received 
another response from this individual (even after one last good faith follow up a 
410 This was often stated in a previously reference study on cybersecurity practitioners. 
Sedenberg, Elaine, and James X. Dempsey. "Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Governance 
Structures: An Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Trade-Offs." Chap. 1 In Rewired: Cybersecurity 
Governance, edited by Ryan Ellis and Vivek Mohan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
411 There were many individuals who declined to be interviewed and are not included in this count.
412 “Ghosting” loosely means instead of breaking up with someone and expressing any disinterest or 
desire to pursue other interests, someone simply stops responding to all texts/calls and disappears off the 
planet with no explanation or goodbye. Fittingly, this was a common phenomena in the social world of the 
Bay Area during the time of this dissertation research.
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few weeks later). This either points to the banal and obvious possibility that this 
person was disorganized and busy even though they were able (and in theory 
willing) to talk with me, or that there was some fear/avoidance/uncertainty/
disinterest that led to a second silence—because after all, if they truly did not 
care, why reply at all with a willingness to chat? Could a single 6 month belated 
reply be enough to allay any guilt for ignoring a PhD student researcher?
This type of email courting and scheduling fanfare was frequent on my part. In 
another case, a potential interviewee finally replied after months of no response 
and two introductions, apologized and asked me to follow up at the end of the 
month when they were back from vacation. When I did as instructed they never 
replied again. While there are other examples mirroring almost exactly this case, 
a mutual colleague speculated based on personal knowledge that this person “felt 
badly because [s/he] would not be able to actually tell me anything on the record” 
and that it was out of character for this individual to act in this manner—
especially to a student. This context about our puzzling interaction provided more 
evidence that these response patterns may have meant more than my emails were 
easy to ignore. 
At a fundamental level—and pushing back on any urge to read more into this 
pattern than necessary—it signals a closed and inaccessible culture. Considering 
most of the tech industry prides itself on open concept office designs, outwardly 
performed transparency, and in many cases (particularly within sensing 
technologies) builds an industry off of other people sharing private data, this 
contradiction invites questions. 
Meta Interviews about Reticence and Anonymity 
It takes a unique individual to hold a researcher or their topic in suspicion, yet 
be willing to talk to them with a pseudo-on the record, and pseudo-off the 
record413 agreement. Against their safer judgement and assuming some level of 
personal risk—even if only perceived risk, because once again this study was 
designed to avoid any sensitive content—several interviewees gave me a rare 
glimpse into the decision making and risk assessment models of potential 
interviewees, and snapshots into a culture shrouded by secrecy. Once this 
patterned emerged, those interviewed who were uncomfortable with my normal 
attribution and transcription process were switched into a separate category of 
interview. This new interview took an opportunity to examine the interviewees 
perceptions and hesitancy to talk with a researcher, instead of focusing 
exclusively on their company (which they were already uncomfortable doing) or 
413 My process for protecting interviewees and deciding level of anonymity are detailed at length in 
Chapter 3. 
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their exact professional activities. Giving these interviewees an opportunity to 
reflect on their position within this private sector research and data sharing 
ecosystem helped to probe at the boundaries of these activities, as well as uncover 
separately the tangible artifacts (e.g., contracts and press leakage meetings) not 
to mention the invisible (e.g., uncertainty, fear, peer pressure) forces at play. 
 Often these rare individuals who had agreed to chat, despite strong 
hesitations and interview constraints, had been PhDs themselves. They 
frequently admitted they would chat with me, in spite of their reservations, out of 
pity—or perhaps just a sympathy that is only possible from someone who has 
walked through the fire for a PhD themselves. Usually this also meant these 
individuals were socialized and receptive to academic research, even if social 
science methods and policy orientation were outside of their training and 
previous exposure. 
The reasons individuals did not want to talk to me—on the record or only with 
special and customized anonymity—included the following non-mutually 
exclusive reasons:
• Personal experience with someone who was reprimanded for speaking 
outside of the company
• Opaque and un-parsable NDAs (particularly to non-lawyers)
• Dusty NDAs that had been locked away and are inaccessible for reference 
by the employees414
• Cultures where leakers are publicly reprimanded and/or fired
• Lack of approval process to discuss any material outside of the company
• Lack of clarity on what is sensitive and what is not about their jobs (and 
consequential casting that everything and every job is sensitive) 
• Lack of management hierarchy to ask permission or clarify 
• Confusion between the role of researcher and a journalist 
• General and unspecific anxiety, nervousness, and spooked attitude about 
discussing their professional jobs
These categories distill down to shared concepts that map onto trends echoed 
by attributed interviews and firms. These include themes of cultures of secrecy, 
opaque (or at least intimidating) legal controls, contexts from the past or 
personal exposure to leakers and corporate retaliation, or an unclear processes 
for approval or sharing. Each of these are discussed in more detail in the next 
section, and corroborated by other interviews, public documentation, and my 
own personal experiences in Bay Area tech companies. 
Each of these anonymous interviewees crafted their own privacy protection 
414 Note this may be because the employee did not keep a copy for themselves, or know where they 
saved it, but it points to a larger problem where signed forms are not always readily accessible to parties 
other than the firm.
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mechanisms, which was a point I was happy—and by design choice ethically 
obligated—to negotiate. In some cases, anonymity of the individual and the firm 
was an acceptable level and I was still allowed to record the interview for 
transcription. Usually in these cases we were careful to only use terminology like 
“your company” in the recording, and then spoke relatively freely about process 
and practices. Others wanted any mention of their name in my notes to be 
deleted, and in one case the interviewee insisted I transcribe the interview myself 
because no transcription company or machine learning transcription service 
could be trusted with even the sound of this individual’s voice. Had we been 
discussing sensitive material, this level of caution would not be remarkable. Once 
again, the material discussed without any company name or product specifics. 
Yet, the interviewee felt the need to establish privacy protections that could have 
only been made better with voice distortion and a VPN encrypted communication 
line. Even more bizarrely, this interview was done while the interviewee was still 
at work while located in a vacant conference room. This may be contrasted with 
others who were willing to chat on the record, but preferred to leave the premise 
of their company for legal reasons. During interviews, some interviewees were 
happy to discuss their experiences at past companies, but requested before we 
began the interview (or recording) that we make no mention of their current 
company or current role. 
Sometimes interviewees would speak freely on background material about 
particular events that had happened to shape internal policies around research or 
data sharing. These interviews would help inform my thinking and approach to 
this research, but made documenting my knowledge difficult. In one interview, I 
was not allowed to use names but I asked to take notes for my own use. After 
probably scribbling too quickly—a habit formed after years as a research assistant 
and during graduate level coursework—I was making the interviewee 
uncomfortable and they asked me to stop. 
At times, it felt like gossip grounded in facts but altered by imperfect 
memories and incomplete firsthand knowledge. These conversations about 
corporate cultures and practices were littered with colorful antagonists and 
wounded, nerdy protagonists. The tales felt both pedestrian and epic underdog 
tales at the struggle and eventual defeat at the helm of massive tech 
bureaucracies. At first I thought these stories were rare, but then I realized how 
important these sophisticated gossip chains were to shaping technology 
corporate culture as actors moved between companies—taking lessons from bad 
experiences and letting them shape the next company. The hesitancy to talk 
continued to plague individuals even after leaving previous companies given how 
small and incestuous talent pools can be at high levels. These publicly toxic 
narratives were embarrassing, legally risky, reputation damaging, and simply 
messy at their worst. Despite the fact these tales would heavily caveat publicly 
known versions or supplement much needed detail, they were instead shrouded 
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in these hushed tones. Despite the fail fast and fail often open mantras of the tech 
industry, these epic failures reaped limited lessons to those outside of the internal 
corporate shockwaves. I consider this a shame, because many of these tales could 
have been dissertation studies on their own.
In all of my interviews, establishing trust and credibility quickly was a 
persistent challenge for me. Beyond an email introduction, I had only minutes to 
introduce myself and not only earn the trust of a stranger but establish myself as 
a knowledgeable expert. This additionally made it difficult since negotiations 
about attribution were done in the beginning, but at times were left open to 
negotiation afterwards. It was not uncommon for interviewees to build a 
professional relationship with me, and send me items of interest or updates after 
our initial interview was complete—even when they were initially approached 
with hesitancy and anonymity. 
The Startup Exception
Gaining initial access to the big firms (or even well-known mid-sized firms) 
was straight forward because their employees were often well connected, visible, 
friendly, and eager to engage the academic community—particularly at schools 
like Berkeley. Getting on the record access, however, was near impossible. 
The majority of the firms used in this dissertation by name are startups, who 
not only agreed to name the company but also often the interviewee themselves—
someone who often was in a leadership position within the company, thus 
enabling them to confidently know what they can and cannot say publicly. At 
startups, the chain of command is straightforward, accessible, or simply 
nonexistent given the small size. In cases where I did not speak to the founder or 
otherwise top manager, the individual almost always had asked permission from 
the founder in order to do the interview. 
The value proposition for startups was also more favorable to agreeing to take 
an interview. Even though startup employees are often overworked and 
individuals each take on many roles within the firm to get things off the ground, 
the prospect of getting free publicity—preferably positive but any press at all—
could be helpful to expand the reach of the company. Interviews also provided an 
opportunity for reflection, and even if this was not apparent at the start of the 
interview it was common for interviewees to comment on how they appreciated 
the ability to reflect on these nuanced points, specifically industry R&D and 
academic partnership strategies, since they are often not intentional decisions 
but driven by subconscious forces set in motion by the desire to gain an intended 
result. At a larger firm with excess resources and existing user bases as well as 
public reputations to foster, there is often a more intentional discussion of how to 
allocate funding. These programs may consider longer termed impact for the 
company—and most generously within the public interest, as well as less virtuous 
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ambitions such as attracting and securing talent or using these initiatives to drum 
up positive public relations. Yet startups are trying only to stay alive, keep 
fundraising, and in the time period of this dissertation usually angling to be 
acquired by a large firm. 
Startups I spoke with were actively learning about how to succeed in the 
current tech marketplace, and were very receptive to wanting to learn from my 
research experience or other companies contained within my dissertation. This 
openness to rethinking their own strategy and my ability to offer relevant 
research to their business and innovation models helped further align our 
incentives to chat.
Startups are unencumbered from an in house legal team and public relations 
department, who have become accidental arbiters of research findings and 
general knowledge sharing in larger firms. Startups often only contract out with 
law firms—who often specialize in the needs of technology startups—for as 
needed tasks like writing a privacy policy or financial agreements involved with 
negotiating stake in companies. Without in-house access and when every 
consultation costs a high price, startups are forced to use common sense and 
their own mental models for risk assessment. In the absence of the endless 
number of people who need to approve a conversation, there was room to openly 
discuss and reflect on practices and strategies.
However, startups were not immune from concerns about secrecy and 
imagining their own threat models in order to maintain a competitive edge while 
balancing their need for press, financing, and partnerships. For instance, at an 
artificial intelligence event, I was talking to vendors about their products and 
practices, and I met a CEO who was primarily there to hire new talent but also 
promote the company. As soon as I began asking questions about the product, he 
clammed up and refused to say anything other than the slogans on the actual box. 
At the time, I was befuddled by the mixed signals and sudden unwillingness to 
talk about a product he was there to demo, but finished my dissertation pitch and 
gave him my card. At the next event break he chased me down to apologize for his 
cagey behavior and explained competitors and engineers from competing 
companies and large firms who were looking to expand their in house technology 
were also at the table around me asking suspicious questions, and he didn’t want 
to give too much away. He graciously offered to sit down with me the next day, 
and in the interview part of our exchange at the event was discussed: 
Interviewee: “There's a lot and people who are really strange about privacy and 
people are strange about privacy around their data and their company, right at 
that event, I didn't talk to you at first because I didn't know-”
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Elaine:   “I just though you didn't like me but it's fine.”
Interviewee:   “But actually and then was a woman shortly after you, she was 
really convinced I didn't like her and she was actually kind of insulted and I said 
why won't you talk to me and just tell me what's in this and what are selling and 
what's in this box and like no, go away, we're not talking. And later at the happy 
hour she came back up to me and we were talking and she's like I saw your panel, 
I know what you do and you're not a competitor, don't worry what's up and I was 
like I don't know. She's like I just thought you were so rude and was it something 
about the way I was dressed or what was going on? I was like why would that be 
your assumption? That's funny.”
This particular exchange helps to illustrate a general anxiety over interactions 
with outsiders, and the lack of a specific threat model other than not to reveal too 
much information. The pressures on startups, stem more about fears of getting 
poached early on for ideas that cannot be patented, or inventions that have not 
yet been patented because of cost. Despite these pressures, many startups were 
willing to not only participate in this study, but be more open in general about 
their practices. This general anxiety manifests in odd ways, such as shutting 
down outsiders at an open information fair when they ask basic information 
about the company. Yet when the individual reconsiders the interaction, the 
reverse course in this case was enough to motivate them to privately track down 
individuals to pursue the conversation separately. There is a competing 
imperative—to be both open for publicity and outreach yet protective—that 
makes these interactions complicated. 
Secrecy impacted and shaped not only my dissertation study, but also impacts 
and influences the subject of my study directly—making it a finding in and of 
itself. The system of research and data sharing under examination plays under 
the same rules and forces that collided with my research study, and offered a 
unique opportunity to press on the boundaries and constraints as methods of 
investigation, rather than just of necessity.
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Appendix C:
From Skunkworks to stealth mode: R&D and 
product development in the Shadows
Skunkworks—or more specifically a skunkworks project—is known as a small 
cluster of individuals who are working together on a clandestine R&D project, 
usually united around a very specific mission to complete an articulated goal.415 
By design, these groups are insulated from the mundane intricacies of large 
bureaucracies, which can be viewed as impediments to the creativity needed for 
the “radical innovation” required in order to reach the goal. Skunkworks got its 
name during WWII at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (later Lockheed Martin) 
when a group of engineers was formed in a hand-selected team to work on the 
XP-80 project—a fighter jet that was needed within 150 days. The team 
succeeded, and named itself after the group leader’s favorite cartoon about a 
moonshine operation in the middle of a forest.416 The term “Skunk Works” took 
off not only within Lockheed, but in other companies as well to refer to isolated 
teams working on secret R&D projects. The team at Lockheed continued a streak 
of R&D successes with other now infamous innovations such as the U2 spy plane. 
Skunkworks came to epitomize highly exclusive and agile teams, and signal to 
others that rapid innovation they were not privy to was occurring within their 
firm. Kelly Johnson, the “head skunk,”417 wrote a set of 14 principles that are 
necessary to inform a skunkworks-style R&D project.418 The rules predictably 
reflect the military/national security roots of the endeavor, focusing on 
information security controls and administration of the project funding and 
employee reports.
Skunkworks became a popular moniker in early Silicon Valley and other 
technology-driven industries. In 1988, William J. Spencer (then Vice President of 
the Corporate Research Group of the Xerox Corporation) described how R&D, 
415 I have seen this referred to as Skunkworks or Skunk Works, and it should be noted that now the 
term is trademarked by Lockheed.
"Skunk Works® Legal Notice." accessed February, 2019, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/
who-we-are/business-areas/aeronautics/skunkworks/skunk-works-legal-notice.html.
416 "Skunk Works Origin Story." accessed February, 2019, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/
who-we-are/business-areas/aeronautics/skunkworks/skunk-works-origin-story.html.
417 Garrison, Peter. "Head Skunk." Air & Space  (2010). https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-
flight/head-skunk-5960121/.
418 Johnson, Kelly, "Kelly’s 14 Rules and Practices," https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-
we-are/business-areas/aeronautics/skunkworks/kelly-14-rules.html.
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particularly secretive R&D, contributed to developing new product lines:
“There’s another whole area, and that is in research in new businesses. If you 
look at a place where the pace of innovation is taking us, we’re not so much 
fighting for market share in old businesses as creating entirely new businesses. 
Personal computers didn’t exist a decade ago and today they represent a $30-$40 
billion business. Laser printers came on the market in the late 1970s and onto the 
desk top in the mid 1980s—a multibillion dollar business that didn’t exist even 
five years ago. The area I see important for research to focus on—and quite often 
there isn’t a corresponding part of the cooperation—is in important new 
businesses. That really complicates the process of technology transfer and leads 
to the development, at least in Xerox, of “Skunk works”. We sometimes spare no 
expense to make them look like decrepit, run down labs, but they’ve been fairly 
effective in developing products where we didn’t have an existing product 
organization, for markets that we hadn’t traditionally been in.”419 In reflection, it 
is interesting how openly the skunkworks operation was discussed in this case, 
and also the admitted performativity of making the operation look like a garage-
tinkering operation. 
Based on my research and despite its previous utility within the tech industry, 
Skunkworks was not mentioned by any company or interviewee I spoke with, 
perhaps in part because Skunkworks is now a registered trademark of 
Lockheed420 (evidence of Lockheed going after those who used the term was 
found around 2000).421 An article in the Economist from 2008 states that the 
“skunkworks concept fell into disrepute when it began to be seen as just another 
cost centre—and one with attitude at that”422 which matches the decline of 
isolated (aka non-collaborative) and internal R&D in large firms in the 1970s and 
1980s mentioned in Chapter 4. The Economist claims that in 2008, when the 
article was published, there had been a revival on the structure of teamwork 
environments in corporations and skunkworks style innovation had made a 
rebound. The article cites Motorola’s Razr mobile phone which was set up in a 
facility that aesthetically looked different and was 50 miles away from the main 
R&D facility in Illinois. However the facility was not left alone and isolated for 
scientific innovation, but in constant contact with the marketing/design/
accounting divisions. The article makes the motivations of this bastardized 
revival concept of skunkworks clear: “The idea is not (as it used to be) that those 
419 Spencer, William J. "Some Thoughts on the Internationalization of Research." In Managing R&D 
and Technology: Competition and Collaboration, edited by Evelyn Samore and James K.  Brown, 3: The 
Conference Board, 1988, 15.
420 "Skunk Works® Legal Notice." accessed February, 2019, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-
us/who-we-are/business-areas/aeronautics/skunkworks/skunk-works-legal-notice.html.
421 Carvell, Tim. "Lockheed Raises a Stink over 'Skunkworks' Brought to You by Aspirin, Corn Flakes, 
and the Yellow Pages." Fortune Magazine, 2000. https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/2000/03/06/275258/index.htm.
422 "Skunkworks." The Economist, 2008. https://www.economist.com/news/2008/08/25/
skunkworks.
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in the skunkworks emerge at the end of the day with something that makes their 
competitors say ‘Wow’. The idea is that they come out with something that makes 
their competitors’ customers say ‘Wow’.”423
Skunkworks in a way created environments that were like the small agile 
startup teams, but with the resources and insulation of a large company. The 
original skunkworks operations had a small and clearly defined mission, which is 
something that has been later misinterpreted as the ability to innovate openly 
and on a broad range of products. There are many covert labs within the tech 
industry—Google X, Amazon’s Lab126 and A9, Jony Ive’s design lab at Apple, 
IBM’s Thomas J. Watson Research Center—but many are larger R&D divisions 
not specific project or goal oriented innovation centers.424 For instance, 
skunkworks has been used to refer to Google X, but is more of a permanent 
distinction rather than a special operation.425 
 During the course of this study, many interviewees referred to “stealth mode” 
within the firm, but a key difference is that stealthy mode—a term traditionally 
used to describe a startup in the first phases of development before it has gone 
public with its concept and strategy—involves the entire company rather than one 
central strategic part. This is further evidence to suggest secrecy has bled into all 
aspects of contemporary tech firms, and thus stagnating many conversations and 
knowledge exchanges, not just concentrated R&D efforts. This also signals that by 
tampering down on all discourse, the elite teams that were required to make 
technically daunting missions like the XP-80 less set apart from the rest of the 
organization, thus possibly diluting the impact of such a core group of experts 
immune to any other organizational forces. When all activities within a firm turn 
into innovation and development, the entire company becomes a clandestine 
operation in practice—open office spaces and culture or not.
This strategy shift away from the core tenants of skunkworks style operations 
not only has an impact on the innovation style and approach, but also the ability 
to exchange ideas and effectively control knowledge and information within 
technology firms. 
423 "Skunkworks." The Economist, 2008. https://www.economist.com/news/2008/08/25/
skunkworks.
424 See for example this list from 2013 of corporate laboratories: 
Nisen, Max. "17 of the Most Mysterious Corporate Labs Coolest Skunk Works." Business Insider  
(2013). https://www.businessinsider.com/coolest-skunk-works-2013-2.
425 See, for instance: Stone, Brad and Vance, Ashlee. "Apple's Obsession with Secrecy Grows 
Stronger." The New York Times, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/technology/
23apple.html.
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Appendix D: 
Essential Background on NDAs
NDA Overview
Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are contracts that restrict parties (usually 
employees or individuals involved in a negotiation) from divulging trade secrets 
or sensitive, proprietary, or confidential information learned during employment 
or negotiation discussions. NDAs are also sometimes referred to as 
Confidentiality Agreements. NDAs are different from non-compete agreements 
which prevent employees from leaving a company and going to work for a direct 
competitor. Non-compete agreements are regulated in certain states like 
California—making it easier for employees to refuse to sign. Those states that 
limited non-competes and allowed employees to move fluidly between even 
competing firms enabled new knowledge flows and is credited as one component 
that helped early Silicon Valley succeed as one of the most innovative regions in 
the world.426 The changing role of the NDA in Silicon Valley tech culture will be 
explored below.
Traditionally, there has been friction when NDAs have been used to stymie 
whistle blowers internal to companies—such as former tobacco R&D VP Jeffrey 
Wigand who was hushed briefly out of CBS’s uncertainty on how to handle his 
confidentiality agreement in the early 1990s.427 Now NDAs have evolved as a 
legal mechanism, and are used as silencing legal mechanisms to limit open 
discussion about incidents, press coverage, and now even researchers. NDAs 
were also frequently mentioned in the news during 2017-2018 because of the 
#MeToo movement where sexual assault and harassment victims were forced to 
sign NDAs during settlements to block their communication with journalists or 
the public. NDAs were also prominent legal mechanisms used in the Trump 
administration to try and prevent leaks to the press, as well as to silence former 
paramours like Stormy Daniels.428 Unsurprisingly, the use of NDAs in each of 
426 See for instance key themes and findings from Regional Advantage. 
More information about the California law may be found here: 
Manwani, Archana R. "The Latest and Greatest Updates About Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation 
Agreements in California." The National Law Review  (2018). https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
latest-and-greatest-updates-about-non-compete-and-non-solicitation-agreements.
427 Dean, Michelle. "Contracts of Silence." Columbia Journalism Review  (2018). https://www.cjr.org/
special_report/nda-agreement.php.
428 Goodkind, Nicole. "Stormy Daniels and Donald Trump Non-Disclosure Was Bungled by Texas 
Notary: Report." Newsweek, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/stormy-daniels-notary-texas-trump-
cohen-nda-1122464.
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these cases has been disputed and argued, both on ethical grounds as well as their 
legal standing. 
NDAs may be unilateral (one sided), bilateral (two sided), or multilateral 
(many parties involved).  NDAs during the time of this study were ubiquitous at 
major tech firms in Silicon Valley, serving as omnipresent reminders that 
running afoul of language you may not understand could come with heavy 
consequences. There were three primary categories of occasions where NDAs 
were signed: 1) When employees were hired; 2) By visitors (including 
researchers, journalists, activists, etc.) upon entering a premise for any reason; 3) 
During a negotiation, like a merger or acquisition. In cases 1 and 2, it is almost 
always a unilateral NDA. This dissertation research dealt primarily with the first 
two categories, from the perspective of employees grappling with what could be 
said about their work to my own personal experiences and the experiences of 
other researchers signing NDAs during office and event visits. 
Early Documentation of NDAs and Tech
Despite NDAs prevalence today, this was not a common legal contract in the 
early-mid 20th century. Dean traced their origin back using a search of newspaper 
databases to the 1940s within the context of maritime law.429 NDAs later began to 
pop up at tech firms like IBM, which probably corresponded to the secret Boca 
Raton facilities and policies described previously. Dean traces the use of NDAs to 
other contexts, including its use in the late 1970s during a House Select 
Committee on Assassinations hearings on the Kennedy and King assassinations 
in order to silence reporters for matters of national security.430 Dean describes 
NDAs as a “quirk” of the technology industry, and details the ways in which they 
have impacted journalism and used as silencing mechanisms. She notes, “NDAs 
are enormously controversial, even within the legal community. From one 
vantage—say that of an exceptionally cautious lawyer, or an exceptionally 
frightened employee—keeping silent is thought necessary to avoid hefty financial 
penalties. Another view holds that NDAs are often unenforceable, most clearly if 
the activity meant to be kept secret is illegal, and that even where a court might 
uphold the agreement, a lot of potential plaintiffs don’t want to have to give the 
other side discovery on their bad behavior.”431
Understanding how and when they were used within the technology industry 
is difficult, even when many note the change. Using limited public and historic 
corporate documentation to prove the absence of any process, including the use 
429 Dean, Michelle. "Contracts of Silence." Columbia Journalism Review  (2018). https://www.cjr.org/
special_report/nda-agreement.php.
430 In researching this portion of the dissertation, additional uses of NDAs within national security 
contexts popped up for the next several decades.
431 Dean, Michelle. "Contracts of Silence." Columbia Journalism Review  (2018). https://www.cjr.org/
special_report/nda-agreement.php.
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of NDAs, is an impossible task. This section accepts evidence from the past, in 
order to highlight that the NDA uses of today are exceptional, even when once 
considered a “quick” of the tech industry, and are having impacts far beyond 
protecting confidential information.
NDAs were used early on for some employees leaving firms. Saxenian 
described the use but limited control over general knowledge flows within Silicon 
Valley technology culture. “This decentralized and fluid environment accelerated 
the diffusion of technological capabilities and know-how within the region. 
Departing employees were typically required to sign nondisclosure statement that 
prevented them from revealing company secrets; however, much of the useful 
knowledge in the industry grew out of the experience of developing technology. 
When engineers moved between companies, they took with them the knowledge, 
skills, and experience acquired at their previous jobs. This localized accumulation 
of technical knowledge enhanced the viability of Silicon Valley startups and 
reinforced a shared technical culture.” 432NDAs were also beginning to be used 
during negotiations, but with limited power as Saxenian further documents.433 
“While nondisclosure agreements and contracts were normally signed in these 
alliances, few believed that they really mattered, especially in an environment of 
high employee turnover like that in Silicon Valley. Firms recognized they had a 
mutual interest in one another’s success, and that their relationships generally 
defied legal enforcement.” Saxenian goes on to quote a manager at Apple who 
comments that they do not always need a formal contract in most negotiations. 
Another industry consultant quoted by Saxenian stated: “Company lawyers are 
trained to write 90 paragraphs to protect their client, but in the end, the 
relationship is based on mutual trust. If you don’t have that mutual trust, then 
you probably shouldn’t have the marriage in the first place.”434
The emphasis on trust, not legal contracts, was reflected by other 
stakeholders. John Seely-Brown wrote in 2000435 that “knowledge may travel 
more easily around a network of practice that lies across several different firms 
than between two different communities of practice in the same firm” because of 
the mobility of labor. He added that startups, who have less turn over and less 
outward knowledge flows in either direction, tended to build a “rich and shared 
context for trust” by working closely on a singular goal. Seely-Brown continues 
that “The same is true for specialty shops and boutique consulting firms, firms 
whose reputations in the Valley can replace the need for detailed legal contracts 
432 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 37.
433 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 149.
434 Saxenian, AnnaLee. Regional Advantage : Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 149.
435 Kenney, Martin. Understanding Silicon Valley : The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region. 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), xv.
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and whose reputations, earned through performance with many different 
customers, makes them easy to trust at a technical level.” 
One article from 1988 discusses Steve Job’s venture Next Inc. after his first 
departure from Apple, and quotes Peter Lyman (then faculty member at USC, 
later a faculty member at Berkeley’s I School) who cannot comment on the actual 
machine—only how much he was impressed by it—because he and others signed 
a nondisclosure agreement as part of Next’s advisory board.436  
As outlined in the history section in Chapter 4, corporate innovation in the 
80s and 90s began to take on more supply chain integration and cooperative 
partnerships. In 1992, one article describes “friendly” processes for learning 
about competitors’ practices through “benchmarking.” 
“Benchmarking should not be confused with industrial espionage. Rather, it is 
the art of finding out, in a perfectly legal and aboveboard way, how others do 
something better than you do so you can imitate -- and perhaps improve upon -- 
their techniques. It may or may not involve tearing down a competing product to 
see how it's built. Through research and field trips conducted by small teams, you 
can compare your products and processes with those of competitors -- yes, they 
sometimes cooperate -- or with those of noncompeting companies in your 
industry or enterprises in completely different businesses.”437  The discussion of 
the practice reflects the somewhat open and fluid nature of the tech culture, while 
warning the pitfalls might be in wasting effort where technology might outpace 
the firm. For instance, Xerox spent 6 years benchmarking the handling of toners 
and typewriters in the early 1980s, only to have the personal computer supplant 
and make all the efforts redundant. There is no mention of NDAs on the site visits 
prescribed in the article. 
In 1994 Microsoft was sued in an antitrust case for the use of particular 
licensing practices and the use of “restrictive” NDAs which restricted any 
software company that had had a preview of an upcoming product from dealing 
with any other operating systems for three years.438 This practice was banned by 
a consent decree. The recommendation of using NDAs during business 
negotiations was still being circulated in 1994 as a novel best practice.439
436 O'Reilly, Brian. "Steve Jobs Tries to Do It Again." Fortune May 23, 1988 (1988): P 83-84.
437 Main, Jeremy, and Rahul Jacob. "How to Steal the Best Ideas Around." Fortune, 1992.
438 Post, Tom. "Bill Gates's Soft Landing." Newsweek 124, no. 4 (1994): 40.
439 Fraser, Jill Andresky. "Keeping Your Numbers Secret." 16, no. 2 (1994).
